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INTRODUCTION*
Private property lay at the heart of the nation that was created
*
The authors of the present study would like to express their appreciation to Professor
James F. Blumstein, Associate Professor of Law, and James W. Ely, Jr., Assistant Professor
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in America in 1788. The American Revolution had been dedicated
in no small part to the propositions that liberty and property were
virtually indistinguishable and that the proper object of government
was to protect both.' Indeed liberty and property were conceived to
be almost identical, for the fullest expression of a man's liberty
could only come through the free enjoyment of his own possessions.
In what may have been the single most influential treatise in American law, Sir William Blackstone observed that "so great moreover
is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize
the least violation of it; no not even for the general good of the whole
community." '2 The original draft of the Declaration of Independence
had recognized the unusual importance attached to private possessions by declaring that among the certain inalienable rights bestowed upon all men by their creator were "life, liberty and
property. ' 3 The federal constitution further recognized the significance of private property by providing that neither the federal nor
later the state governments could arbitrarily deprive citizens of
of Law, at the Vanderbilt School of Law for their generous and patient help during the
research and writing that led to this article. Any errors in the text, however, are of course
those of the authors alone.
1. As James Madison later observed in The Federalist, "Government is instituted no
less for protection of the property, than of the persons of individuals. The one as well as the
other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government." THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 370 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
The importance the leaders of the American Revolution attached to the institution of
private property was characteristic of political and legal philosophies current in 18th century
England and its American colonies. John Locke exercised a particularly important influence
on 18th century views of the function of government, and Locke left no doubt that "The
reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property." Indeed as Locke
progressed in the development of his political philosophy he declaimed that "government has
no other end but the preservation of property," an observation that became an axiom of 18th
century political theory and was endorsed by such prominent legal authorities as Sir William
Blackstone and Lord Camden. J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 80, 95 n.2
(2d ed. 1973). For discussions of the philosophic importance of private property in 18th
century America see R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 11, 13, 16, 31 (1957);

C.

RoSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 61, 67-69 (1966); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 404, 410, 411 (1969). For a modern view of the function of private property

that is strikingly similar to that of the 18th century philosophy of property see Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1965).

2. W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW

74 (B. Gavit ed. 1941). Blackstone fur-

ther observed that:
The law will not authorize a violation of the right of property, even for the public good.
Thus a new road through private grounds may be beneficial to the community, but it
cannot be laid out without the consent of the owner of the land. In vain, may it be urged,
that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community, for it would be
dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be judge of this
common good, and to decide on its expediency. Besides the public good is interested in
the protection of every individual's private rights, as modelled by the municipal law.
3. Thomas Jefferson later revised the phrase into the more felicitious and more familiar
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Pennsylvania's constitution of 1776, however,
proclaimed that "every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of
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their property but instead must accord each owner the full due
process of law.' Although the federal constitution implicitly recognized the power of the state to take private land through the inherent sovereign power of eminent domain, it sought to limit the exercise of eminent domain by requiring that land so taken must be put
to some public use and that the landowner must be paid a just
compensation for his loss. '
Yet from the first years of the new republic, the sanctity of
private property appears to have been at least as honored by its
breach as by its observation. The governments of the newly formed
states were not restricted by the requirements of the federal consitution and were often eager to exercise their sovereign power to enforce
the conveyance of land from one private land owner to another.'
Although Blackstone and other influential jurists observed that the
power of eminent domain should be exercised by the legislature only
upon some showing of a public necessity for the taking of the land,
American state legislatures were normally willing to delegate their
condemnation power to private interest groups whose activities were
thought to confer some general benefit upon the state. Throughout
the 19th century the American states regularly delegated the power
of eminent domain to private transportation, manufacturing and
mining companies to allow the companies to directly enforce the
acquisition of land from other private owners. When at length the
United States Supreme Court came to pass upon the states' practice
of permitting enforced conveyances of land from one private citizen
to another, the court concluded that the practice was a matter for
local political discretion to resolve and was not to be obstructed by
federal constitutional standards.7 In the course of the 20th century
the court concluded that when the state itself chose to exercise its
power of eminent domain as an adjunct to its police power, the
life, liberty, and property" and Virginia's Bill of Rights of 1776 avowed that the "means of
acquiring and possessing property" was one of the inherent rights of man that government
was established to protect. SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1764-1788, 149, 164 (2d ed. S. Morison 1965).
4. The fifth amendment provides in part that a person may not be "deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth
amendment provides in part that "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. Nor should "private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The eminent domain clause of the fifth amendment was proposed by
James Madison and ratified by the United States Congress without any apparent debate on
its purpose or significance. H.R. JOUR. 85, 86 (1789); S. JOUR. 69-72 (1789); H.R. JOURN. 115,
116 (1789); 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 378 (G.Hunt ed. 1904).
6. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 74.
7. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Mills v. St. Clari County, 49 U.S. 569 (1850).
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decision to take private land and the choice of persons to develop it
were both political questions that would be accorded the broadest
constitutional deference by the federal judiciary.8 Thus by the middle of the 20th century, Blackstone's observation that the law would
not authorize the least violation of private property even for the
general good of the community had been supplanted by the law's
apparent willingness in a number of circumstances to authorize any
"violation" initiated by the legislature.9 Although the federal constitution continued to require that land acquired by eminent domain
be subject to some public use, the question of what constituted a
public use within the context of the Fifth Amendment had become
a question for the legislature and not the courts to resolve. Similarly, while a deprivation of property could not take place under
either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments without due process of
law, due process in eminent domain cases had come to require primarily that the affected landowner have the opportunity to address
the legislature before it made its decision to proceed. 0
The study which follows attempts to trace, in a necessarily
limited fashion, the evolving use of eminent domain on behalf of
private interest groups throughout the last century and a half of
American legal history. Part One of the study traces the broadening
scope of eminent domain in the United States during the 19th and
20th centuries, focusing on the direct use of eminent domain by
private interest groups as a key element in the increasing breadth
of the power. Part Two delineates the process whereby one modern
private interest group-an informal aggregation of American col8. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
9. "'Regard of the law for private property,' wrote Blackstone, 'is so great. . . that it
will not authorize the least violation of it, not even for the general good of the whole community;' and in the eighteenth century, the elder Pitt declaimed that 'the poorest man in
his cottage could defy the King-storms may enter; the rain may enter-but the King of
England cannot enter.' In sharp contrast, the United States Supreme Court, by upholding
in sweeping terms urban redevelopment legislation, has ruled in effect that the King not only
may enter, but may remain, in the name of the general good, indeed for the very purpose of
keeping the rain out.'" C. HoOR, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE AND
REUSE OF URBAN LAND 1 (1959).
10. Due process in eminent domain proceedings incorporates the fifth amendment requirements of public use and just compensation. In addition it requires notice and an opportunity to be heard by the landowner, either at a judicial or legislative proceeding. 1 NICHOLS
EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 4.10, 4.103 (rqv. 3d ed. 1970 by J. Sackman; 1973 recomp. by P. Rohen)
[hereinafter referred to as NICHOLS]. The right to a hearing on the subject of damages has
been well established and while the right to address the legislature before it resolves upon a
taking is not so clearly established in the context of eminent domain proceedings, it has been
suggested by recent Supreme Court decisions indicating that an individual must be given a
hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest. NICHOLS § 4.103 and cases
cited in n.91.1.
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leges and universities-succeeded in acquiring access to the states'
power of eminent domain through Section 112 of the federal urban
renewal program. Although Section 112 has received surprisingly
little attention from students of the urban renewal program," within
ten years of its inception the statute had been used to generate three
quarters of a billion dollars worth of federal matching money for
participating communities and to acquire thousands of acres of privately owned urban land for university expansion.' 2 Part Three of
the present work seeks to trace the process whereby the city of
Nashville, Tennessee, sought to participate in just such a Section
112 urban renewal project. The case study of Nashville's experience
with Section 112 focuses upon the process by which one community
resolved to commit its power of eminent domain to assist the expansion of a private university 13 and the tensions within the community
produced by that decision. Although Nashville's experience with
Section 112 is by no means necessarily typical of those of the
hundreds of other cities that participated in the program, it would
seem to indicate that in at least one community, the federal urban
renewal process combined with local circumstances to cause those
persons who were affected most directly by the project to have the
least practical influence in the political and administrative decisions that were eventually to lead to the loss of their property.
Moreover, Nashville's experience would seem to suggest that while
the use of eminent domain on behalf of private institutions has been
an integral part of American legal history, a vocal minority of citizens continues to resist the process on philosophic grounds that
recall the attitude of Blackstone and the 18th century legal system
towards private property. In large measure because they believed
that eminent domain should not be exercised on behalf of a private
11. The only book that deals with § 112 at any length is by Julian Levi, the person
principally responsible for drafting the section and for assisting in its passage by Congress in
1959. Levi's book is not a critical evaluation of the program, however, and instead dwells upon
the potential benefits of § 112 in Boston. J. LEVI, MUNICIPAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS
WITHIN BOSTON: THE BENEFITS OF SECTION 112 OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING AcT OF 1961 (1964).
The only legal article on § 112 deals with its implications for the constitutional relationship
between church and state. Harrison, Dispositionof UrbanRenewal Land to SectarianInstitutiors of Higher Learning, 40 NoTE DAME L. 251 (1965).
12. By 1970 § 112 had generated $774 million in federal cash credits out of a total
federal expenditure of $6.367 billion on urban renewal projects as a whole. The amount of
private land taken for the § 112 project was estimated at more than 2,000 acres. Letter from
John K. Johnson, Assistant for Legislature Affairs, HUD to Congressman Richard Fulton,
March 28, 1974.
13. Nashville's original plan also included an expansion area for a private hospital but
the hospital later withdrew from the project, leaving the university as the sole institutional
sponsor.
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university, a small number of persons whose land was to be taken
by the Nashville project continued to resist the plan for seven years
after its implementation had already begun. Their political and
legal struggles were ultimately fruitless, but the time and energy
required to reopen and resolve the issue of the project's validity
represented a considerable cost to the participants in the struggle
as well as to the community as a whole. Nashville's protracted
struggle with its Section 112 urban renewal project would thus seem
to indicate that a considerable social tension continues to exist between a legal system which recognizes the use of eminent domain
on behalf of private institutions and a system of personal values that
continues to place a premium upon the inviolacy of private property. The tension between the two and the social struggle it perhaps
inevitably creates must, in the end, be recognized as one of the
inherent costs of using eminent domain to assist the activities of
particular private institutions.
This study does not attempt to trace all the benefits or effects
flowing from a Section 112 urban renewal project and the use of
eminent domain. The major focus is upon the concerns and social
costs to the community, the residents and the private institutions
involved. To this end, the authors have attempted to present, objectively, the practical results of the program's implementation as well
as the legal results determined by the judicial system.
PART ONE
THE PRIVATE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The characteristic elements of the power of eminent domain
were first fully formulated in the United States in the nineteenth
century, and, in broad outline, those elements have remained substantially unaltered throughout succeeding years. The right of the
sovereign to take land from private owners continues to be regarded
as an inherent power of both the state and federal governments, a
power which is vested directly in the legislature and is normally
exercised by it or through its appointed agent. 4 An attribute of
sovereignty, 5 the eminent domain power exists in the sovereign
14. Murphy v. Uhl, 149 A. 566 (Md. App. 1930); State Highway Comm'n v. City of
Elizabeth, 102 N.J. Eq. 221, 140 A. 335 (Ct. of Chancery 1928). For discussion of the extent
and types of delegations of the power of eminent domain permitted see 1 NICHOLS §§ 3.23 et
seq.
15. E.g., Adirondack Ry. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1900); Muscoda Bridge Co.
v. Worden-Allen Co., 196 Wis. 76, 219 N.W. 428 (1928).
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without any formal constitutional grant of authority.'6 Indeed, the
legislature is thought to possess the power in absolute and unlimited
form unless a positive constitutional limitation is placed upon its
use.' 7 The fifth amendment to the federal constitution places two
such restrictions upon federal condemnations-the landowner must
receive "just compensation" for his loss and the land that is taken
subsequently must be put to some "public use."'" Although the fifth
amendment initially was held not applicable to takings effected by
the several states, state condemnations have been widely held to be
limited by similar restrictions derived from state constititions.'9
Whether the takings are authorized by the federal or state
legislatures, however, the troublesome task of determining whether
the constitutional requirements of just compensation and public
purpose have been fulfilled has long 2°been recognized to be the ultimate responsibility of the judiciary.
While the basic elements of the power of eminent domain are
well-settled, the circumstances in which eminent domain might be
used have varied considerably and have sparked a continuing legal
debate about the legitimate scope of the power. The controversy
originated in the nineteenth century and revolved around the limitations attached by the judiciary to the legislature's use of condemnation. The principle problem lay in determining the difference
between the taking of land for a public use and a taking for a merely
private purpose. 2' While the government unquestionably could take
land from a private owner if it were to be put to some public use, it
was unthinkable for the state to appropriate land from one owner
22
for another private citizen's own use and enjoyment.
The abstract debate about the distinction between the public
16. "Itis, of course, not necessary that the power of condemnation . . . be expressly
given by the Constitution. The right to condemn at all is not so given. It results from the
powers that are given, and it is implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate
in exercising those powers." United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896);
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
17. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
18. The fifth amendment provides "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31 (1847); Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. 162 (N.Y. Ch.
1816); Harding v. Goodlett, 11 Tenn. (3 Yerg.) 40, 24 Am. Dec. 546 (1832); Grant, The
"Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1930-31).
Contra, Raleigh & Gaston R.R. v. Davis, 19 N.C. 451 (1837).
20. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
21. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 BoST.U.L.
REV. 615, 618 (1940) [hereinafter referred to as Nichols, Public Use].
22. Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige 137, 159 (N.Y. Ch. 1835); New York Housing Auth. v.
Muller, 270 N.Y. 33, 1 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1936).
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and the private use of expropriated land had a full measure of practical importance. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a variety of private interest groups were eager to participate in
American economic growth if the legislatures of the individual
states would allow them to use eminent domain in pursuit of their
activities. At varying points in time, transportation companies,
manufacturing corporations, mining industries, and farming interests actively sought the right to use eminent domain.13 Most state
legislatures, responsive to the importance of economic development
and the accompanying needs of private enterprise, were quite willing to delegate their expropriation power to groups that would use
it to advance the economic best interests of the state. 4 As a result
the question whether these companies' activities constituted a public use justifying the exercise of eminent domain became an issue
of no little importance to the growth of many states. Although the
courts reached different results, there was a common judicial reluctance to impede domestic prosperity by an overly firm insistence
upon a narrow construction of public use. Thus as state courts came
to approve legislative devolutions of eminent domain upon private
enterprise, the state courts' notion of public use grew more and more
flexible.? As the state definition of public use became more inclusive, it formed the basis for a federal conception of public use that
seemed, by the middle of the twentieth century, to include virtually
any activity, whether public or private, that contributed to the general welfare of the nation.2"
I.
PRIVATE INTEREST GROUPS AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN: THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

State courts shaped the law of eminent domain in the nineteenth century. Federal courts normally acquiesced in the results.
Since the federal government did not exercise its own eminent domain powers until late in the century and since federal courts did
not review state expropriations until even later, the federal judiciary
23. For a provocative analysis of the relationship between private interest groups and
the power of eminent domain see Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource
Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232 (1973)
[hereinafter referred to as Scheiber, PropertyLaw].
24. For a comprehensive list see 2A NICHOLS § 7.5124-7.672.
25. Nichols, Public Use, supra note 21, at 618-24.
26. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946); Marquis, Constitutionaland Statutory Authority
to Condemn, 43 IOWA L. REv. 170 (1958).
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seldom had occasion to pass upon eminent domain cases.Y The state
courts on the other hand were presented regularly with condemnation questions by local legislatures anxious to exercise their powers.
In determining when the state could take private lands, the state
courts were bound only by the state constitutions, not the federal
bill of rights.- Most state constitutions, however, contained no explicit restrictions on state use of eminent domain. While in theory,
then, the state legislatures possessed an unfettered right to seize
private .property, in practice, the state judiciaries almost uniformly
determined that "natural law" imposed upon the states the same
restrictions contained in the fifth amendment.2 9 The state therefore
could exercise eminent domain powers only upon payment of just
compensation and only if the land were taken for a public use or
public purpose. Yet while the state courts of the early nineteenth
century imposed the familiar requirements of compensation and
public use upon state takings, they did so in a way that permitted
state legislatures to devolve eminent domain upon private enterprises in order to encourage private entrepreneurial expansion.' "
A.

1800-1850

The first half of the nineteenth century was characterized by
an understandable willingness on the part of state courts to defer
to legislative delegations of eminent domain to private corporations.
It was an era of unprecedented economic expansion in a country
with very little surplus capital. As the American nation began to
expand across the continent, individual states sought to establish
swift and certain methods of communication as well as local manufacturing industries. The states, however, lacked a tax base and tax
revenues sufficient to support an expansive program of public devel3' 2
opment." This "nagging consciousness of scarcity of fluid capital,
coupled with the need for internal developments, induced state legislatures to rely upon private corporations to raise capital for projects the states could not finance by themselves. Accordingly, state
legislatures chartered private corporations to build such transporta27. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose
in the State Courts, 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AM. HIST. 329, 360, 376-81 (1971) [hereinafter referred
to as Scheiber, Road to Munn].
28. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833); Scheiber, Road to Munn at 36061.
29. Grant, supra note 19.
30. Scheiber, PropertyLaw at 237-40.
31. Scheiber, Road to Munn at 365.
32. J. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 182 (1964).
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tion facilities as bridges, canals, turnpikes and railways. The privileges granted to these transportation companies varied widely from
state to state but one privilege almost uniformly granted by the
state legislature was the power to condemn land for rights-of-way
and other facilities. 3 Absent such power, the companies would have
been at the mercy of any stubborn landowner who decided to hold
out for a high price. With it the companies were virtually assured
control of desirable routes and could attend to the difficult details
of raising capital investments, implementing the project, and supervising the daily activities of the company.
The devolution of eminent domain upon turnpike, bridge,
canal, and railroad companies occurred in every state during the
1820's and 1830's.3 1The usual pattern was for the legislature to grant
the power to ineividual companies which in turn would exercise it
directly upon private lands if negotiated sales with the owners were
not successful. The private companies, rather than the state, initiated and concluded the condemnation proceedings and the land
taken was used directly by the company in furtherance of its corporate activities. Since the ultimate objective of the company was to
reap profits for its shareholders by assessing a charge on the traveling public for use of company facilities, dispossessed landowners
argued that the land had been taken for the private purpose of
realizing a return on an investment. With striking uniformity the
state courts rejected the landowners' view and upheld the delegation
of eminent domain powers to private companies.35 The courts reasoned that where land had been taken for construction of new modes
of transportation open to the public upon payment of a fee, the
taking was for a public use, even if it did serve to generate private
profits for the company.3 6
33. Scheiber, Road to Munn at 365.
34. 2A NICHOLS §§ 7.672, 7.5124, 7.5131, 7.521; Scheiber, Property Law at 237.
35. By 1831 Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania,
Virginia and the District of Columbia had authorized railroads to exercise eminent domain.
Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige 50, 62 (N.Y. Ch. 1831). Massachusetts upheld the
use of eminent domain by turnpikes in 1834. Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 33 Mass. (16
Pick.) 175 (1834). By the mid-1870's the courts of Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Wisconsin had approved commercial
milldam acts. Hazen v. Essex, Co., 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 475 (1853); Ryerson v. Brown, 35
Mich. 333, cases cited at 336-37 (1877); Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694
(1832); Newcomb v. Smith, 2 Pin. 131 (Wis. 1849).
36. Chancellor Kent concluded that "Turnpike roads are, in point of fact, the most
public roads or highways that are known to exist, and in point of law, they are made entirely
for public use, and the community has a deep interest in their construction and preservation."
(emphasis added) Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 735, 742 (N.Y. Ct. of Err. 1823). See Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R.R., 3 F. Cas. 821, 829 (Case No. 1, 617) (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (nonbinding decision).
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The verbal formulae used by the courts to differentiate between
a legitimate public use and an unconstitutional private purpose
varied widely from state to state. One court suggested that the
legislature was vested with broad discretion in determining what
constituted a public use and was free to employ or to delegate its
power of eminent domain "not only where the safety, but also where
the interest or even the expediency of the state is concerned."3 At
the other extreme were some judges who insisted that the eminent
domain power should be used only where necessary, not merely
when expedient. 38 The dominant view, however, seemed to be that
a corporate taking might be regarded in law as for a public use if
the project for which the land was taken would merely benefit the
public in some manner.3 9 Under this broad approach public use
meant public benefit, and where the taking was for a new toll road
or canal or bridge or railroad, the benefit to the public in a state with
inadequate transportation facilities was apparent. Yet whatever the
ostensible judicial formula for determining a permissible public use,
the only cases in which state courts actually refused to uphold legislation delegating eminent domain powers to private transportation
companies were a handful of situations involving strictly private
access roads. 0
In addition to devolving eminent domain upon transportation
corporations, a number of states delegated the power to private
manufacturing companies seeking to acquire river sites for power
mills producing textiles and other goods.41 In one case involving the
delegation of condemnation powers by the New Jersey legislature to
a private company seeking to develop seventy power mill sites on a
six mile stretch of the Delaware River, the displaced owners
attacked the legislation as "the first attempt, in this state, to take
private property for private use." They argued that failure to invalidate the delegation would render the public use limitation totally
ineffectual.42 The New Jersey Court rejected the owners' arguments
and upheld the delegation. Even if the corporation's primary purpose was private profit, the court found that "what shall be considered a public use or benefit, must depend somewhat on the situation
37. Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige 50 (N.Y. Ch. 1831).
38. Boston and Roxbury Mill Dam Corp. v. Newman, 39 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467 (1832);
Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Ct. Corr. of Err. 1837).
39. Giesy v. Cincinnati'W. & Z. R.R., 4 Ohio St. 308 (1854); Nichols, Public Use, supra
note 21, at 617; Scheiber, Road to Munn at 368.
40. Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843); Scheiber, Road to Munn at 369.
41. Note 35 supra.
42. Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 712 (1832).
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and wants of the community for the time being. 4 3 Since the needs
of the New Jersey community at the time would be served by an
expansion of industry, the company's use of eminent domain was for
a public not a private purpose. Although some states refused to
expand their concept of the public use requirement to permit condemnation for general manufacturing purposes," others followed
the New Jersey court on the ground that waterpower development
would, as a critic observed, "largely conduce to the prosperity of the
state."4 5
In addition to permitting state legislatures to delegate eminent
domain to private transportation and manufacturing companies,
state courts were inclined to interpret the "just compensation" requirement in a manner that was advantageous to private enterprise.
In an era when capital was scarce, the duty to compensate the owner
of a condemned parcel of land would impose a genuine practical
limitation on widespread use of eminent domain. The state legislatures and courts, however, developed a measure of compensation
that markedly reduced actual cash payments for expropriated land.
The condemnor would calculate the loss caused the former landowner by the deprivation of his property and then deduct from it
the presumed benefits that accrued to any remaining portions of the
owner's tract by virtue of the construction of the public enterprise
in question." This offset formula was widely and generously used in
determining just compensation and in one case permitted the acquisition of a railway right of way at virtually no cost to the corporation .
In allowing state legislatures to delegate the power of eminent
domain to transportation companies and manufacturers and by normally equating public use with a generalized benefit to the public,
the state courts of the first half of the nineteenth century gave
sympathetic approval to legislative plans for achieving public
growth through private activities. By granting eminent domain to
43. Id. at 726-28 (emphasis added).
44. Alabama, Georgia, New York and Vermont rejected delegations to commercial
mills. Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 336-37 (1877).
45. Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 334, 337 (1877).
46. Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Johnson, 5 F. Cas. 563, 564 (Case No. 2,649)

(C.C.D.C. 1829); H.

SCHEIRER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE

ECONOMY, 1820-1861, 277-78 (1969); Horwitz, The Transformationin the Conception of Property in American Law 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248, 274-75 (1973); Scheiber, Property
Law at 237; Comment, Eminent Domain: Set-off of Benefits Against Damages to Remaining
Land Denied, 43 IOWA L. REV. 303 (1958).
47. Scheiber, Property Law at 237.
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private interest groups the legislature sought to encourage and subsidize their activities without spending tax money on them. Also, by
finding that such activities were a public use and by allowing such
groups to measure just compensation through the offset formula,48
the state courts helped underwrite broad public and private use of
the eminent domain power.49 Nonetheless, in giving such freedom
to the legislature, the courts ran the risk of ignoring the interests of
those whose land actually was taken. It was hardly surprising then
that a period in which the interests of landowners were largely obscured should be followed by a period when their interests were
championed more vigorously.
B. A Period of Reaction 1850-1870
The liberal use of eminent domain on behalf of private enterprise that characterized the first half of the nineteenth century produced a noticeable reaction in judicial philosophy in the decades
before and after the Civil War. The source of the reaction apparently was in the fear that internal improvements were being subsidized at the expense of private property rights. 5 As one writer observed, "At no time has there been such a spirit of improvement
pervading the country. . . .The vast plans, for turnpikes, canals,
railroads,bridges and other means to facilitate internal communications, are almost without number." He went on to warn that
"attempted encroachments upon private property by a state [were
likely to increase] in an age and in a country, where the expediency,
if not the necessity of public improvements is constantly presenting
itself to the attention of legislative bodies.""1
In an effort to preserve the rights of property owners, the courts
had earlier begun to develop a more strict concept of public use.
Rather than equating public use with a benefit received by the
public as a whole, many courts began to require a showing that the
land actually would be open to use by the public as a matter of
48. Professor Morton Horwitz argues persuasively that the courts also encouraged economic expansion by limiting recoveries in damage actions against favored business activities.
See Horwitz, Did the Legal System Subsidize Economic Growth in Ante Bellum America?
(unpublished ms.).
49. Professor Scheiber argues strongly for the proposition that expropriation was purposefully used to allocate resources, to influence the structure of entrepreneurial opportunity
and to provide subsidies for favored types of business enterprise. Scheiber, Property Law at
232-34. For a different view of the era see Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MIcH. L. REv. 247 (1914).
50. Nichols, Public Use, supra note 21, at 617-18.
51. Restrictions Upon State Power In Relation to Private Property, 2 U.S. Law Intell.
4, 5 (1829) (emphasis in original).
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right."5 For example, a railroad available for use by anyone who
chose to pay a fare constituted a suitable public use of condemned
land. 3 A power mill to be used exclusively by the mill owner, however, would be considered a private use and beyond the scope of
eminent domain. 4 By the 1870's the Michigan Supreme Court went
beyond even this narrow "use by the public" test and required that
any exercise of eminent domain must be justified constitutionally
by "necessity of the extreme sort."5 5
In addition to narrowing the definition of "public use," some
states amended their constitutions to require that just compensation be determined irrespective of any benefit accruing to the owner
of land from improvements.5 6 Revealing the temper of the time in
its celebration of a court decision that reversed a damages award for
being too small an Ohio journal observed that "[h]eretofore when
they [corporations] have wanted the property of individuals to aid
them in their splendid schemes of speculation, it had been seized
and appropriated under the false and lying pretext that it was for
public use, and little or nothing paid for it." It proclaimed that "a
brighter day seems to be dawning-a day when courts will not aid
in riding roughshod over individuals. '57 The dawning, however,
seems to have been limited to the east and midwest. Farther west,
the newest states in the union embarked upon an exercise of eminent domain that was more expansive than in the days of the transportation revolution.
C.

1870-1910

While eastern and midwestern states may have been concerned
with establishing limits on the use of eminent domain, the Western
52. Nichols, Public Use, supra note 21; The Public Use Limitationon Eminent Domain:
An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 603 (1949). The New York courts seem to have taken
the lead in advocating the narrow construction. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R.R., 18 Wend.
9, 60 (N.Y. Ct. Corr. of Err. 1837) (Sen. Tracy's concurring opinion); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill
140 (N.Y. 1843).
53. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Ct. Corr. of Err. 1837).
54. See cases cited in Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 336-37 (1877).
55. Id. at 340-41.
56. The Ohio Constitution of 1851 provided that a jury of 12 men should determine just
compensation in corporate condemnation cases and that the offset formula could not be used
in arriving at a fair figure. The Ohio provision was adopted by Iowa in 1857 and by Kansas
in 1859. Ohio State Constitutional Convention of 1850, 1 Reports and Debates, 883-93;
McCormick, The Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain, 17 MINN. L. REv. 492-93
n.116 (1933); Scheiber, Property Law at 241-42.
57. As quoted by Horwitz, Did the Legal System Subsidize Economic Growth in AnteBellum America? 372 (unpublished Ins.).
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states were more concerned with using condemnation as liberally as
possible in order to exploit their natural resources quickly. Western
state legislatures were more than willing to delegate eminent domain powers to miners, farmers, and lumbermen as well as to railroads and power mills. Condemnations by private enterprises became so common in the years from 1870 to 1910 that one scholar has
characterized the period as the "heyday of expropriation as an instrument of public policy designed to subsidize private enterprise.""5
In an effort to forestall thejudiciary from delimiting the scope
of the public use concept, the constitutional conventions of the new
western states frequently inserted into the state constitutions provisions which explicitly declared enterprises such as mining, irrigation, lumbering, or manufacturing to be public uses. The Colorado
constitution of 1876 provided that private property might be taken
for private use "for private ways of necessity, . . . reservoirs,
drains, flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others, for
agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes."59 In
the Idaho constitutional convention of 1889 the debate on expropriation led to a bitter clash between farming and mining interests that
were eager to gain the power of eminent domain in order to exploit
common resources. The heated discussions between the two factions
at last resulted in a compromise constitutional provision which declared all condemnations of land for irrigation and drainage purposes as well as for the draining and workingof mines to be a "public
use".10
58. Scheiber, Property Law at 243.
59. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14 (1876) (emphasis added). A similar provision may be
found in the Arizona Constitution which declares that private property cannot be taken for
private use "except for private ways of necessity, and for drains, flumes or ditches, on or
accross the lands of others for mining, agricultural, domestic or sanitary purposes." Aniz.
CONsT. art. II, § 17.
60. Of all the state constitutions, the Idaho Constitution contained the most comprehensive declaration of public uses. Public use included
Itihe necessary use of lands for the construction of reservoirs or storage basins, for the
purpose of irrigation, or for rights of way for the construction of canals, ditches, flumes
or pipes, to convey water to the place of use for any useful, beneficial or necessary
purpose, or for drainage; or for the drainage of mines, or the working thereof, by means
of roads, railroads, tramways, cuts, tunnels, shafts, hoisting works, dumps, or other
necessary means to their complete development, or any other use necessary to the complete development of the material resources of the state, or the preservation of the health
of its inhabitants, is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulation
and control of the state.
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14. Other constitutions have declared a public use in the taking of
private property for a railroad, for logging or lumbering purposes (CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14);
or for milling purposes (CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 14); or for rights of way over lands of others
for all ditches, drains, flumes, canals and aqueducts (MONT. CONST. art. III, § 15).
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Moreover, the western state legislatures were not slow to follow
the example of the constitutional conventions. The legislatures of
Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington delegated eminent domain to any farmer who wished to condemn part of his neighbor's land in order to run an irrigation canal
across it." Other legislatures authorized miners to take private
2
lands if the taking would assist in the exploitation of the claim .
Although some courts were reluctant to sanction such wholesale
delegations to private organizations, many others upheld such statutes. In passing favorably upon its own state's panoramic devolution statute, 3 the Idaho Supreme Court held that nothing was
wrong with the statute's breadth and stated that unless the eminent
domain powers were very broad "complete development of the material resources of our young state could not be made.""4 Other
courts in mining areas found that development of local mineral
resources constituted "an interest of great public benefit to the community," 5 which warranted the delegation of eminent domain to
mining companies. Agricultural states found similar merits in statutes allowing farmers to expropriate land for irrigation purposes."
Whether the land was taken to aid a miner working his claim or a
farmer watering his crops, the western courts had little difficulty
perceiving that such a use was public since it contributed to the
67
material prosperity of the state as a whole.
The western states' use of the power generated some of the first
eminent domain cases to receive direct review by the United States
Supreme Court. The Court had ruled in 1896 and 1897, that the
fourteenth amendment, which prohibited the states from depriving
a citizen of his property without due process of law, implicitly defined due process in terms of the public use and just compensation
requirement of the fifth amendment." Thus in order for a state to
61. Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 26 P. 376 (1891); Scheiber, Property Law at 246-47.
62. E.g., Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876).
63. The statute is quoted in Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 781, 88 P.
426, 429-30 (1906).
64. Id. at 431.
65. Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876).
66. Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 26 P. 376 (1891); S. WIEL, 1 WATERRIGHTS /N THE
WESTERN STATES

148-57 (3d ed. 1911).

67. E.g., Butte, A. & P. Ry. v. Montana Union Ry., 16 Mont. 504, 41 P. 232 (1895).
68. In 1833 the Supreme Court had ruled that the requirements of the fifth amendment
did not apply to expropriation by the states but only to federal condemnations. Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833). In 1896 and 1897 the Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment required the states to pay just compensation and to
observe the public use requirement. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897);
Missouri P. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
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deprive any citizen of his lands, the state would have to demonstrate
as a matter of federal constitutional law that the taking was for a
public use and in return for just compensation. For the first time
state condemnatons were subject to direct federal review to determine whether the just compensation andpublic use requirements
had been met.
At this time the western view of public use seemed to be particularly ripe for federal scrutiny. In a period when most states defined
public use in terms of either a strict "use by the public" test"9 or a
broad "public benefit" standard, 70 the western states seemed to be
evolving a new criteria that verged on the edge of simple public
expediency. 71 Those cases holding the use of eminent domain on
behalf of a farmer's irrigation ditch seemed most suspect since the
benefit to the farmer was obvious but the advantage to the public
as a whole seemed so general as to be without meaningful limitation.
The Supreme Court, however, was not eager to invalidate eminent
domain devolution statutes for lack of an appropriate public purpose.7 2 On the contrary the Court largely upheld local practices and
granted a wide discretion to the state legislatures in determining
what constituted a federal constitutional public use. In broadest
terms the Court found that if a taking was "essential or material for
the prosperity of the community ' 73 it was for a public use. Thus it
upheld a California law permitting water companies to condemn
private land for irrigation purposes, 74 validated Utah's statute
authorizing an individual to expropriate a neighbor's land in order
to convey water to his own, 75 and upheld an eastern railway's taking
of private property to construct a spur line to the warehouse of a
larger shipper. 7 Rather than serve as a check on the aggressive use
of eminent domain by private groups, the Supreme Court served to
69. "It is sufficient that the general public, or any considerable portion thereof, should
have a right to the use." Jacobs v. Clearview Water Supply Co., 220 Pa. 388, 393, 69 A. 870,
872 (1908).
70. "[Elverything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a
section of the State" [constitutes a public use]. Talbot v. Hudson, 82 Mass. 417, 425 (1860).
71. Notes 59 and 60 supra.
72. In 1850 the Supreme Court ruled that even if the facts showed that a state condemnation blatantly violated the public use requirement of the state constitution "it rests with
state legislatures and state courts to protect their citizens from injustice and oppression of
this description." Mills v. St. Clair County, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 569, 585 (1850).
73. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
74. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
75. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
76. Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry., 208 U.S. 598 (1908).
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ratify the state legislature's determinations of who should have access to the power of condemnation.
The Supreme Court's attitude towards state condemnation
questions was characteristic of much of the nineteenth century. Although the period was marked in part by a concern for the interests
of individual landowners," the courts of the day were more inclined
to sustain rather than question the legislature's use of eminent domain. Thus the courts permitted legislative delegations to groups
formed to build turnpikes, bridges, canals, and railroads; to private
textile manufacturers; to mining companies; to individual farmers
and even to lumberjacks to secure places to store their logs. In a
young nation preoccupied with rapid expansion and committed to
swift economic growth, it was perhaps only natural for legislatures
and courts to unite in perceiving that the best interests of private
enterprise represented the best interest of the public as a whole. The
result of that perception was to establish eminent domain as a flexible power that could be used freely by either the legislature or private groups selected by it. Moreover, as both the state and federal
courts came to accord greater respect to the legislature's perception
od the public interest, the nation's judiciary became inbued with
the habit of deferring to the legislative definition of public use.
II.

THE BROADENING SCOPE OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY

Although the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of a broad
use of eminent domain prompted by the needs of private enterprise,
a more narrow view of the power in many jurisdictions continued to
exist into the twentieth century. Typically, these courts retained the
view that the public use requirement implied that condemned land
had to be subsequently used by the public as a matter of right in
order to justify the use of eminent domain. 8 The courts would therefore scrutinize the intended use of the land to ascertain whether the
public would have access to it but they would not consider the
broader purposes of the authorizing statute. 9 Thus the first court
to rule on a statute delegating the eminent domain power to a pri77. See text at notes 36-43 supra. Professor Corwin maintained that the era's most
enduring accomplishment was its assertion of the importance of vested property rights. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American ConstitutionalLaw, 12 MicH.L. REv. 247, 275 (1914);
accord, Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691, 723
(1938). Contra, Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American
Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CHt. L. Ray. 248 (1973); Scheiber, Property Law at 232-33.
78. Nichols, Public Use, supra note 21, at 624.
79. Id. at 626.
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vate college struck the statute down on grounds that the college
could deny use of the land to members of the public at large."0 Yet
whatever vitality this narrow view of public use may have had at
the beginning of the twentieth century, as a matter of national
practice, it was dissipated almost entirely within fifty years.
Whereas industrial growth and economic expansion spurred
courts to take a liberal view of public use in the nineteenth century,
urban development programs came to serve a similar function in the
twentieth century." As the nineteenth century ended, the United
States underwent a transformation from an agricultural to an urban
nation. The shift of population from country to city, however, coincided with a decline in the quality of urban life and urban housing.
At the height of national prosperity in 1929, a government survey
of real property in sixty-four cities revealed that only thirty-eight
percent of all dwellings were in good condition. Much of the nation's
housing was described as obsolete and one expert estimated that
about ten million people lived in conditions that endangered their
"health, safety and morals. ' 's2 By the mid-1930's the federal government recognized that the growth of urban slums and the declining
supply of adequate housing were problems of national magnitude.
In 1937, therefore, Congress approved a housing act providing federal grants to states that would condemn slum areas, clear the
slums, and replace them with homes for low-income families., Underfinanced and interrupted by war, the Housing Act of 1937 was
supplanted by the much more ambitious Housing Act of 1949.84
While the 1937 Act had provided for slum redevelopment by government agencies, the 1949 program specified that the cleared land
could be sold to private enterprise for redevelopment in accordance
with a master plan for the area. Under either Act, however, the task
of assembling parcels of slum land for clearance was assigned to
state housing agencies. Although the agencies were directed to attempt land acquisitions through negotiation, they were delegated
80. Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 88 A. 633 (1913); "[Tjhe
vital question is whether. . . the public will have a common right upon equal terms, independently of the will or caprice of the corporation, to the use and enjoyment of the property
sought to be taken-." Id. at 430, 88 A. at 637. CompareUniversity of S. Calif. v. Robbins, 1
Cal. App. 2d 523, 37 P.2d 163 (1934).
81. Nichols, Public Use at 629; Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain:
An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 607-08 (1949); 68 HAxv. L. Rav. 1422 (1955).
82. Bellush & Hausknecht, Urban Renewal: An Historical Overview, in URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND PLANNING 4 (1967).
83. United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
84.

United States Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
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the power of eminent domain for use in the event negotiations
failed.
Inasmuch as landowners were likely to refuse to sell, or at the
very least to hold out for the highest possible price, the success of
the 1937 and 1949 Acts depended in large part upon whether eminent domain could be used by state agencies to acquire, clear, and
redevelop slum areas. Under a narrow view of public use, however,
both Acts seemed to authorize condemnation for private purposes. 5
The 1937 Act provided that the low-income housing constructed in
the place of slums were to be made available for rental only to
families of moderate means. Furthermore, the 1949 Act provided
that cleared lands might be sold for commercial and industrial sites
for private businesses. Either program, therefore, might easily encounter difficulties in a jurisdiction that defined public use as use
by the public. Yet state and federal courts gave full constitutional
sanction to both Acts and in doing so marked the end of any narrow
limitations that may once have existed upon the use of eminent
domain.
The state courts took the lead in asserting the constitutionality
of the 1937 Housing Act. In New York City Housing Authority v.
Muller," the New York Court of Appeals authoritatively determined
that condemnation for slum clearance and public housing was for a
public purpose. The Muller court specifically repudiated the narrow
doctrine that public use meant use by the public. Since slums were
an ancient evil which menaced the people of the state, slum removal
was viewed as a broad benefit enjoyed by the public as a whole. In
reaching its decision, the court articulated a new approach for determining public use. Stating that the purpose of government was to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people, the court noted
that the government could protect these interests through a trinity
of powers- the power to tax, the police power, and the power of
eminent domain. Whenever an adverse condition such as a dangerous slum arose to threaten the public health, safety or welfare, it
became the duty of the state to employ one of these three powers to
eliminate the threat. If the menace was serious enough to warrant
public action and the power applied was reasonably calculated to
remove it, the court reasoned that it was constitutionally immaterial which of the three were actually employed. 7 By implication,
85. In 1935 a federal court had used the narrow view of public use to declare that
condemnation for slum clearance and housing was for a private use. United States v. Certain
Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ky. 1935).
86. 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
87. Id. at 341, 1 N.E.2d at 155.
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therefore, a public use appeared to be any governmental program
within the ambit of governmental authority that was reasonably
calculated to protect the public.
Within six years after Muller, twenty-two jurisdictions had followed New York's lead in rejecting the narrow view of public use and
replacing it with a broad definition based on the benefits derived
from slum clearance." Moreover, several courts adopted the New
York rationale that eminent domain powers could be invoked whenever necessary to protect the public's health, safety, or welfare.8 9
The police power-the power of the sovereign to regulate private
property for the public welfare-came to be the key element in
defining the scope of public use. Thus, if the object of a statute was
within the traditional scope of the police power, the object was
necessarily a public use for which eminent domain might then be
used. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a state law similar
to the 1937 Housing Act on the ground that the housing provisions
were merely ancillary to the act's main purpose of eliminating dangerous and unsanitary slums, an obviously legitimate object under
the police power. The court stated further that when the power of
eminent domain is thus called into play "as a handmaiden to the
police power and in order to make its proper exercise effective, it is
necessarilyfor a public use."9"
State judicial acceptance of the Housing Act of 1937 marked
the repudiation of the narrow view of public use. In embracing the
Housing Act of 1937, the state courts focused on the public policy
underlying the condemnation rather than the subsequent use of the
expropriated land. Since the policy that lay behind the taking was
the determinative factor in deciding public use, the only remaining
question was whether that policy was a proper subject for governmental action. If the policy helped to protect the welfare of the
public, then it was a legitimate governmental action and a permissible public use. "Public use" appeared to have become synonomous
with "public welfare."
Federal courts adopted the same approach in passing upon the
constitutionality of using eminent domain to effectuate the more
expansive Housing Act of 1949. Unlike the 1937 Act, the 1949 Housing Act contemplated turning expropriated slum land over to private developers for construction of commercial and industrial facili88. See cases collected in McDougal & Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An
Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE L.J. 42, 46 n.13 (1942).
89. Doman v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 331 Pa. 209, 200 A. 834, 840 (1938).
90. Id. at 226, 200 A. at 842. (emphasis added).
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ties. Since the effect was to take land from one private owner for the
use and enjoyment of another, the Act was quickly subjected to
attack by affected landowners. In one famous instance, a businessman whose department store had been condemned as part of a slum
clearance program in the District of Columbia challenged the use
of eminent domain on the grounds that his property subsequently
was to be resold to yet another businessman for private commercial
use. Upholding the condemnation in the landmark case of Berman
v. Parker," the United States Supreme Court centered its attention
on the congressional policy underlying the taking. Since the slum
clearance and urban renewal purposes of the condemnation were
within the traditional police powers of Congress, it could select
whatever means it deemed appropriate to achieve the desired ends.
Eminent domain was one means to that end; private redevelopment
was another.
The Court went even further in giving Congress broad authority
in eminent domain cases. In the past, the question of defining what
constituted a public use ultimately had been a judicial issue. In a
previous case, however, the Court had indicated that a legislative
determination of public use was "entitled to deference until it is
shown to involve an impossibility.""2 Reiterating the same theme of
extreme deference to the legislature the Berman Court stated:
"Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the
main guardian of the public-needs . . . . -,3Precisely what these
specific constitutional limitations were supposed to be was by no
means clear. As one commentator observed, the only specific constitutional limit on land use was the third amendment's prohibition
against quartering troops without the consent of the owner and even
it would not prohibit the condemnation of private property for the
purpose of constructing barracks. 4
-The practical effect of the Berman case was to give judicial
approval to a federal urban renewal program that was operative in
many cities of America during the 1950's and 1960's. The legal effect
of Berman was to extend the fifth amendment's requirement of
91. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The contested taking was authorized by the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act of 1945, D.C. CODE AN. §§ 5-701 to -719 (1951), an act which closely
resembled the Housing Act of 1949.
92. Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925).
93. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
94. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63, 68.
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public use to encompass any taking that would further a legitimate
governmental policy. Whether land was taken from one private
owner for the benefit of another was constitutionally inconsequential provided that the taking furthered a program that lay within
congressional authority. The scope of eminent domain literally had
become almost as broad as the scope of government itself; aside
from the just compensation obligation, its only limit was the limit
on governmental action. Barring unnamed "specific constitutional
limitations," it was for the legislature not the judiciary to determine
what policies were in the public interest and therefore what programs constituted a public use. 5
Although some commentators have demonstrated that the public use requirement still has vitality in a few state courts that define
it narrowly as a matter of state constitutional law,98 most writers
have taken the position that the public use doctrine no longer imposes a meaningful federal limitation upon the exercise of eminent
domain powers. Thus after nearly two hundred years of using eminent domain on behalf of private transportation companies, manufacturers, mining concerns, and farming interests, American legislatures have achieved the federal right to employ eminent domain on
behalf of any group whose activities subserve a legitimate governmental purpose. Moreover, the legislatures have established their
power to transfer land from one private owner to another and from
one business to another in the pursuit of governmental objectives.
95. The Berman case has received extended critical comment. Among the best are
Dunham, supra note 81, and Marquis, Constitutionaland Statutory Authority to Condemn,
43 IOWA L. REV. 170 (1958). A series of interesting essays have explored the implications of
Justice Douglas' remark that it is within the congressional power to make a city beautiful as
well as safe. Gormley, Urban Redevelopment to FurtherAesthetic Considerations: The
Changing ConstitutionalConcepts of the PolicePower and Eminent Domain, 41 N.D.L. REV.
316 (1965).
96. Note, State ConstitutionalLimitations on the Power of Eminent Domain, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 717 (1964); Note, "Public Use" as a Limitation on the Exercise of the Eminent
Domain Power by Private Entities, 50 IOWA L. REv. 799 (1965); 1969 LAW AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER 688.
97. Public use "has been stretched to such an extreme position that the requirement
of public use no longer exists." Gormley, supra note 95, at 320. "If there is a doctrine that
property cannot be condemned from one person to be transfered [sic] to another, it has some
large exceptions." Stoebuck, A Generbl Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553,
599 (1972).
It is so widely conceded that the public use doctrine no longer has vitality that the focus
of scholarly attention has shifted to distinguishing between police power regulations of property which do not require compensation and eminent domain takings which do. F. BOSSELMAN,
P. CALLIAS, J. BAUTA, THE TAKING ISSUES: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY

TO REGULATE

COMPENSATION TO OTHERS

THE USE OF PRIVATE-OWNED

LAND

WITHOUT PAYING

194 (1973); Van Alstyne, Taking orDamaging by PolicePower: The

Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 So.

CAL.

L. REv. 1 (1971).
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As a practical matter then the state legislature has become the only
source of limits placed on eminent domain. If the American legal
history of the past several hundred years is an accurate guide, those
limits will not be made for inconvenience to private interest groups
actively soliciting the public power of eminent domain.
PART TWO
UNIVERSITY EXPANSION THROUGH EMINENT DOMAIN
SECTION 112 OF THE FEDERAL URBAN RENEWAL ACT
In 1959 a small group of distinguished private universities successfully petitioned the United States Congress for the benefits
flowing from the use of eminent domain. Their proposal was artfully
constructed. Rather than request a direct delegation of the eminent
domain power, spokesmen for the universities instead proposed an
amendment to existing legislation that would have the effect of
encouraging state agencies already endowed with the power to employ it on behalf of universities in their area. As an incentive to
exercising condemnation in such cases, participating agencies
would generate otherwise unobtainable federal funds for local expenditures on streets, sewers, and other community improvements.
The university spokesmen emphasized that the effect of the proposed legislation would be to take a measured step towards the
solution of two problems that were of immediate congressional concern-the elimination of urban slums and the expansion of American educational facilities. The proposal of the universities was enacted into law on September 23, 1959, as Section 112 of the Housing
Act of 1949.11
I.

THE ORIGIN OF

SECTION

112

Section 112 represented an ingenious and well-intentioned attempt to provide a common solution to two related problems of
national concern. The first problem was the continuing need to
cleanse and restore those portions of almost every American city
that were in obvious and often dangerous states of decline. The
second was the less obvious but equally real need of many urban
universities to expand their campuses by acquiring and razing the
commercial and residential areas surrounding them on every side.
The two problems were related by an accident of location. Many
urban universities were situated in or near the older parts of town
98. Section 112 of the Housing Act, as added by § 418 of the Housing Act of 1959, 42
U.S.C. § 1463 (1970).
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most affected by slums or blight. Consequently, most universities
needed to expand into those areas of the city most in need of thorough renewal.99
In passing the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts,' 0 Congress had
recognized and attempted to solve the problem of urban deterioration. Taken together, the two acts committed the nation to a program of slum clearance and rehabilitation through a coalescence of
governmental action and private enterprise. Under the 1949 Act,
local government agencies acquired and demolished predominantly
residential slum properties, invoking the power of eminent domain
when necessary. The cleared land was then sold below cost to a
private redeveloper who constructed standard quality housing upon
the site.'0 ' The net cost of the project-the cost of acquisition and
demolition less the price received from the private redevelopers-was underwritten by both the federal government which
would pay up to two-thirds the net cost, and the local sponsoring
government, which would pay the remaining one-third either
through cash or through improvements in the project area.0 2 Under
the 1954 Act, the local agencies could sponsor commercial as well
as residential redevelopments 13 and, in those areas which did not
require clearance, federal funds were allocated for the rehabilitation
of existing structures.' 4
While Congress had confronted the problem of urban blight, it
had not been quick to perceive the needs of urban universities.
Educational institutions such as Columbia and the University of
99. See Hearingson § 112 of the HousingAct Before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 501-19 (1959) (statements by Julian Levi, Executive
Director, South East Chicago Commission, and George F. Baughman, Vice President of
N.Y.U.).
100. Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970); Housing Act of 1954. In addition
to the federal provisions, most states independently have enacted some form of urban renewal
legislation. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 25, § 106 et seq. (1958); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 33000 et seq. (West 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1101 et seq. (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67
1/2 § 1 et seq. (1959); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 500 et seq. (McKinney 1965); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 13-822 et seq. (1973).
101. See J. WEICHER, URBAN RENEWAL: NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR LOCAL PROBLEMs 5 (1972).
102. See notes 148-51 infra and accompanying text.
103. Under one provision of the amendment, 10% (later increased to 35% in 1965) of
the authorized federal capital grant funds could be used for nonresidential projects. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1460(c) (Supp. 1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1970).
104. Although the original 1949 Act provided for demolition and redevelopment as the
only means for eliminating slums, the 1954 amendment added the additional tool of "rehabilitation." Included in the definition of an "urban renewal project," it was intended to permit
the elimination of blight in the area by private enterprise through rehabilitation, so that
structures will be conserved before reaching the stage where demolition becomes necessary.
42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1970).
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Chicago were surrounded by declining areas and unless those areas
were included in urban renewal programs by the cities, the universities lacked any means to protect the quality of life in their immediate neighborhoods. As blighted areas began to engulf the campuses,
some schools seriously considered abandoning their urban locations
in favor of new sites in the suburbs." 5 Nevertheless, even as their
oppressive surroundings induced some university leaders to consider
a flight from the city, other pressures induced them to stay and even
to expand their urban sites. By the early 1950's a sharp rise in
student enrollments had underscored the need of many American
colleges to enlarge their campus facilities. Before World War II, one
million students had enrolled in colleges and universities. Immediately after the war the figure had risen to two million and by 1959,
with the first wave of the war years' baby boom reaching college age,
enrollment had climbed to three million with an estimated peak of
six million students by 1970.16 An expansion of facilities and in
many cases an expansion in the size of the campus itself were necessary to absorb an increase of three million students in a decade.
While the strain was felt by all universities, both public and private,
private universities in urban areas were in a particularly precarious
situation. Unlike state schools, which could prevail upon the legislature to exercise condemnation powers in their behalf, private institutions could only acquire land for expansion through private negotiations. Major acquisitions inevitably were impeded by private
owners holding key tracts who either demanded exorbitant prices for
their land or refused to sell altogether. 07
As the leaders of America's urban universities became cognizant of the implications of their position, they turned to one another
for assistance. The University of Chicago, which had previously
taken steps to preserve its neighborhood and to expand its campus,
provided the initial leadership. 08 In April of 1957, the Chancellor of
the University of Chicago met with the presidents of Harvard, Yale,
the University of Pennsylvania, and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology to explore the dimension of their common problems. 0"
As a result of their meeting, the Chicago administration organized
105. See Hearings,note 99 supra, at 523 (Temple University considered but later abandoned plans to move from Philadelphia).
106. See id. at 519, 521 (statement of John L. Moore, Business Vice President of the
University of Pennsylvania).
107. See id. at 516-19 (statement of George Baughman, Vice President of N.Y.U.).

108. See generally J. ABRAHAMSON, A NEIGHBORHOOD
DENTLER, THE POLITICS OF URBAN RENEWAL

109. See J. KLOTSCHE,

FINDS ITSELF

(1959); P. Rossi & R.

(1961).

THE URBAN UNIVERSITY: AND THE FUTURE OF OUR CrTIEs 73

(1966).
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and directed a detailed survey of sixteen major universities, which
included among others New York University in the east, the University of California in the west, and Vanderbilt University in the
south. ' 0 Conducted under the auspices of the American Association
of Universities, the survey was completed in 1958 and demonstrated
conclusively that the lack of available land for expansion was one
of the most acute problems facing each university surveyed.
On the basis of the survey results, the University of Chicago
sponsored the drafting of what was to become Section 112 and, along
with representatives from other universities, presented the draft on
January 26, 1959, to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency.' The bill was designed to overcome the universities' inability to acquire land for expansion by allowing them to participate in
urban renewal projects. The proposal provided that state housing
agencies would acquire slum lands near university areas by negotiated sales or condemnations and then turn the land over to the
university for academic redevelopment. Alternatively, the university could purchase land directly, relying upon state condemnation
when necessary, and redevelop it in accordance with a plan approved by the city."12 In either case, the cost to the university of
acquiring the land could be treated as if it were the city's own
contribution to the cost of the project. It was thus possible for the
city to receive two dollars in federal money for every one dollar spent
by the university without contributing anything to the project from
its own funds. The university therefore not only would finance its
own expansion program, but also would help clear the slums near
campus and raise federal funds for the city in the process.
The proposed bill was presented to the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency by university spokesmen who emphasized
the importance of eminent domain to university expansion and the
wisdom of fostering a national policy of university growth. George
Baughman, the Vice President of New York University, clearly summarized the value of eminent domain to a university surrounded by
commercial and residential lots:
110.

Levi, Expanding the University of Chicago, in CASEBOOK ON CAMPUS PLANNING AND

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 108,

124 (1962). The universities participating in the study were:

Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Tulane University; Vanderbilt
University; University of California; George Washington University; Washington University;
St. Louis University; University of Minnesota; Johns Hopkins University; Northwestern University; University of Indiana; University of Illinois; Columbia University; University of
Pennsylvania; and University of Chicago.
111. See Hearings, note 99 supra, at 501.
112. See note 158 infra and accompanying text.
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Very often in our building programs we have been unable to assemble adequate
plottages within an area made up of many small landholdings. At such times
the advantage of eminent domain would have saved us many precious months
and many (equally precious) thousands of dollars.
Gentlemen, it comes to this: without the right of eminent domain, our

institutional planning and development could be totally blocked for the
future.'

Representing the University of Chicago, Julian Levi, the dominant figure behind the proposed bill, chose to emphasize that the
national interest lay in permitting private as well as public universities to rely upon eminent domain. Since private universities were
nonprofit organizations operated for the benefit of the nation, the
measures being proposed were not to be judged in terms of financial
gain or loss to the universities, but rather in terms of gain or loss to
the nation's students, whom the bill was ultimately intended to
serve. By providing an economically attractive method of financing
community improvements incident to university expansion, Congress could therefore induce individual cities to commit themselves
on a local basis to a goal of national significance.'
The universities presented a good case for the indirect delegation of eminent domain on their behalf. The members of the Senate
Committee to whom they appealed received them with respect and
sympathy, induced perhaps in part by the presence on the committee of Senator Douglas of Illinois, who for twenty-eight years before
his election to the Senate had taught at the University of Chicago.
When the proposal was later debated on the Senate floor, Senator
Douglas served as one of its principal advocates. 'Despite the existence of some fears that the bill might result in windfall credits to
local agencies, no Senator raised the important issue whether eminent domain should be used on behalf of private universities in the
first place.1 5 On September 23, 1959, Congress approved the bill as
originally drafted by the universities and thereby determined that
the taking of private land for redevelopment by a private university
was a desirable, as well as constitutional, public use."'
113.

See Hearings, note 99 supra, at 516, 517 (emphasis added).

114.

See id. at 504, 505, 527.

115. 105 CONe.. REC. 16157-58 (1959) (remarks of Senators Bennett, Bush, Clark, &
Douglas).
116. Section 112 of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1463 (1970), presently reads
in relevant part as follows:
(a) In any case where an educational institution or a hospital is located in or near an
urban renewal project area and the governing body of the locality determines that, in
addition to the elimination of slums and blight from such area, the undertaking of an
urban renewal project in such area will further promote the public welfare and the proper
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THE MECHANICS OF URBAN RENEWAL

Section 112 was engrafted upon an urban renewal program that
was already plagued by organizational complexities. By 1959 urban
renewal consisted of two different kinds of projects executed by
three principal parties. The two programs consisted of the rehabilitation of blighted neighborhoods and the outright clearance of overt
slums.'1 7 The three parties involved in carrying out the rehabilita-

tion and clearance programs were the local city government, which
formally initiated the project; the local administrative agency,
which actually executed each plan, and the federal agency, which
ultimately approved each project for federal funding. The relationships between the three parties were delineated by state and federal
laws and in their mixture of legislative and administrative duties,
development of the community (1) by making land in such area available for disposition,
for uses in accordance with the urban renewal plan, to such educational institution or
hospital for redevelopment in accordance with the use or uses specified in the urban
renewal plan, (2) by providing, through redevelopment of the area in accordance with
the urban renewal plan, a cohesive neighborhood environment compatible with the
functions and needs of such educational institution or hospital, or (3) by any combination of the foregoing, the Secretary is authorized to extend financial assistance under
this subchapter for an urban renewal project in such area without regard . . . to the
predominantly residential character or predominantly residential reuse of urban renewal
areas. The aggregate expenditures made by any such institution or hospital (directly or
through a private redevelopment corporation or municipal or other public corporation)
...
. shall be a local grant-in-aid in connection with such urban renewal project:
Provided, that no such expenditure shall be eligible as a local grant-in-aid in any case
where the property involved is acquired by such educational institution or hospital from
a local public agency which, in connection with its acquisition or disposition of such
property, has received, or contracted to receive, a capital grant pursuant to this subchapter: Provided further, That no such expenditure shall be deemed ineligible as a local
grant-in-aid in connection with an urban renewal project, to the extent that the expenditure is otherwise eligible, if the facilities, land, buildings, or structures with respect to
which the expenditure is made are located within one mile of the project.
(c) The aggregate expenditures made by any public authority, established by any
State, for acquisition, demolition, and relocation in connection with land, buildings, and
structures acquired by such public authority and leased to an educational institution
for education uses or to a hospital for hospital uses shall be deemed a local grant-in-aid
to the same extent as if such expenditures had been made directly by such educational
institution or hospital.
(d) As used in this section(1) the term "educational institution" means any educational institution of higher
learnings, including any public educational institution or any private educational institution, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and
(2) the term "hospital" means any hospital licensed by the State in which such
hospital is located, including any public hospital or any nonprofit hospital, no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
117. See note 105 supra.
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those relationships were by no means clearly drawn.
In essence, however, urban renewal was a local program which,
if properly designed, received a heavy federal subsidy.1 18 The local
city council not only made the legislative decision to initiate an
urban renewal project, but also selected the site, approved the plan
for the area and the application for federal funds and ultimately
paid the city's share of the bill. Almost invariably the city delegated
the actual organization and execution responsibilities of each project to a local administrative agency."' The local public agency, or
LPA as it became known in federal circulars, was a creature of state
law, but was charged with meeting both state and federal urban
renewal requirements. The LPA was frequently a housing agency
that had been established by the state in the 1930's to pursue state
slum clearance programs. 2 ' Accordingly, it was obligated to determine whether an area qualified as a "slum" under state law. If the
area qualified, then the LPA was authorized as a matter of state law
to employ eminent domain to acquire slum lands for clearance.12 '
Since the state usually did not offer to pay the costs of urban renewal programs, the LPA's determination that an area was a slum
under state law ordinarily had little practical significance other
than to allow the LPA to use eminent domain on behalf of projects
that also qualified under federal regulations.
The real function of the LPA then was to satisfy federal, rather
than state, urban renewal requirements. Unlike the state requirements that were usually quite cursory, the federal standards were
outlined in detail in two major federal statutes 22 and accompanied
by three volumes of administrative regulations'2 1 that were modified
or amplified by monthly circulars. In essence, the LPA was obligated to develop a basic analysis of the housing and other characteristics of each urban neighborhood and formulate a plan to prevent
or eliminate blight in each area. On the basis of this self-styled
"workable program"'' 24 for the city as a whole, the LPA next would
118. See note 148 infra and accompanying text.
119. See generaiy M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER 16 (McGraw-Hill paperback
ed. 1967).
120. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-801 et seq. (1973).
121. Id.
122. Housing Acts of 1949 & 1954.
123. The first
administrative regulations were published by the Housing and Home
Finance Agency in a 3 volume manual. HHFA's URBAN RENEWAL MANUAL has since been
replaced by the HUD URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK [hereinafter cited as URH-RHA]. The
language in the old manual is substantially the same as in the new handbook under HUD.
Further cites will be to the handbook.
124. The workable program is composed of seven elements:
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draft a detailed plan for an area selected by the city council for
redevelopment. The urban renewal plan was to be a comprehensive
blueprint of the various aspects of redevelopment that set forth the
specific properties to be taken by the LPA and indicated the nature
of the proposed new uses for the area.12 5 After receiving approval of
the plan from the city council and the federal funding agency,, ' 6 the
LPA would execute the project by acquiring the land, 2 relocating
former residents and businesses,' 21 clearing the site,' 29 constructing
any necessary site improvements,'30 and disposing of the cleared
3
land to a private redeveloper by public auction or negotiation.' '
Although it was a local agency, the LPA worked most closely
with the federal organization entrusted with national responsibility
for federal urban renewal as a whole. The federal agency's name
changed according to the latest trend in organization charts, entering the 1950's as the Housing and Home Finance Agency, changing
to the Urban Renewal Administration, and finally emerging in the
late 1960's as part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The principle function of HUD, as it was later called, was
to distribute federal funds to those urban renewal plans that appeared to it to be eligible for assistance. As a guide to communities
wishing to apply for federal money, HUD issued an UrbanRenewal
Manual,32 a three volume collection of particularized requirements,
1. Codes and Ordinances: establishing adequate standards of health and safety under which
dwellings may be lawfully constructed and cooupied.
2. Comprehensive Community Plan: providing a framework for improvement, renewal, and
blight prevention to foster sound community development in the future.
3. Neighborhood Analyses: developing a community-wide picture of blight-where it is, how
intense it is, and what needs to be done about it.
4. Administrative Organization: establishing clear-cut authority and responsibility to coordinate the over-all program through effective administration of planning measures and other
activities.
5. Financing: providing funds for staff and technical assistance needed, for public improments and renewal activities essential to the program.
6. Housing for Displaced Families: determining community-wide the relocation needs of
families to be displaced; developing housing resources to meet these needs, and providing
relocation service to displaced families.
7. Citizen Participation: assuring that the community as a whole, representative organizations, and neighborhood groups are informed and have full opportunity to take part in developing and carrying out the program. M. ANDERSON, supra note 119, at 17-18.
125. See URH-RHA 7207.1, ch. 4, § 1, General Requirements, at 1. See also M.
ANDERSON,

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

supra note 119, at 18.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

generally URH-RHA 7207.1, ch. 4, § 1 Urban Renewal Plan at 1.
URH-RHM 7208.1, ch. 1, Objectives and Policy, at 1.
URH-RHM 7212.1, ch. 1, Objectives and Submission Requirements, at 1.
URH-RHA 7207.1, ch. 1, Selection & Treatment of ProjectAreas, at 5.
URH-RHA 7209.1, ch. 1, Project Improvements, at 1.
URH-RHA 7214.1, ch. 4, Selection of Redevelopers, at 1.
note 123 supra.
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to which each application for funds would have to conform. The
Manual established the elements that had to be contained in the
LPA's plan for each area,'3 the procedure whereby the plan was to
be approved by the local community,13 and the process by which
the LPA was to submit both the plan and an accompanying application to HUD for funds. 35 In addition, the Manual described three
other requirements of particular significance: the participation of
the community in the local decision to initiate an urban renewal
project,' compliance with the criteria that HUD would use to approve the site eventually selected 37 and the means of financing the
project. 3 ,
A.

Public Participation

Before an application could be submitted to HUD, it first had
to be approved formally by the LPA and the local city government.
In addition, HUD required that members of the public at large have
an opportunity to voice their opinions on the plan at a public hearing. 3 9 The hearing could be sponsored by any local body and normally was held immediately before the final plan was presented to
the city council. If nothing else, the hearing provided critics of an
urban renewal program a chance to state their observations publicly
prior to a conclusive decision by the council. Yet it was neither a
judicial nor a legislative hearing, it had no binding effect on any
public body and it had little substantive significance to HUD itself.
Only summary minutes of the meeting were forwarded to HUD for
the limited purpose of showing that "the hearing was held and an
opportunity accorded to all persons and organizations to present
their views."' 40 The fact that a hearing was held was of consequence
to HUD but the actual details of the meeting were not.
B.

Qualifying of an Area for Urban Renewal

Of greater import to HUD than the outcome of the public meeting was the question whether the area proposed for renewal was fully
qualified for federal assistance. The federal acts that provided for
rehabilitation and clearance projects did not define the sorts of
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See note 125 supra.
See note 126 supra.
See URH-RHA 7215.1, ch. 3, Federal Grants, at 1.
See URH-RHM 7206.1, ch. 3, Public Hearingon the Project, at 1.
See notes 141-46 infra and accompanying text.
See note 147 infra.
See note 136 supra.
Id.
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areas eligible for urban renewal. Instead, they delegated to HUD the
responsibility of defining the specific characteristics of slum and
blight that would qualify an area for federal assistance. HUD complied by first establishing the general principle that a local area had
to contain deficiences to such a degree that public action was considered necessary to eliminate and prevent the spread of deterioration and blight.' More explicitly, HUD created two sets of standards that had to be met depending upon whether an area was to
be rehabilitated or cleared completely.
1.

RehabilitationAreas

In the case of a rehabilitation project, at least twenty percent
of the buildings had to contain one or more "building deficiencies"
and the area had to contain at least two "environmental deficiencies."'' 2 Building deficiencies encompassed a multitude of conditions, including deterioration of the structure caused by a defect not
correctable by normal maintenance; an extensive series of minor
defects in the building causing a deteriorating effect on surrounding
land; or, more simply, defects that in general warranted the removal
of the building as a whole. Environmental deficiencies were slightly
more specific and included over-crowding of buildings on the land,
excessive dwelling unit density, unsafe streets, and inadequate public facilities.4 3 If an LPA could demonstrate that twenty percent of
the buildings in an area had one such building deficiency and if the
area had two such environmental deficiencies, the project area was
eligible for federal rehabilitation funds. If, however, the LPA proposed to clear an area, it had to demonstrate that the area met both
the rehabilitation standards and separate, stricter criteria for clearance.
2.

ClearanceAreas

If an area were to be cleared, the LPA had to demonstrate to
HUD that one of two conditions existed: (1) either more than fifty
percent of the buildings were "structurally substandard to a degree
requiring clearance" or (2) alternatively, more than twenty percent
of the buildings were qualified for clearance and additional clearance was required to remove external blighting influences from another thirty percent of the houses.' 4 The first clearance formula
141.
142.
143.
144.

URH-RHA 7205.1, ch. 1, General Eligibility Requirements, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
See URH-RHA 7207.1, ch. 1, Selection and Treatmentof Project Areas, at 3.
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emphasized deterioration in the quality of the individual houses in
a neighborhood. Over half the houses had to contain sufficient basic
structural defects or deficiencies in essential facilities to warrant
clearance. If slightly more than half the houses were substandard
warranting clearance and slightly less than half were still in good
condition, the entire neighborhood might be razed and redeveloped.
The second clearance formula, on the other hand, placed more
weight upon the deterioration of general living conditions in the
neighborhood. Under it more than twenty percent of the houses had
to warrant clearance for their own sake. More importantly, another
thirty percent had to warrant clearance, not because the structures
were defective in themselves, but because their removal would eliminate "blighting conditions" from the area as a whole. "Blighting
conditions" were virtually the same as "environmental deficiencies"' 45 and included over-crowding of buildings, excessive dwelling
unit density and inadequate street layout. Of the two clearance
formulas, the second was the easier to satisfy and was actually only
slightly more difficult to meet than the basic standard for a rehabilitation project.'4 6 In view of the slight difference between the rehabilitation and the alternative clearance standards, the LPA would appear to have had a choice between rehabilitating or clearing an area.
HUD, however, expressed a preference for rehabilitation and therefore required the LPA to explore all possible alternatives in order
to retain the maximum number of sound buildings. 4 '
In drawing up its qualification standards and in applying them
to LPA applications, HUD exercised a well-insulated administrative discretion. Since its function was to disburse federal grants,
HUD was not subject to the usual federal requirement that it submit its regulations to open public debate before final adoption.
HUD's standards for rehabilitation and clearance areas were therefore not open to public discussion and ultimately were imposed in
145. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
146. The rehabilitation standard at its strictest required (1) twenty percent of the
buildings to have "defects warranting clearance" and (2) the area as a whole to have two
environmental deficiencies. The second clearance formula required (1) that twenty percent
of the buildings be "substandard warranting clearance" and (2) that "blighting influences"
might be removed from the neighborhood as a whole if an additional thirty percent of the
buildings were also cleaned. "Defects warranting clearance" were for all practical purposes
the equivalent of a house that was "substandard warranting clearance." Similarly "environmental deficiencies" were very similar to "blighting influences" warranting clearance. The
only significant difference between the two categories of requirements appeared to be the
extent to which these blighting conditions affected the neighborhood as a whole. See note 142
supra and accompanying text; notes 149-158 infra and accompanying text.
147. See notes Part 1I 152 and 153 infra.
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an unilateral fashion. Moreover, since HUD was an administrative
agency, its determinations on the eligibility of particular projects
under its own guidelines ordinarily were not subject to either legislative or judicial review. Thus as both a practical and a legal matter,
HUD's decisions about which areas qualified for federal assistance
were normally conclusive and beyond appeal.
C. Financing an Urban Renewal Project
HUD exercised less discretion in specifying the procedure by
which an urban renewal project was financed. The federal government was statutorily required to pay up to two-thirds or threefourths of the net cost of any project HUD declared eligible for
assistance.4 8 The net cost of a project was determined by first computing the gross cost of the project to the LPA, which usually included the purchase cost of the land and buildings within the urban
renewal area, the cost of planning, overhead, interest, and relocation costs, and the cost of site improvements and supporting facilities."' If the project involved the sale of cleared land to private
redevelopers, the proceeds from those sales were retained by the
LPA and deducted from its gross costs. The resulting amount was
the net cost of the project.'50 The federal government would pay up
148. Federal funds in an urban renewl project consist of four principal types: planning
advances, temporary loans, long-term loans, and outright grants. A planning advance is a
loan to cover expenditures during the survey and planning stage of a project that is being
conducted on a two-thirds formula basis. See URH-RHA 7215.1, ch. 2, § 1, Planning
Advance, at 1. This type of loan must be repaid with interest out of the first federal funds
that become available to the LPA for undertaking the project. The actual execution of the
project is financed by temporary loans consisting of either direct federal loans or federally
secured loans. The most common of the two is the federally secured loan from a private
lending institution to the LPA. See URH-RHA 7215.1, ch. 4, § 2, FederallySecured, Private
Short-Term Loans, at 1. Generally, the market rate for this type of loan, which is guaranteed
by the federal government, is lower than for the direct federal loan. For this reason, direct
temporary loans from the federal government will be made only under certain circumstances
when the private loans are not available to the LPA. See URH-RHA 7215.1, ch. 4, § 1, Direct
FederalLoans, at 1. A definitive long-term loan is used in the few cases when land is leased,
rather than sold, to a private redeveloper. The LPA finances the capital value of the leased
land with the loan, and uses the proceeds from the rents to repay the federal government.
See URH-RHA 7215.1, ch. 4, § 5, Definitive Loan to Finance Imputed Capital Value of
Leased Land, at 1. Last, and most important, is the federal grant. See URH-RHA 7215.1,
ch. 3, Federal Grants, at 1. These are payable in several installments, called "progress payments," over the life of the project. The LPA must have acquired at least 25 percent of the
land to be acquired for the project before it can receive the first progress payment. The
agreegate of progress payments cannot at any time exceed 75 percent of the total authorized
capital grant. See URH-RHA 7215.1, ch. 3, § 2, Capital GrantProgressPayments, Relocation
Grant Payments and Rehabilitation Grant Payments, at 1.
149. See URH-RHA 7215.1, ch. 1, § 1, Calculatingand SharingProject Cost, at 1.
150. Id.
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to two-thirds of the net cost if the LPA included planning, administration, and local over-head costs in its calculation of gross costs.
If, however, the LPA chose to pay for those particular expenses
rather than to declare them as part of its gross cost, the federal
government would pay up to three-fourths of the net cost of the
entire project.'51
Ordinarily the LPA elected to have the federal governme t pay
two-thirds of the net cost, leaving the city to pay the remaining onethird. The city's portion could be paid either by cash disbursements
or noncash grants-in-aid,'5 2 the latter consisting primarily of the
expenditures that the city made on supporting facilities and site
improvements within the project area.'5 3 Thus, if the city opted to
build a major road through an urban renewal area or place a school
nearby for its residents, the cost of the road or the school would be
counted as a noncash contribution to the city's one-third share of
the cost of the project as a whole. In many cases, it was to the city's
advantage to pay for its one-third share through noncash grants-inaid since the costs of public facilities that the city would have built
anyway would then be credited to the city's share.'54 If, as often
happened, the noncash expenditures of the city totaled more than
one-third the net cost of the project, the federal government simply
paid the remaining portion of the cost rather than its full two-thirds.
The city could, however, receive credit for its extra expenditures by
pooling them with its noncash contributions to another project.
Accordingly, any noncash grant-in-aid that was over the city's nor155
mal one-third share could be recaptured later in another project.
III.

SECTION

112 AND THE URBAN RENEWAL PROGRAM

Into this complex statutory milieu, the universities of the
United States-and later its hospitals "-introduced Section 112 of
the Housing Act of 1949, which introduced two changes into the
basic structure of federal urban renewal. First, Section 112 waived
the 'requirement for predominantly residential reuse of land in
urban renewal areas, thus making it possible for an LPA to acquire
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id.
153. See URH-RHA 7216.1, ch. 2, § 1, GeneralEligibility, at 1.
154. See M. ANDERSON, supra note 119, at 30.
155. A simplified example of pooling of projects on a two-thirds capital grant basis is
provided in URH-RHA 7215.1, ch. 1, § 1, Calculatingand SharingProject Cost, at 4-5.
156. In 1961 Section 112 was amended to allow public and private hospitals to participate on the same terms as educational institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 1463 (1970).
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and sell land to a university for a non-housing purpose 15 7 and effectively placing eminent domain power behind the university in land
acquisitions. Either the land owner would negotiate with the institution, or the LPA would take the land by eminent domain and then
resell it to the institution. Secondly, where purchases were made
directly by a university within or near an urban renewal area, the
cost of the land, demolition expenses, and relocation expenses could
be credited to the LPA as a noncash grant-in-aid toward its onethird share of the urban renewal project." 8 It was clearly possible,
therefore, for a city to receive credit for expenditures it did not make
and to use federal money generated by university purchases toward
other urban renewal projects or, in some cases, for other HUD approved urban projects. Thus Section 112 not only enabled local
communities to include universities in urban renewal, but also provided a strong financial incentive for doing so.
In order to participate in an urban renewal program, an educational institution could be either public or private, provided that it
offered at least two years of course work towards a bachelor's degree.' '9 Moreover, it had to be proximately situated to an urban
renewal area for its acquisitions to receive federal credit. The project
area either had to include part of the principal buildings of the
institution, or, it had to be close enough, in most circumstances, so
that more than 50 percent of the project area could be enclosed by
a line no more than one-fourth of a mile distant from the campus
boundaries.' 0 If either test was satisfied, then expenditures for the
acquisition of land within one mile of the project would qualify for
grant-in-aid credit.' 6 '
Assuming the institution was academically qualified and properly located, the direct cost of any acquisitions made by it within
the project area, the cost of any demolitions, and moving expenses
for displaced residents would be eligible for grant-in-aid credit to
the city.' In addition, if the university made purchases outside the
project area but within one mile of its boundaries, the city could
nonetheless receive credit for the expenditures if certain conditions
were fulfilled. The land itself had to be deteriorating and the univer157. 42 U.S.C. § 1463(a) (1970).
158. Id. See also note 162 infra.
159. See URH-RHA 72161.1, ch. 2, § 3, Grants-in-Aid Other than Supporting
Facilities, at 2-3.
160. See id. at 2; URH-RHA 7205.1, ch. 2, ProjectEligibility Categories, at 5-6.
161. See URH-RHA 7216.1, ch. 2, § 3, Expenditures for Land Acquisition, at 7.
162. See URH-RHA 7216.1, ch. 2, § 3, Expenditures of Educational Institutions or
Hospitals Under Section 112, at 2.
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sity had to demonstrate that it would be used for academic purposes
in such a way as to eliminate blight.'6 3 More importantly, the university had to show that the land fell within an area covered by a
university development plan that had been approved by the local
government after a public hearing."4 In the event these conditions
were met and the university plan received HUD approval, university acquisitions outside the urban renewal area also could be
claimed for credit by the city. Indeed, there was only one situation
in which university acquisitions would not generate credits for the
city. If the LPA acquired property on behalf of the university in
connection with a project for which it contracted to receive an urban
renewal capital grant, the expenditures for the land were not eligible
for grant-in-aid credit.'65 Thus, although the university had no reason to avoid condemnation proceedings conducted on its behalf by
the LPA, the city had reason to prefer that university acquisitions
proceed by private negotiations whenever possible.
PART THREE
PRIVATE UNIVERSITY EXPANSION THROUGH SECTION
112: A CASE STUDY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Slightly more than a year after the United States Congress
provided American universities with access to the power of eminent
domain through Section 112 of the federal urban renewal program,
Mayor Ben West of Nashville, Tennessee, invited half a dozen of his
city's private colleges and universities to join him in planning an
163. Id., Development Plans, at 4, provides that: The minimum criteria for determining
blight or deterioration are that one or more of the following types of deficiencies must be
present to the extent that living conditions in the area are being affected adversely: (1) Unsatisfactory standards of maintenance or repair. (2) Inadequate alterations. (3) Inadequate
plumbing, heating, or electrical facilities. (4) Inadequate, obsolete, or unsafe building layouts, such as presence of fire hazards, shared bathroom facilities, or dwelling units or bedrooms without privacy of access. (5) Conversions to incompatible types of uses, such as
rooming-houses among family dwellings or introduction of mixed uses. (6) Overcrowding or
improper location of structures on the land. (7) Unsafe, congested, poorly designed, or othrwise deficient streets. (8) Inadequate public utilities or recreational and community facilities
contributing to unsatisfactory living conditions or economic deterioration. (9) Incompatible
land uses creating adverse influences on residential properties or living conditions in the area.
(10) Overoccupancy of buildings. (11) General characteristics of obsolescence tending to
reduce neighborhood stability, as evidenced by an unusual number of movements in and out
of the area. (12) Other significant conditions which are clear evidence of neighborhood obsolescence or decline.
164. See id., Development Plans, at 5.
165. See id., Expendituresfor Land Acquisition, at 7.
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urban renewal project that would embrace the expansion plans of
all six schools.'66 Taken together the six institutions represented a
variety of different religious, secular and racial communities.' Yet
they all shared a common need to acquire urban land for campus
expansion and they all appeared to be bordered by neighborhoods
that would be suitable for urban renewal. Not surprisingly, each of
the schools accepted the Mayor's invitation and their assent marked
the commencement of a hotly contested urban renewal project of
unusually long duration.
As it happened, only one of the six original sponsors of Nashville's Section 112 project ever implemented Mayor West's proposed
plan. The sole survivor of a planning period that stretched from 1961
to 1967 was Vanderbilt University, the largest and most financially
secure of Nashville's private educational institutions. Under the
terms of its eventual agreement with the city of Nashville, Vanderbilt agreed to purchase and clear some one hundred and ten acres
of nearby residential housing between 1968 and the end of the year
1975. If at the end of the eight year period the university had not
been able to acquire the entire area by private purchase, Nashville's
Housing Authority was to condemn the remaining houses and sell
them to the university for clearance and redevelopment. The nine
million dollars which it would cost the university to acquire the
entire tract of land would serve as the city's share of the urban
renewal project and in addition would generate ten million dollars
in otherwise unobtainable federal funds for the city to spend on
68
street and utility improvements.
The land the university was to acquire lay in the heart of an
exclusively white, predominantly middle-class neighborhood which
bore little resemblance to the conventional image of a slum. The
majority of the houses in the area had been built between the first
and second world wars and although a number of them had begun
to decline, many were still in adequate repair. A housing census
conducted in 1960, the year Mayor West first proposed renewal for
the area, established that nearly eighty per cent of the homes in the
166. Nashville Banner, Dec. 20, 1960, at 1, col. 3.
167. The six institutions invited to meet with Mayor West included Scarritt College for
Christian Workers; George Peabody College for Teachers; Vanderbilt University; Meharry
Medical College; Fisk University, and Tennessee State University. In addition, Belmont
College, a private Baptist college, later considered'joining either the University Center or the
nearby Edgehill project.
168. Contracts signed between the Nashville Housing Authority and HUD dated April
16, 1968 and between Vanderbilt University and the Nashville Housing Authority dated May
6 and May 7, 1968.

19741

SPECIAL PROJECT

area were in "standard" condition. Only twenty per cent were characterized as "substandard,"' 6 9 in marked contrast to the two other
residential areas of the city that received urban renewal treatment
in which more than fifty per cent of the houses were classified substandard. 7 " Moreover, the character of the neighborhood affected
the attitude of its residents towards the urban renewal project that
was to remove their homes. A handful of homeowners were convinced the neighborhood was fundamentally sound, resented the
threatened use of eminent domain on behalf of a private university,
and resisted the city's plan to raze their houses for university development. These active opponents of the university urban renewal
plan certainly never constituted a majority of the residents in the
area and they were seldom if ever unified in a single cohesive
group. 7' In addition, they were understandably ignorant of the complexities of the urban renewal process and did not secure essential
information about the particular project that affected them until
after the project was formally approved by the Nashville Council in
1967 and the Department of Housing and Urban Development in
1968. Yet so deeply rooted was their opposition to the project that
despite their practical ineffectiveness, the residents of the area actively opposed the project's implementation for six years after the
project had been officially initiated. Their persistence, their inventiveness and their growing political skills eventually won for them
an unusual success in the summer of 1973 when Nashville's Metropolitan Council voted to amend the urban renewal plan for the
university area in such a way as to ensure their houses could not be
taken by condemnation proceedings. The Council's action represented a vivid-and quite probably unlawful-repudiation of Nashville's original commitment to assisting university expansion
through urban renewal. Although it was short-lived the accomplishment was none the less remarkable. Six years after all seemingly
irreversible official commitments had been made to the plan for the
169. As quoted in Inner City Blight: Analysis and Proposals, 34 (1973), a study undertaken by the Metropolitn Planning Commission, an agency of Metropolitan Nashville.
170. The other two residential area projects were the East Nashville Urban Renewal
Project in which 48.2% of the area's housing stock was classified substandard and the Edgehill
Urban Renewal Project in which 55.9% of the houses were classified substandard in the 1960
housing census. Id. at 28, 31.
171. It is difficult to determine accurately how many of the area residents participated
actively in the three citizen pressure groups that formed in the neighborhood. Membership
in the groups apparently varied from ten to thirty-five residents of the area, depending upon
the group and the period of time. Interview with area resident Dr. Marie H. Means, former
president of the University Neighborhood Association, on Jan. 11, 1974. Interview with Mr.
Joseph Johnston, Chairman of the Project Area Committee, on May 3, 1974.
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university area, a relatively small group of neighborhood residents
led by their Councilmen had persuaded the members of the Nashville Council to reconsider the merits of a major urban renewal
project on which some nine million dollars had already been expended. Moreover, for a period of two months they succeeded in
persuading the Council to abandon major elements of a plan which
it had overwhelmingly endorsed six years earlier.
The narrative that follows traces the origin and evolution of the
urban renewal project those residents sought to stop, the University
Center Urban Renewal Project of Nashville, Tennessee. The study
attempts to delineate the reasons why an urban renewal project that
was honestly intended to benefit the community as a whole grew
into a bitter and divisive struggle between an urban university that
sought in no small part to make a positive contribution to its neighborhood's betterment and an adjoining residential area whose residents had for many years regarded the university with a certain
measure of respect and perhaps affection. While it may be too late
to resolve all the emotional charges and countercharges which
gained the Nashville project momentary attention from such national publications as Newsweek and the New York Times, there
may still perhaps be some intrinsic value in establishing a history
of the events which first gave the controversy life. The events which
took place in Nashville between 1960 and 1974 suggest the tensions
which may be produced in a contemporary American community
that resolves to use its power of eminent domain to clear a legally
blighted neighborhood for redevelopment by a single highly visible,
private institution. Although Nashville's experience with Section
112 is not necessarily characteristic of that of the hundreds of other
American cities that also implemented similar urban renewal clearance programs, it does suggest the social costs a community might
encounter when it determines to exercise eminent domain in a fashion that challenges the values as well as the comforts of those whose
land is to be condemned. Although the power of eminent domain
has been regularly used throughout American legal history to support the activities of favored private interest groups, Nashville's
experience suggests that not all Americans willingly accept the legal
reality that the state may ensure the enforced conveyance of land
from one private owner to another. Moreover, while the decision to
use eminent domain on behalf of piivate interest groups is essentially a political decision, Nashville's experience with urban renewal
projects would seem to indicate that the residents of a neighborhood
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destined to be subject to condemnation are initially ill-equipped to
participate in the political process. Yet given the time and opportunity to develop political skills, the residents and homeowners in
an urban renewal clearance area have the capacity to become an
effective political force in their own right, are quite capable of protecting their own interests in the local political arena. As the experience of the residents and homeowners in Nashville's Section 112
clearance area suggests, however, the acquisition of the technical
and political knowledge necessary to effectively represent the interests of those whose houses are to be cleared can be a time consuming
process which reaches fruition only after the key decisions about the
future of a neighborhood have already been made. Thus while as a
legal matter those who were to suffer the loss of their property in
Nashville undoubtedly received due process of law, as a practical
matter those who were affected most directly by Nashville's decision
to institute a Section 112 clearance project had the least eventual
effectiveness.
lI.

THE CITY OF NASHVILLE

Nashville, Tennessee, was an appropriate community for a Section 112 urban renewal project. Although the city was not large it
contained an unusually high number of colleges and universities. By
1960 when its population had reached 170,000 persons, Nashville
sustained no fewer than eleven different colleges or universities,
nine of which were privately endowed and supported. The wisdom
which was presumed to flow from such a high proportion of educational institutions combined with a rather grand reproduction of the
Athenian Parthenon had long since earned for Nashville the sobriquet "Athens of the South." Not that the city's reputation for academic accomplishment was entirely regional. Peabody College for
Teachers was nationally known for its contributions to public education. Meharry Medical College had educated over half the nation's black physicians and its next-door neighbor Fisk University
was one of the oldest and most distinguished black universities in
the country. To natives of Nashville, however, perhaps the best
known of all the city's institutions was Vanderbilt University. Not
only had Vanderbilt established a solid national reputation in such
diverse fields as economics, literature and medicine, the University
had made a continuing and visible impact on its own immediate
community. Many of Vanderbilt's graduates had remained in Nashville to become influential members of the city's flourishing banking
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and insurance establishments. Still others had achieved a full measure of local political success. The chief executive of the local county
government was a Vanderbilt graduate1 2 and the Mayor of Nashville was a graduate of both Vanderbilt and its law school.7 3 Among
a group of commercial and political leaders who were more often
than not educated at Vanderbilt and who were in general accustomed to taking pride in the accomplishments of their city's educational institutions, any positive federal program which benefitted
Nashville's colleges and universities in addition to the community,
was almost certain to receive Warm support.
In addition to its unusual number of educational institutions,
Nashville was nationally known for its aggressive urban renewal
program. In the early 1950's the city had launched one of the nation's first urban renewal programs when it acquired and cleared
ninety-seven acres of badly deteriorated buildings that surrounded
the Tennessee State Capitol. The Capitol Hill Redevelopment Project soon became a showpiece for the national urban renewal program. The Commissioner of Urban Renewal displayed a portrait of
the project in his Washington office and delegations from other
cities were encouraged to visit Nashville to learn how to implement
a successful urban clearance program. Buoyed by the success of the
Capitol Hill project, the city organized a second major undertaking
in 1956. The East Nashville Project embraced over two thousand
acres of blighted buildings and at the time of its official inception
in 1959, it was the second largest urban renewal program in the
United States. On the basis of Nashville's participation in one of the
earliest urban renewal programs in the country as well as in one of
the largest, one urban renewal official observed in 1961 that "Nashville is considered a first class example of an urban renewal city.""
The same official confidently predicted that Nashville would eventually become the greatest center for urban renewal in the nation.'
III.

ORIGINS OF THE UNIVERSITY CENTER PLAN

1959-1961

With its high proportion of educational institutions and an
unusual amount of experience in the urban renewal process, Nashville was an obvious site for a Section 112 urban renewal project.
172. County Judge Beverly Briley graduated from Vanderbilt in 1930.
173. Mayor Ben West graduated from the Vanderbilt School of Law in 1932 and received his A.B. in 1934.
174. T.W. Anderson, Conservation Officer for the Atlanta Region of the Urban Renewal
Administration, Nashville Banner, July 17, 1961, at 15, col. 2.
175. Id.
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Indeed Nashville's political and institutional leaders made initial
plans to use Section 112 as the basis for a new urban renewal project
within a few months after Section 112 was declared ready for federal
funding. Although it is virtually impossible to determine what group
first broached the subject, Mayor Ben West and the administration
of Vanderbilt University were particularly aggressive in ensuring
that Nashville utilized the newest opportunity for federal funds.
A.

The Mayor of Nashville

Of the two, Mayor West was the most self-evident. Elected
Mayor of Nashville in 1951, he was a New Deal Democrat who
believed in strong federal action to prevent American cities from, in
his phrase, "choking to death in urban decay."' 76 The West Administration had overseen the implementation of the nationally famous
Capitol Hill urban renewal project and it had been Ben West himself who helped initiate the mammoth East Nashville project. By
1959 Mayor West had become something of a national spokesman
for urban renewal. When President Eisenhower vetoed a housing bill
which contained urban renewal funds, Mayor West was called before the Senate Subcommittee on Housing to testify to the value of
the urban renewal program. In his appearance before the Subcommittee Mayor West declared that urban renewal funds were vitally
necessary to allow Nashville to save itself from slum and blight.
After recounting the history of the two projects for which Nashville
had become known, the Mayor then described in some detail the six
additional areas in Nashville that he had earmarked for future renewal programs. At the time, none of the areas he mentioned
included any of the residential neighborhoods that surrounded
Nashville's colleges and universities.
When Section 112 was enacted into law later in the fall of 1959,
however, it immediately made urban renewal for university areas an
attractive program for cities like Nashville. Under Section 112 a
university's private expenditures on land acquisitions for campus
expansion could be used to fund the city's share of a clearance area
for university development and a rehabilitation area as well. In
addition to providing the city's share of the renewal project, the
university expenditures could also generate federal funds for use on
other projects or for the city to spend directly on improvements to
the neighborhood's roads and utilities. 7 ' The incentive for a city
176.
177.

Nashville Banner, July 24, 1959, at 1, col. 1.
See text accompanying footnotes 148, 155 supra.
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government to use Section 112 was powerful: by merely agreeing to
include a university expansion plan in its program of urban renewal,
a city could generate federal funds that would be unobtainable otherwise. When the mechanism for administering Section 112 programs was established in February of 1960,178 Mayor West moved to
take advantage of it. During the summer and fall of 1960 West
requested the Nashville-Davidson County Planning Commission to
study the areas in Nashville that would be appropriate for a college
or university renewal program.' 71 While the Commission was conducting its preliminary studies, the Mayor addressed himself to the
theme of the urban university's responsibilities to its own community. In a key note address before a group of university officials
gathered for a conference in Milwaukee in October, West stressed
his belief that the problems of the city posed a challenge to the
resources and integrity of the urban university. His remarks left
little doubt that it was the role of a responsible university to take
an active part in the concerns of the society around it and that
participation in an urban renewal project was one means of satisfying this obligation.8 0
B.

Vanderbilt University

Ben West's enthusiasm for urban renewal and his view of the
urban university's role in the life of the city helped create a positive
climate in which Nashville's educational institutions could consider
participation in a Section 112 program. Yet at least one of Nashville's institutions had already taken quiet steps to insure that its
plan for the future might be included in the federal renewal program. During 1958 and 1959 the leaders of Vanderbilt University
had worked with other urban universities to help draft Section 112
and were, therefore, at least in part responsible for the legislation
allowing universities to participate in urban renewal in the first
place.' 8 ' Moreover, the senior members of the University administration had provided the impetus for a Tennessee statute that secured the right for any senior college or university in Tennessee to
exercise directly the power of eminent domain whenever necessary
to further campus expansion into adjoining neighborhoods.'82
178. Local Public Agency letter 193 issued on February 16, 1960 established the mechanics for implementing Section 112.
179. See Nashville Banner, September 25, 1960, at 1, col. 3. The Commission studied
the area surrounding Vanderbilt University as well as the area adjoining Fisk University and
Meharry Medical College.
180. See Nashville Banner, Dec. 20, 1960, at 1, col. 3.
181. See text accompanying footnote 187 infra.
182. See text accompanying footnote 189 infra.
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The actions of the Vanderbilt administration in 1958 and 1959
were part of a national pattern of response to the problems of campus growth which confronted Vanderbilt and most other private
urban universities during the mid 1950's.181 When founded, Vanderbilt had been located on the western edge of Nashville in a semirural setting, but with the passing of the years the university had
become surrounded by residential housing and further constricted
in its growth by two major traffic arteries intersecting to form a
rough "U" around three sides of the campus. As enrollments began
to increase at Vanderbilt during the early 1950's,111 the university
felt impelled to expand the campus and its facilities to keep pace.
University officials faced a choice between moving the campus altogether in order to expand it or acquiring property on the open market on the only side of the university that was not landlocked by
major roadways. In the end the university was deterred from moving
the entire campus by the time, cost and inconvenience it would have
required.' 1' Instead, in 1956 Vanderbilt formally initiated a policy
of acquiring land by private purchase in the residential area that
formed the open top of the arterial "U" which surrounded the one
hundred and fifty acre campus. In pursuit of its new policy, between
1956 and 1961, the university acquired one hundred and four tracts
of land outside the campus proper at a total cost of some two million
dollars.8 I
But campus expansion through piece-meal acquisitions was
necessarily sporadic and depended on the availability of willing
sellers in the adjoining neighborhood. Moreover, it was inherently
subject to obstacles imposed by real estate speculators who would
purchase key tracts for resale to he university at deliberately inflated prices.' 7 As a consequence, Vanderbilt, along with other private universities in a similar position, began to explore statutory
means of ensuring the success of their expansion program. In the
183. See text accompanying footnotes 27, 22, 23 supra.
184. The enrollment at Vanderbilt was 3,529 in 1950; 3,663 in 1955; 4,111 in 1960, 6,123
in 1967 and 7,485 in 1972.
185. Chancellor Harvie Branscomb, Chancellor of Vanderbilt University from 1946 to
1963, contemplated shifting the university's campus during the early 1950's but rejected the
move, in part because it would have required him to dedicate most of his years as Chancellor
to overseeing the move. Interview with Chancellor Emeritus Harvie Branscomb in Nashville,
Tennessee, February 26, 1974.
186. Id.
187. Gerald Henderson, former Business Manager for Vanderbilt, has observed that
speculators occasionally bought property in the Vanderbilt expansion area but that he was
normally able to block their projects through timely purchases. Interview with Gerald Henderson, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 31, 1974.
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summer of 1957 a Vanderbilt representative attended a workshop on
urban university expansion sponsored by the Association of American Universities. The workshop participants eventually agreed to
sponsor a proposed amendment to the Housing Act of 1949, which
amendment eventually became Section 112 of the Housing Act of
1949.'11
In addition to assisting in the passage of Section 112, Vanderbilt took other steps closer to home to assure the success of its
expansion program. Chancellor Harvie Branscomb of Vanderbilt
initiated a draft bill for the consideration of the Tennessee legislature which would allow private colleges and universities in Tennessee to exercise the power of eminent domain directly, without recourse to any state or federal agency. Although Vanderbilt's attorney, Mr. Cecil Sims, expressed doubts about the constitutionality
of the bill, Chancellor Branscomb encouraged its presentation to
the legislature because, if it did nothing else, its presence alone
would help deter speculators from exploiting the university even if
it never had occasion to employ the measure. Chancellor Branscomb
invited officials from Union College in Jackson, Tennessee, to present the bill to the Tennessee legislature, which they did in 1959.111
The bill was enacted into law in the same year, in large part because
by encouraging the expansion of private schools it helped reduce
pressure on the legislature to create four new state colleges.19 "
C.

Early Planning

By the spring of 1960 Mayor West and the administration of
Vanderbilt University were moving in the same direction for differ188. During 1957 and 1958 Vanderbilt participated in the preliminary discussions and
the comprehensive institutional survey which preceded the drafting of Section 112. Vanderbilt University was listed as one of the institutions sponsoring the bill but did not send a
representative to the Senate hearings. With its active involvement in the meetings and
studies which led to the drafting of Section 112, the Vanderbilt Administration was almost
certainly aware of Section 112's enactment into law in September of 1959. Interview with
Edwin Bryan in Nashville, Tennessee, March 1, 1974; see Hearingsnote 99 supra (Vanderbilt
University as participant in the creation of Section 112).
189. Interview with Chancellor Emeritus Harvie Branscomb, in Nashville, Tennessee,
February 26, 1974.
190. The original statute granted the University of Tennessee the power of eminent
domain for use in campus expansion. The amendment proposed by Chancellor Branscomb
purported to give the same power to all qualified colleges and universities in Tennessee on
the same grounds. The complete statute, as amended, provided in relevant part: "The University of Tennessee shall have the power to condemn and appropriate such lands, property,
property rights, privileges and easements of others as in the judgment of its board of trustees,
or the executive committee thereof, may be necessary or proper for the purpose of providing
buildings and other facilities . . . .The compensation for damages in taking of such lands,
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ing reasons. Both the Mayor and the university were fully aware of
Section 112 and were prepared to consider using it: the Mayor be-.
cause Section 112 would help regenerate a deteriorating neighborhood in urban Nashville at little or no expense to the city; the
university because Section 112 would back-stop the university's private acquisition plan and guarantee its ultimate success. The two
groups spent the better part of 1960 conducting their own preliminary studies to determine the feasibility of a Section 112 plan.
Mayor West requested that the Nashville-Davidson County Planning Commission investigate Nashville's potential for employing
Section 112. At about the same time Chancellor Branscomb established at Vanderbilt an Executive Planning Committee composed
of the Chancellor, the three Vice-Chancellors, the university's principal philanthropist, Mr. Harold S. Vanderbilt, and the director of
the university's planning division, Mr. E.E. Bryan.' The Mayor's
study group and the Vanderbilt group met separately but were
united from the outset by an influential common member, Mr.
Charles Hawkins, who served as a member of the Vanderbilt Planning Committee and who was then the Director of the NashvilleDavidson County Planning Commission. By the end of November
work had progressed sufficiently for Vanderbilt's planning team to
suggest that a meeting with other college officials might be useful
in order to explore the possibility of a joint project.' 92 Mayor West
took the initiative and organized two exploratory meetings with
university officials from six different colleges and universities. The
first meeting was held on December 19 among officials from three
contiguous schools on the soughwest side of Nashville: Vanderbilt
University, Peabody College for Teachers and Scarritt College for
Christian Workers. Mayor West presided over a group which included the executive leaders from all three schools, the four
councilmen in whose districts the schools were located and repreproperty, property rights, privileges, and easements shall be paid by said university, and the

same shall be condemned and determined in the mode and manner provided in chapter 14
of this title.
Existing senior colleges in Tennessee, located on established campuses, granting the
bachelor's degree, and holding membership in the Southern Association of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, shall have the power of eminent domain to the same extent, to be exercised in the same manner, as the University of Tennessee under this section except, the
property sought to be condemned must be adjacent to the campus of said senior college."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1506 (1973).
191. The planning committee was officially instituted in May 1960. Nashville Banner,
May 20, 1960, at 1, col. 4.
192. Memorandum by Charles Hawkins, dated November 29, 1960, on file at the Nashville Housing Authority.
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sentatives from the Nashville Housing Authority and the citycounty planning commission. At the end of what he termed a most
satisfactory discussion, West announced the willingness of the three
schools to coordinate their expansion plans with the city's urban
renewal program.'93
A few days later at a meeting of officials from Meharry Medical
College, Fisk University and Tennessee State University, West received assurances from Fisk and Meharry that they too would be
willing to plan a joint urban renewal project that would unite their
separate expansion plans.'94 At West's suggestion, in February of
1961,'15 the heads of Vanderbilt, Peabody, Scarritt, Fisk and Meharry each wrote the Commissioners of the Nashville Housing Authority urging them to make an application for federal funds in
order that formal planning on a Section 112 project might begin.
D.

Application for a Federal PlanningAdvance

The agency to which the colleges addressed their request, the
Nashville Housing Authority, was entrusted with operational control of Nashville's entire urban renewal program. Created under
state law by an ordinance of the city of Nashville,' 9 the NHA had
been organized during the depression to supervise Nashville's public
housing program but it had assumed responsibility for urban renewal as well when the program was initiated in 1949. Although only
the Nashville City Council could formally initiate a housing or
urban renewal project, once approved by the Council the project was
supervised and implemented by the NHA.'97
In theory the NHA's own activities were controlled by its fiveman Board of Commissioners who were charged with ultimate responsibility for the authority's programs and were alone empowered
to institute eminent domain proceedings on behalf of NHA projects.'99 In practice, however, the five commissioners were normally
193. Nashville Banner, Dec. 20, 1960, at 1, col. 3. The story which appeared in the
Banner suggested that Mayor West initiated the project "when he pointed out to Chancellor
Branscomb that wording in the federal urban renewal act includes 'university center' as areas
that can be designated as urban renewal projects." In light of the university administration's
active involvement in the development of Section 112 in 1958 it is unlikely that Chancellor
Branscomb was surprised by the news brought to him by Mayor West.
194. See id.
195. Mayor West made his request in a letter dated February 2, 1961. Chancellor
Branscomb responded by writing the NHA on February 4. Minutes, Board of Commissioners,
Nashville Housing Authority, number 8265.
196. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-901 to -918 (1973).
197. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-801 to -833 (1973).
198. The Board of Commissioners could institute eminent domain proceedings by
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local businessmen who served at their own expense on a part-time
basis. The commissioners relied upon the NHA staff to attend to the
numerous details incident to any joint project involving both local
and federal government. In the case of an urban renewal project the
NHA staff was responsible for drafting all the applications for federal funds and ensuring that they were duly circulated to the Board
of Commissioners, the City Council, and the Urban Renewal Administration for political and administrative approval. In addition,
it was normally the duty of the staff to supervise the development
of formal renewal plans for each project area, to acquire any land
that was to be cleared and to ensure that each tract was properly
redeveloped or rehabilitated. With its previous experience in clearing, redeveloping and rehabilitating the Capitol Hill and the enormous East Nashville projects, the NHA staff was undoubtedly one
of the most experienced in the nation.
It was also one of the busiest. In the spring of 1961, acting on
the request of the leaders of Nashville's colleges and universities,'99
the NHA staff began to prepare an application for a federal loan to
subsidize the cost of drawing up plans for a university center project.""' Officially the application was to be made by the city of Nashville to the Urban Renewal Administration and it had to demonstrate on a preliminary basis that the proposed area was suitable for
urban renewal assistance. In addition to drawing up such an application for the university area, the NHA staff was also requested by
Mayor West to draft similar applications for planning funds for two
other projects in Nashville, a clearance and redevelopment area in
the central business district and a renewal project in Edgehill, a
black residential area in South Nashville.20 The NHA staff prepared the university center, the downtown loop and the Edgehill
applications at the same time and presented them together for
approval by the Board of Commissioners on August 7. The Board
adopting a resolution declaring that the acquisition of the property in question was "in the
public interest and necessary for public use." TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-807 (1973).
199. See text accompanying note 195 supra.
200. At a joint meeting of the City-County Planning Commission and the NHA staff
on February 11, 1961, the Planning Commission recommended that the NHA prepare applications for federal planning funds for the university center area, the Fisk-Meharry area and
Edgehill. Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA, number 8265-6.
201. The sudden burst of urban renewal activity was caused in part by a telegram from
President Kennedy to Mayor West encouraging West to increase the pace of urban renewal
projects. West replied by cabling Kennedy "Your words come as manna and your wish is my
command." West later observed to the Nashville press, "This is a real switcheroo from the
days when we had the Republican slowdown." Nashville Tennessean, Feb. 3, 1961, at 1, col.
8.
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approved the applications and passed them on to the Nashville
Council for final political approval. Taken together the three applications called for a potential total of 3,243 acres to receive urban
renewal treatment at an approximate cost of one hundred and
sixteen million dollars. Of this amount the proposed university
center project represented less than a third of the total in size at a
modest 959 acres and less than one quarter the estimated cost at
approximately twenty-four million dollars. 22 Faced with three
major undertakings simultaneously, the Nashville Council could
not examine any of the three projects in detail. On August 15, 1961
the Council unanimously declared that all three areas were slum
and blighted neighborhoods suitable for urban renewal and ap2 3
proved the applications for planning funds for all three. 1
With regard to the university center area, however, there was
some initial doubt at the time as to whether the 959 acre neighborhood was really an area qualified for urban renewal. The Council's
finding that the neighborhood was a slum and blighted area represented the recital of a legal conclusion necessary for the area to be
legally eligible for federal planning funds. It was not based upon
detailed research but rather upon a brief visual survey conducted
by the NHA staff and a later inspection tour by the four councilmen
whose districts were affected by the proposed project. 2 4 Other observers, perhaps equally familiar with the neighborhood, expressed
doubt about the accuracy of the Council's official findings. The
Nashville Tennessean, a newspaper seldom inclined to oppose local
use of federal programs, had expressed its misgivings when Mayor
West first revealed the project was under consideration. In a lead
editorial, the Tennessean observed:
"A bothersome question keeps popping up: Are these areas surrounding
Vanderbilt-Peabody-Scarritt ... the ones in worse need of repair? Do Nashville's slums touch Vanderbilt on any side?
We do not mean to discourage enlightened planning. It is true the housing
around Vanderbilt and Peabody is growing old, and within a few years could
become substandard.
Perhaps, all circumstances considered, the two ... centers belong in the city's
next order
of renewal business. But at the moment, we are not fully con205
vinced."
202. Nashville Tennessean, Aug. 12, 1961, at 1, col. 1.
203. See Nashville Banner, Aug. 24, 1961, at 14, col. 1.
204. Interview with former Councilman Aubrey D. Gillem in Nashville, Tennessee, Feb.
22, 1974. Mr. Gillem co-sponsored the measure and toured that part of the project area that
was in his district. Mr. Gillem observed that his walk through the neighborhood constituted
the only research that he, or as far as he knew, other Councilmen undertook in 1961.
205. Nashville Tennessean, Dec. 22, 1960, at 14, col. 1.
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More importantly the Urban Renewal Administration was not
immediately convinced the area was qualified for urban renewal.
Although the applications for planning funds for the downtown and
Edgehill projects were processed in a regular manner, the application for the university center was delayed by the URA's request for
additional documentation that the neighborhood was, on a preliminary basis, sufficiently substandard to warrant investing time and
money in a planning study." ' The URA made its request in October
of 1961 and a month and a half later the NHA supplied the additional data."" On the basis of the 1960 Housing Census the NHA
demonstrated that 21% of the houses in the area were substandard.
Moreover, a recent NHA exterior survey indicated that 53% of the
houses were deficient in some respect. Using these figures the NHA
maintained that the university area met, on a preliminary level, the
federal requirement for an urban renewal rehabilitation area. After
three months of deliberation the URA concurred and issued Nashville a $200,000 planning loan with which to survey the area and to
draw up plans for its renewal.2""
IV.

19621967
The planning loan from the Urban Renewal Administration was
to be used for two major tasks. The first was a formal housing survey
of the university center neighborhood to determine on a final basis
whether the area constituted a slum or blighted area eligible for
federal urban renewal. Assuming that the area was found to be
qualified for urban renewal, the second task was to prepare a plan
for its redevelopment, either by rehabilitation of the original structures if the neighborhood was merely blightd or by clearance and
private redevelopment if the area met the stricter qualifications for
a clearance area. Rather than conduct the eligibility survey and
draft the redevelopment plan for the university area itself, the NHA
contracted for the work to be done by a New York consulting firm,
Clarke and Rapuano. Clarke and Rapuano were already familiar
with Nashville urban renewal and the university center area: the
firm had prepared the redevelopment plan for Nashville's Capitol
Hill Project and in the late 1950's it had been hired by Vanderbilt
University to draft a comprehensive plan for the university's camFORMAL PLANNING OF THE UNIVERSITY CENTER PROJECT

206.
207.
208.
at 1, col.

Letter from Bruce Wedge of URA to Gerald Gimre of NHA, Oct. 17, 1961.
Letter from Gerald Gimre of NHA to Bruce Wedge of URA, Dec. 4, 1961.
The planning loan was approved on April 9, 1962. Nashville Banner, April 9, 1962,
5.
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pus expansion program. Since Vanderbilt could expand in only one
direction, the planning firm was necessarily familiar with the neighborhood in question. Thus Clarke and Rapuano was hired by the
NHA in 1962 to determine if the neighborhood for which it had
already begun to draw up redevelopment plans for Vanderbilt might
qualify as an urban renewal clearance area. In effect the planner for
Vanderbilt University was hired to help determine whether Vanderbilt and four other institutions might acquire. land needed for their
expansion programs through urban renewal rather than private purchase. Although later critics were quick to point out what seemed
to them to be an apparent impropriety and the potential for a conflict of interest on the part of Clarke and Rapuano, 211 at the time
the NHA staff itself was not concerned by the firm's overlapping
responsibilities to the NHA and to Vanderbilt. Instead the staff was
troubled by the initial unwillingness of the Urban Renewal Administration to approve the selection of Clarke and Rapuano as the
project planner. The URA noted that the firm's proposed fee for the
project was unusually high and it requested the NHA to send additional information demonstrating the wisdom of its choice. 20 Gerald
Gimre, the Executive Director of the NHA did so at length. In a nine
page single spaced letter with four enclosures, 21' Gimre justified the
selection of Clarke and Rapuano on the basis of their unusual competence in urban renewal work and the unusual complexities losed
by the university center area. Gimre observed that in addition to a
local staff of four engineers and draftsman who would work virtually
full time on the project, the principal-partner in the firm would be
expected to devote half his working time to the university area as
would a New York support staff of nine additional designers, architects and engineers. Gimre concluded that Nashville "will not coun2 12
tenance a routine, ordinary, run-of-the-mill planning program"
and that Clarke and Rapuano was ideally suited to provide the
community with a stimulating and inventive plan for the university
area. At length the URA was swayed by the NHA's defense of its
choice of planners and allowed the agency to hire Clarke and Rapu23
ano for a total fee of not more than $134,000 dollars.
209. The issue was subsequently raised in a lawsuit filed by two homeowners in the
eventual clearance area. Two federal district judges found no impropriety in Clarke and
Rapuano's role with the NHA and Vanderbilt.
210. Letter from Bruce Wedge of URA to Gerald Gimre of NHA, May 21, 1962.
211. Letter from Gerald Gimre of NHA to Bruce Wedge of URA, June 1, 1962.
212. Id.
213. Bruce Wedge approved the choice of Clarke and Rapuano although he noted that
its fee was still in excess of those normally paid in the southeastern region. Letter from Bruce
Wedge of URA to Gerald Gimre of NHA, June 13, 1962.
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A.

Surveying the Area

The most critical of all Clarke and Rapuano's tasks was to
determine whether the university center neighborhood qualified as
an area suitable for urban reneal under Tennessee and federal law.
The task was critical because the constitutionality and the legality
of the entire project depended upon whether the area met the legal
definition of a slum. If the area was a legal slum, then eminent
domain could be exercised to clear the area for private redevelopment and the slum clearance in its own right would satisfy the Fifth
Amendment's requirement that eminent domain be exercised for a
public purpose. 214 Thus any land acquired by condemnation could
be conveyed to Nashville's colleges and universities for their own
private reuse without violating the Fifth Amendment. If, however,
the area was not a slum, any land taken for condemnation and
private institutional use would not be taken for the public purpose
of slum removal but for the arguably private purpose of campus
expansion. If the area was not a slum or deteriorating area, any land
acquired by eminent domain for Nashville's private educational
institutions would be taken in a prima facie unconstitutional manner.
1. State and FederalStandards
Both the Tennessee and federal standards for an urban renewal
area were extremely flexible but both served different functions.
The Tennessee statute allowed the NHA to condemn and clear
"blighted areas" which the agency found to contain buildings which
were "detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the
community. 2' 25 If it determined that a neighborhood constituted
such a detriment to the community, the Board of Commissioners of
the NHA was authorized to exercise eminent domain to acquire and
clear the offending lots. 22 1 Thus a finding by Clarke and Rapuano
that the university center area was a blighted area under Tennessee
law was essential if the NHA were later to use its power of eminent
domain in the neighborhood.
The federal guidelines served a different purpose. Rather than
214. See text accompanying footnotes 86-94 supra.
215. "Blighted areas are areas (including slum areas) with dwellings or improvements
which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowing, faulty arrangement or design,
lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use,
or obsolete layout, or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety,
health, morals, or welfare of the community." TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-813 (1973).
216. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-807.814 (1973).
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trigger the condemnation power, the federal standards determined
whether the proposed renewal area qualified for federal urban
renewal funds.Unlike the state requirements the federal specifications were not statutory but were administrative regulations issued
by the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), the parent
agency of the Urban Renewal Administration. Since the regulations
governed the release of federal funds, they were not subjected to
217
open public debate before being finally adopted by the HHFA.
Instead the agency unilaterally determined the standards it would
apply to the applications it received for loans and grants. 2" The
standards themselves were then published in the Urban Renewal
Manual, a three volume compendium of urban renewal procedures
issued for the benefit of local agencies like the NHA. The Urban
Renewal Manual requirements for a federal rehabilitation or clearance area were more detailed than those of Tennessee but no less
flexible and no less open to subjective interpretation.
For an area like the university center in Nashville to qualify for
federal funding, Clarke and Rapuno had to determine that the
neighborhood satisfied two different sets of criteria. The first standard to be met was that governing urban renewal rehabilitation
areas. In order for the university area to qualify for federal funds to
rehabilitate the neighborhood's houses, Clarke and Rapuano had to
determine that twenty percent of the buildings in the area contained
at least one "building deficiency" and that the neighborhood as a
whole contained at least two "environmental deficiencies.121 1 As
217. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act does not require federal agencies to
follow the rule making procedure if a matter relating to federal grants is involved. The
exception to the usual requirement of a public hearing on proposed federal regulations originally stemmed from the belief that a federal grant was given as a matter of privilege to which
the government could attach any limitations it saw fit, rather than as a matter of the rights
of the recipient. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2). For a classic statement of the "privilege doctrine" in
a licensing context see Walker v. Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953). The doctrine
has been undermined by recent cases. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d
262 (2d Cir. 1968) (admission of tenants to public housing).
218. The Urban Renewal Manual was first compiled and issued in the early 1950's by
the Housing and Home Financing Agency. An examination of the Federal Register for the
years from 1949 to 1974 reveals that the Manual qualification standards were not subject to
the rule making process. An inquiry by Congressman Richard Fulton of the Fifth District of
Tennessee directed to HUD determined that present HUD officials do not know by what
precise means the Housing and Home Finance Agency drafted the original eligibility guidelines. Letter from John K. Johnson, Assistant for Legislative Affairs, HUD, to Congressman
Richard Fulton, March 28, 1974.
219. "The legal eligibility of a project area must be determined in the light of State and
local legal requirements as well as the Federal requirements contained herein.
"An urban renewal area must be a slum area or a blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating
area (or an open land area) which is approved by HHFA as appropriate for an urban renewal
project.
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defined by the Urban Renewal Manual, "building deficiencies" included "inadequate" original construction of the building, "inadequate" internal utility systems, extensive minor defects in a building which caused it to have a deteriorating effect on the surrounding
neighborhood or quite simply defects in a building that were so
extensive as to warrant its clearance. 22 The two "environmental
deficiencies" could include among other things an "excessive" number of dwelling units in the area's building, "incompatible" types
of conversions such as roominghouses among family dwellings, unsafe or "congested" streets, "inadequate" public utilities or any
other "significant" environmental deficiency. 22 ' If Clarke and Rapuano determined by its survey of the neighborhood that twenty percent of the buildings contained such building deficiencies and that
the area as a whole contained at least two such environmental deficiencies, the neighborhood would qualify for federal funds with
which it could be rehabilitated and restored. 2 2 Since the 1960 Hous"To qualify for Title I assistance, an urban renewal area, other than an open land area,
must contain deficiencies to a degree and extent that public action is necessary to eliminate
and prevent the development or spread of deterioration and blight. Specifically, at least 20
percent of the buildings in the area must contain one or more building deficiencies, and the
area itself must contain at least two environmental deficiencies." (emphasis added). 1 Housing and Home Finance Agency, URBAN RENEWAL MANUAL, §§ 3-1, 1 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as MANUAL].
220. Building deficiencies included:
(1) Defects to a point warranting clearance.
(2) Deteriorating condition because of a defect not correctable by normal maintenance.
(:3) Extensive minor defects which, taken collectively, are causing the building to have
a deteriorating effect on the surrounding area.
(4) Inadequate original construction or alterations.
(5) Inadequate or unsafe plumbing, heating, or electrical facilities.
(6) Other equally significant building deficiencies.

1 MANUAL § 3-1, 1.
221. Environmental deficiencies included:
(I) Overcrowding or improper location of structures on the land.
(2) Excessive dwelling unit density.
(:3) Conversions to incompatible types of uses, such as roominghouses among family
dwellings.
(4) Obsolete building types, such as large residences or other buildings which through
lack of use or maintenance have a blighting influence.
(5) Detrimental land uses or conditions, such as incompatible uses, structures in mixed
use, or adverse influences from noise, smoke, or fumes.
(6) Unsafe, congested, poorly designed, or otherwise deficient streets.
(7) Inadequate public utilities or community facilities contributing to unsatisfactory
living conditions or economir decline.
(8) Other equally significant environmental deficiencies.
I MANUAL § 3-1, 1-2.
222. In addition the surveyor had to establish that the deficiencies be envenly distributed throughout the area.
Either building deficiencies or environmental deficiencies necessary to establish the

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

ing Census indicated that twenty-one percent of the houses in the
area were substandard, the neighborhood seemed likely to qualify
for rehabilitation if the requisite environmental deficiencies ex22
isted.
If, however, any parts of the university neighborhood were to
be cleared and subsequently redeveloped, Clarke and Rapuano had
to find that those sections met a nominally stricter standard for
clearance projects. Since the clearance of houses necessarily involved marked personal inconvenience to the displaced residents,
the Urban Renewal Manual required as a preliminary matter that
the necessity for the clearance be satisfactorily demonstrated in
every case24 and that alternatives to clearance be fully explored in
an attempt to limit the number of demolitions. 2 51 If the area still
appeared to require clearance, however, it had to conform to one of
two alternative clearance formulas. The first clearance formula was
a severe one and required Clarke and Rapuano to determine that
50% of the buildings in the proposed clearance zone were "structureligibility of a project area must be present to a reasonable degree in all parts of the area.
If any sizable part of the project area fails to meet this test, it must be justified by one
of the following:
(1) Inclusion of the part is necessary to achieve the urban renewal objectives

for the total project area.
(2) Inclusion of the part is necessary to bring the project area to a sound
boundary.
Any included area not meeting the distribution-of-deficiencies test cannot be more
than a relatively minor portion of the project area.

1 MANUAL § 3-1, 2.
223. See note 169 supra.
224. "The necessity for clearance and redevelopment of a project area, or of any sizable
part thereof, must be satisfactorily demonstrated in all cases. If conditions warranting clearance and redevelopment do not exist, the appropriate treatment will be rehabilitation and
conservation, which may include spot clearance.
The LPA must (1) demonstrate the necessity for treatment through clearance and redevelopment, (2) show that the extent of clearance proposed is necessary, and (3) fully justify
the acquisition of indivudual parcels of basically sound property which involves high acquisition costs." (emphasis added) 1 MANUAL § 10-1, 1-3.
225. "In connection with either type of treatment-clearance and redevelopment or
conservation-the LPA must demonstrate that:
(1) The extent of clearance proposed is necessary.
(2) In the decelopment of the Urban Renewal Plan, full consideration has been given
to proposals which would result in retention of a greater number of buildings which are
structurally sound or capable of rehabilitation. HHFA will not concur in the acquisition
for demolition of property that is:
(1) Of such quality and potential use that its retention is compatible with the
achievement of the Urban Renewal Plan objectives for the project area.
(2) Capable of being improved and successfully integrated into the project."
1 MANUAL § 10-1, 3.
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ally substandard to a degree requiring clearance. '22 6 The phrase
structurally substandard to a degree requiring clearance was a term
of art which, reduced to its simplest form, meant any combination
of defects that would justify the clearance of a building.227 Since half
the buildings in the immediate clearance area had to be in such
condition, the first clearance formula was not an easy standard to
achieve. The second clearance formula, however, was not as severe.
It placed less emphasis on the condition of individual houses and
more on the general condition of the neighborhood. Under its terms
only twenty percent of the houses had to be substandard requiring
clearance and, in addition, another thirty-one percent of the houses
had to warrant clearance in order to remove general "blighting
conditions 2' ' from the neighborhood. "Blighting conditions" were
very similar to the environmental deficiencies that were necessary
for a rehabilitation area and included, among other factors, "excessive" dwelling unit density, "overcrowding" of buildings on the
land, and "inadequate" street layouts. 2 9 Since one of the major
objectives of the Nashville university project was to provide cleared
land for campus expansion, it was necessary for Clarke and Rapuano to determine whether the areas immediately adjoining each
campus would be eligible for clearance under either the first or
second clearance formula. The 1960 Housing Census finding that
the entire neighborhood contained only twenty-one percent sub226. "In a built-up project area or sizable part thereof which is proposed for clearance
and redevelopment, one of the following conditions must exist:
(1) More than 50 percent of the buildings, not including accessory outbuildings, must
be structurally substandard to a degree requiring clearance as determined by specific
criteria consistent with the definition set forth below." 1 MANUAL § 10-1, 2.
227. "Buildings classified as 'structurally substandard to a degree requiring clearance'
must contain defects in structural elements and/or a combination of deficiencies in essential
utilities and facilities, light and ventilation, fire protection (including adequate egress), layout and condition of interior partitions, or similar factors, which defects and/or deficiencies
are of sufficient total significance to justify clearance. Additional buildings warranting clearance in order to remove blighting influences shall be classified and reported separately."
228. "More than 20 percent of the buildings must be structurally substandard to a
degree requiring clearance, and additional clearance, in an amount bringing the total to more
than 50 percent of the buildings, must be warranted to effectively remove existing blighting
influences such as:
(a) Inadequate street layout.
(b) Incompatible uses or land use relationships.
(c) Overcrowding of buildings on the land.

(d) Excessive dwelling unit density.
Ce) Obsolete buildings not suitable for improvement or conversion.
MC)Other identified hazards to health and safety and to the general well-being of the
community."

1 MANUAL § 10-1, 1-2.
229.

Id.
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standard housing made it unlikely that any area near a campus
would be able to qualify under the first formula with its requirement
that over fifty percent of the houses be so substandard as to require
clearance. It was far more likely that any area that would be used
for university expansion would have to qualify under the second
formula with its relative emphasis on the general inadequacy of the
neighborhood itself rather than the individual houses it contained.
2.

Application of the Federal Standards

As those who were closest to the project were stibsequently
quite willing to admit, the Nashville university area was not a
slum. 31' Moreover, there were many other neighborhoods in Nashville that were in far worse condition.2 3' Nevertheless the professional engineers who worked for Clarke and Rapuano and the Nashville Housing Authority agreed that even if the area was not a slum
or even a badly blighted area, it did qualify for federal urban renewal under the necessarily elastic terms laid down in the Urban
Renewal Manual.2Z2 In defining rehabilitation and clearance areas
the Manual made numerous references to "inadequate" or "excessive" or "incompatible" conditions but made no attempt at defining
the terms in a practical way that a working engineer could use to
assess the condition of a particular house or an actual neighborhood.
Nor were the officials of the Urban Renewal Administration much
more helpful. Although urban renewal was a national program ostensibly based on national standards for participation, in reality the
working definition of the eligibility standards to be applied by such
firms as Clarke and Rapuano was a local matter, to be decided by
the surveying firm in consultation with local and federal urban renewal officials. In practice, the URA tolerated a reasonably wide
variation in qualification procedures from one city to another. What
constituted "excessive" density of dwelling units in one city might
be entirely reasonable in another, depending upon variations in
municipal codes and the professional opinion of the engineer surveying the area.
Before Clarke and Rapuano could survey the university area to
determine whether any part of it was qualified for rehabilitation or
clearance, the firm had to devise its own working version of the
230. Interview with Mr. Jack Herrington, Executive Director, Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency (the successor agency to the NHA) in Nashville, Tennessee, Sept.
13, 1973. "The area was not a slum area but it was a qualified area."
231. Interview with Alexander Koltowich, Resident Engineer, Clarke and Rapuano, in
Nashville, Tennessee, Nov. 6, 1973. "There are scores of areas in town worse than this area."
232. Id.
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Urban Renewal Manual standards. It did so by using a combination
of its own engineers' professional sense of what constituted adequacy in construction and the city of Nashville's current zoning
ordinance.23 1 The definition of "inadequate plumbing," a building
deficiency which would help qualify the area for rehabilitation, was
derived from the Clarke and Rapuano staff's professional opinion of
modern plumbing standards. Thus although all the plumbing in the
eventual clearance area was in workable condition,z" some plumbing was deemed inadequate if the pipes were not in "modern condition" as judged by the surveyors? 5 " On the other hand a major
"blighting condition" that would serve to qualify the area for clearance under the second clearance formula was defined by reference
to Nashville's most recent zoning ordinance. The standard for determining what constituted the "overcrowding of structures on the
land" was taken directly from the ordinance.2 A majority of houses
in the area were built before the ordinance was adopted, and a
number were either built on lots that were subsequently deemed to
be insufficient in size or were centered upon their lots in such a
fashion as to crowd too closely to an adjoining house. These nonconforming uses were entirely legal but under the Clarke and Rapuano standard for inspection they were considered blighting influences that could warrant the clearance of the area. In another instance the Clarke and Rapuano staff defined an Urban Renewal
Manual term by using both the Nashville zoning ordinance and
their own sense of professional building standards. "Excessive
dwelling unit density" was not defined by the Manual but was
considered both an environmental deficiency and a blighting influ233. Id. The ProjectArea Report placed on public record at the Metropolitan Clerk's
office by the NHA on July 27, 1967, also describes in general terms the working standards
employed by Clarke and Rapuano. In addition the testimony given by Mr. Koltowich, in the
Adair-Gardner lawsuit on August 12, 1971, at pages 468-581 of the trial transcript adds more
details about the survey process and its evaluation standards. The testimony given at that
trial will hereinafter be referred to as Trial Transcript.
134. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Housing Census of Nashville, Tennessee p. 12 (1960).
The census revealed that nearly ninety per cent of the area's plumbing was "sound" and that
all of the area houses contained flush toilets. In the East Nashville project on the other hand,
privies were still in use in the project area at the time the program was begun.
235. Trial Transcriptof Mr. Alexander Koltowich p. 562-67.
"Q: Would you consider any bathroom that had a tub and a commode and a lavatory, would
you consider that an adequate bathroom if it worked?
Mr. Koltowich: Yes, if it worked, and the plumbing pipes that ran to it were in modem
condition.
Q: You mean workable condition?
Mr. Koltowich: No, I mean modem condition."
236. The zoning ordinance was enacted in 1933 and was used as one of Clarke and
Rapuano's standards in 1962. ProjectArea Report, Code R 212, 9 (1967).
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ence warranting clearance. The Clarke and Rapuano staff chose to
define the term in two ways. First, the zoning ordinance for the area
permitted only one to two family dwellings. Thus a four family
dwelling constructed before the passage of the ordinance was considered to be excessive dwelling unit density and a blighting influence warranting clearance even though it was a legal nonconforming use in the neighborhood. :7 Second, even if a single
homeowner chose to convert his house in such a way as to provide
adequate zoning space in his house for two families, the survey staff
chose to regard the house as having excessive dwelling unit density
because the house was originally built for one family not two. '
Thus a family of six in one house was not considered excessive but
if the same house was converted for use by two families with two
persons each it would be considered to have excessive dwelling unit
density and to be sufficiently blighting to warrant clearance.
The standards which Clarke and Rapuano ultimately devised
to evaluate the Nashville university center were approved by both
the NHA and later by the URA. The firm then began to apply them
to each individual house in the 959 acre area that was proposed for
the five institution project. From September 1962 through January
1963 a two man team inspected over three thousand five hundred
buildings, compiling individual evaluation sheets for each. As the
buildings were evaluated, the individual sheets were checked for
accuracy by the head of Clarke and Rapuano's Nashville office.
Together the three men rated each house as needing minor repair,
needing major repair or as substandard and beyond repair. In addition, any house that was regarded by the surveyors as obsolete was
so designated 2: ' and a darkened circle affixed to its place on the
master map of the area. Upon completion of the exterior inspection
237. Q: And why did it warrant clearance?
Mr. Koltowich: "The zoning ordinances permit one to two family dwellings ..... Four
dwellings is excessive.
Q: Did you count as a blighting influence warranting clearance, the buildings that were
constructed before the zoning regulations that were in effect in 1967, that were a nonconforming use in the zoned area? Did you count them as a blighting influence warranting clearance in the clearance area?
Mr. Koltowich: Yes.
Q: Why is that a blighting influence warranting clearance?
Mr. Koltowich: Because this was a residential A zone, which was limited to one and two
families, and this would come up with an excessive dwelling unit density on a property
within the zoning area where you would have entirely one and two family units, one or
two family units.
Trial Transcript, 509-10.
238. Testimony of Mr. Alexander Koltowich, Trial Transcript 522 (1971).
239. Interview with Mr. Alexander Koltowich.
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in January 1963, the survey team joined a representative from the
Nashville Division of Inspection and Permits for a random interior
inspection to determine whether the interior conditions of each
house were consistent with the survey results for the exterior. Interior inspections were conducted for houses that were regarded as
standard, needing minor repair or needing major repair but those
houses which had previously been classified as substandard were
not thought to be worth further evaluation and were excluded from
the interior survey. 211 In addition to the exterior and interior inspections, the Clarke and Rapuano team conducted a third study to
determine the nature and extent of the environmental deficiencies
in the area.2" ' On the basis of their three different kinds of inspection, the team at last concluded that the area as a whole qualified
for rehabilitation and that among others, the area nearest Vanderbilt was qualified for clearance under the second clearance formula.
Some thirty percent of the houses near Vanderbilt were found to be
structurally substandard warranting clearance and an additional
twenty-four percent of the houses in the area were found to constitute blighting influences warranting clearance. 42 With the area properly qualified for urban renewal, Clarke and Rapuano released the
inspection sheets, the maps of the area and the final tabulation of
results to the staff of the NHA for their use in further planning and
for ultimate submission to the Urban Renewal Administration for
federal funding.
While the professional qualifications and the integrity of the
Clarke and Rapuano staff were beyond reproach, the process
whereby they determined that the university area was appropriate
for urban renewal clearance was more troublesome for some area
residents. The determination that the area was appropriate for
clearance was the first and most critical step in a long line of decisions that would ultimately lead to a loss of the homes of the area
landowners. As a practical matter some value existed in assuring
those whose property might be taken that the procedure used to
evaluate their neighborhood was unquestionably fair and free from
doubt. Yet the firm hired to evaluate the area had, again as a practi240. Project Area Report, Code R 212, 8. The failure to include substandard houses in
the interior survey subsequently proved to be a source of anger to the area residents who
believed that their homes were thus prematurely foreclosed from a better ranking. Testimony
of Celeste Albright, Trial Transcript, 666-71 (1971).
241. Id. at 2.
242. 30.6% of the houses in the clearance area were found to be structurally substandard
warranting clearance. 23.7% were categorized as "blighting influences warranting clearance."
Id. at 14.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

cal matter, an apparent political interest in the outcome of its survey. Even if the legal elements of a conflict of interest were not
present-as indeed a federal judge subsequently found-the selection of Clarke and Rapuano to survey the area was inevitably bound
to spark an avoidable controversy about the firm's impartiality.
Similarly, as a practical if not a legal matter, some value existed in
ensuring that the process which derived the standards used to judge
the neighborhood was in its own right a transparently fair procedure. Yet the standards applied to the area were never subjected to
public scrutiny or debate. The original standards for a clearance
area as delineated in the Urban Renewal Manual were promulgated
unilaterally by a federal agency, without the benefit of the public
hearing that normally accompanied federal rule making. Moreover,
the standards themselves were so inherently ambiguous as to require broad local discretion in their interpretation and application,
particularly in the case of the second clearance formula whereby
only twenty percent of the houses were to be "structurally substandard requiring clearance" and the remaining thirty-one percent
needed only represent such general blighting influences as "overcrowding of structures" or "excessive dwelling unit density." Yet
the local interpretations of such broad concepts, which ultimately
had a major influence in determining whether the area was to be
cleared, were no more open to discussion than the formulation of the
original standards.
Instead, perhaps even necessarily, the professional engineers of
Clarke and Rapuano reached their own operative definitions of the
Manual standards subject only to later consultation with other engineers from the NHA or the URA. While their determinations were
made in complete good faith, they were not entirely free from doubt.
The decision to use the Nashville zoning ordinance as a decisive
indicator of blighted houses that warranted clearance might reasonably have been subject to further discussion. As an indirect statement about the undesirable building practices of the past, the
Nashville zoning code no doubt had merit as a standard by which
to judge the quality of housing in a neighborhood. Moreover it was
an easy guide to use, subject to few ambiguities of interpretation.
Yet the Nashville zoning code was probably never intended to serve
as a final determinant of which neighborhoods in the city should be
cleared and which preserved. Had it been so intended, the doctrine
of non-conforming uses would not have been observed and those
areas that did not comply with the code could have been put into
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immediate conformity by an enforced rebuilding of the neighborhood after the code was first passed. Similarly, Clarke and
Rapuano's decision that "excessive" dwelling unit capacity would
be determined by the number of dwelling units the structure was
originally built to contain rather than, for example, by reference to
the number of persons per square or cubic foot the structure might
properly hold could have been viewed as a convenient but perhaps
unduly narrow standard. Yet just such decisions made by professional engineers who were removed from the persons whose houses
might be affected helped determine whether a future deprivation of
property was to take place. The nature of the Urban Renewal
Manual standards and the scope for their discretionary local interpretation was perhaps best summarized by the able and conscientious NHA engineer responsible for the university area project who
later observed "If you use the HUD [URA] regulations, you could
define anything as a slum. '243
B. Delay 1963-1967
Although Clarke and Rapuano determined that the entire 959
acre project area was qualified for federal urban renewal funds in
the winter of 1963, the final plan for renewing and redeveloping the
area was delayed for four and a half years thereafter. The delay was
occasioned by the difficulties inherent in attempting to coordinate
the policies and activities of a metropolitan government, a housing
agency responsible for four urban renewal plans and five educational institutions. In the latter part of 1962 the city government of
Nashville merged its governmental powers into those of Davidson
county to form a new, unified, city-county government. In the ensuing election for Mayor of Metropolitan Nashville, the main proponent of Nashville's urban renewal program, Ben West, was defeated
by his fellow Vanderbilt alumnus County Judge Beverly Briley. Like
West, Mayor-elect Briley was an advocate of urban renewal and had
at one time addressed a Senate subcommittee on the need for extending urban renewal to the counties as well as the cities of America. 24 Briley, however, was concerned that the new Metropolitan
Nashville treasury would be unable to afford the four ambitious
development programs that West had initiated. Although it was
unlikely that the university area project would be an expense to the
243. Interview with Mr. John Acuff, Jr., Director of Development, Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency, in Nashville, Tennessee, Oct. 1973.
244. Nashville Tennessean, Jan. 28, 1959, at 7, col. 6.
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city, the NHA nevertheless delayed planning for six months to allow
2 45
the new Mayor time to assess the proposed program.
In the meantime changes of attitude and changes of leaders at
the participating institutions led to additional delays and alterations in the size of the area. Under pressure from their district
councilman who opposed the use of urban renewal on philosophic
grounds, the Presidents of Fisk University and Meharry Medical
College withdrew from the proposed plan. 26 The withdrawal of Fisk
and Meharry, coupled with a reduction in the availability of federal
funds, triggered a reduction in the size of the area from 959 acres to
700 and then again to 527 .247 Nor was it entirely clear that the
remaining three schools were ready to sustain even such a greatly
reduced project. Although Vanderbilt University's financial position was more secure,25 it experienced a change of administrators
which clouded its original commitment to the project. On February
1, 1963 Chancellor Harvie Branscomb retired and was succeeded in
office by Dr. Alexander Heard. Upon assuming office, Chancellor
Heard initiated a study of the future needs of the university including the availability of funds with which to sustain an expansion
program. Although the NHA organized a special meeting between
the new Chancellor and the drafter of Section 112, Julian Levi, the
NHA was still unable to get an official commitment to the project
from the Vanderbilt administration pending the outcome of the
Chancellor's study. 249 When Gerald Gimre of the NHA was equally
unsuccessful in his efforts with the leaders of Peabody and Scarritt,
the planning phase was informally postponed for still another six
month period.?- Planning was resumed once again in 1964 in the
245. Interview with Mr. John Acuff, note 243 supra.
246. Id.
247. The proposed project area was reduced from 959 acres to approximately 700 in
1963. The area was reduced to 527 acres in 1965 with the elimination of an area to the north
of West End Avenue.
248. In 1956 Mr. Harold S. Vanderbilt had established a living trust that was to be
conveyed to the university upon his death. The corpus ultimately grew to 23.7 million dollars.
In the intervening years the university was allowed to secure loans with the corpus of the trust
as security. Mr. Vanderbilt in turn absorbed the cost of the interest on the loans, thus
allowing the university interest free loans during his lifetime as well as the corpus of the trust
thereafter. Of the 23.7 million dollars, approximately 12 million dollars was ultimately committed to land acquisition. Interview with Dr. George Kaludis, Vice Chancellor, Vanderbilt
University, in Nashville, Tenn., May 15, 1974.
249. On April 9, 1963, a conference was held at the chancellor's dining room on the
Vanderbilt campus with Julian Levi .and Neil Carothers, President of the University Circle
Development Foundation of Cleveland who described their experience with Section 112 projects. Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA number 9907.
250. At a meeting of the NHA on August 5, 1963, Gerald Gimre, Executive Director of
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course of which the NHA conducted a series of meetings with the
merchants in the area to determine how their interests might be
advanced through the project.25 Nevertheless, 1964 lengthened into
the fall of 1965 and Charles Hawkins, who had become the Director
of Urban Renewal for the NHA, became increasingly impatient for
the planning phase to conclude and the implementation of the project to begin. Under his urging a NHA site office in the project area
was opened for area residents in the summer of 1965.52 The site
office was equipped with maps and printed explanations of the proposed project and a full-time staff to answer the questions of the
residents of the neighborhood. As a supplement to the site office on
November 15, Hawkins and Gimre responded to an invitation from
a local Parents-Teachers Association and described the project to a
PTA meeting held at Eakin School in the project area. Hawkins and
Gimre described in necessarily general terms the still tentative plan
for the 527 acre project. According to one member of the audience
the NHA staff members did not describe the plans for a clearance
area and the audience was requested by the presiding officer of the
PTA to refrain from questioning the staff about individual parcels
of land.3 Whatever its limitations, the November 15 PTA meeting
represented the first in a series of similar meetings for residents that
Hawkins promised to hold in the future. In addition to his attempts
to publicize the plan among the area residents, Hawkins proposed
that the formal plan for the area and an application for federal funds
should be forwarded to the Nashville Metropolitan Council for final
political approval before they were submitted to the URA. Hawkins
noted that the delay between 1961 and 1965 had created hardship
for the staff of the NHA, which had difficulty keeping maps and
proposals up to date, and serious inconvenience to the residents of
the area who were uncertain about the status of their property. He
proposed that the plan and application for funds be submitted to
the Council for a two-month period of deliberation to begin in December of 1965 and to end February 1, 1966. In the course of the two
the NHA reported that the principal difficulty lay at Vanderbilt, where the change in administrations had not allowed the new Chancellor to determine the future needs of Vanderbilt
nor the availability of funds. Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA, number 100937.
251. On July 10, 1964, the NHA held meetings with the business merchants in the
Hillsboro Village section of the project area to discuss how alternative roadways in the area
would affect their business. Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA, number 10759.
252. The site office was opened on July 6, 1965. The NHA circular which announced
its opening emphasized that there was no completed plan for the area but that the NHA staff
would be available to discuss and explain the general implications of the project for the area.
253. Testimony of Mrs. Charles Adair, Trial Transcript, 9-10; interview with Mrs.
Charles Adair in Nashville, Tennessee, May 27, 1974.
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months the Council would hear the bill on three separate readings
and would conduct a separate public hearing on the merits of the
proposal." 4 Hawkins's timetable seemed to allow a reasonable
amount,of time for deliberate reflection on the part of the Metropolitan Councilmen and a reasonable opportunity for members of the
public at large to express their opinions. The timetable was blocked,
however, by Councilman Glenn Ferguson, one of two councilmen
whose districts were still affected by the now reduced university
center plan. 2" ' Unlike his colleague, Councilman Richard Taylor,
who supported the urban renewal plan, 2 6 Councilman Ferguson was
less certain of the plan's value and inclined to explore its potential
adverse effect on the neighborhood residents. Ferguson argued that
the residents should have further opportunities to learn about the,
project before it was presented to the Council. He forcefully suggested that both he and the NHA should conduct further public
meetings for the area residents and that in the meantime the presentation of the project to the Council should be postponed. Reluctantly Hawkins agreed to Ferguson's suggestion and his plan for
submission to the Council was withdrawn.27
Although the presentation of the plan to the Council was delayed in order to give the NHA and Ferguson further time to meet
with the area residents, only one such meeting was subsequently
held in 1966 and it was held for residents of a neighborhood that was
later deleted from the project area. In August of 1966, Hawkins
secured memoranda of understanding from the heads of Vanderbilt,
Peabody and Scarritt, firmly binding the three schools to an urban
renewal project in the event the plan was approved by the Metropolitan Council and the Urban Renewal Administration. On the
strength of these commitments, Hawkins sought to establish a new
timetable for presentation of the plan to the Council. Under his new
schedule the Council's consideration of the plan would be preceded
by four public meetings to be held in the project area during the
254. Hawkins proposed the plan would be presented to the Council for first reading on
December 21, 1965; a public hearing would be held three weeks later on January 11, 1966; a
second reading a week later on January 18, and a third and final reading on February 1, 1966.

Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA, number 11812-13.
255. Councilman Ferguson expressed his opposition to Hawkins time-table at a meeting
held at the NHA on November 16, 1966. Id.
256. A graduate of Vanderbilt, Councilman Taylor was originally opposed to the project
on the philosophic grounds that it was improper to exercise eminent domain on behalf of a
private university. He later became convinced of the value of the plan for the area he represented and subsequently became the sponsor for the project in the Metropolitan Council.
Interview with former Councilman Richard Taylor, in Nashville, Tennessee, Feb. 12, 1974.
257. See note 254 supra.

19741

SPECIAL PROJECT

month of September. Thus during September the area residents
would have a full opportunity to hear the plan described and to
present their criticisms of it to the NHA. Both the NHA and the
area residents would then have two months during October and
November to air their differences and to amend the plan where that
seemed desirable before it was finally presented to the Council at
the end of November for three readings and a public hearing during
a period of two and a half additional months. 58 If anything, Hawkins' second timetable was longer than his first, allowing as it did
over five months of time for public consideration of the university
center project. Ironically, however, Councilman Ferguson was once
again responsible for its postponement. After the first of the four
September neighborhood meetings had been conducted by Hawkins, Ferguson resigned from the Council to run for another office, the
postition of Metropolitan Trustee. Until his position as Councilman
could be filled in a special election, the members of his district
would be unrepresented in the Council at a time when the Council
would be giving consideration to a plan that could fundamentally
change the neighborhood. In deference to Ferguson's request to
delay consideration of the plan until his successor had been elected,
on September 21, 1966 the NHA once again abandoned its plans
for presenting the project to the Council and cancelled the three
remaining meetings with the area residents.25 Thus of the four
meetings scheduled to be held in the project area in September
1966, only one was successfully implemented before the entire
schedule for presenting the plan to the Council was cancelled.26
In the early winter of 1967, the Department of Housing and
Urban Affairs (HUD), the successor to the Housing and Home Finance Agency and to the Urban Renewal Administration, began to
cut back on its funding of urban renewal projects. HUD's new policy
was a direct result of increased federal military spending in Southeast Asia and it resulted in a sharp drop in funds available for
Nashville's university center project. HUD officials recommended
258. Hawkins's timetable called for 4 public meetings in the project area at the end of
September and a two month pause for reflection during October and November before the
plan was presented to Council on November 30, 1966. During the two and a half months from
November 30, 1966 to February 15, 1967, the Council would consider the bill on three separate
readings and a single major public hearing. Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA, August
16, 1966.
259. Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA, number 2449 for a meeting held Sept.
21, 1966. NHA Circular dated Sept. 21, 1967.
260. The residents from an area bounded by Grand Avenue, Broadway and Villa Place
were invited to the meeting. The area was eliminated from the project in 1967. An NHA
Circular dated September 1966 shows the area for which the meeting was held.
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that the university area should be divided into two parts?. ' Area I
would include Vanderbilt University's clearance area, a clearance
area for St. Thomas Hospital which had expressed an interest in
constructing a new facility near Vanderbilt's medical school2 6 2 and
a rehabilitation zone for the remaining houses. Since Vanderbilt
had already purchased a substantial amount of land in its clearance
area and since it appeared financially able to purchase the remaining lots, NHA officials suggested that the federal funds that were
presently available should be used to sponsor an immediate project
in Area I."3 The renewal project in Area II which included Peabody
College and Scarritt, would be deferred until further federal funds
became available. In April 1967, the NHA divided the university
center project into Area I and Area II. Area II, the Peabody and
Scarritt project section, was destined to go unfunded and unfulfilled. And as luck would have it the sole meeting held for the area
residents in September of 1966 had been for the benefit of those who
lived in a part of Area 11.264
With the division of the project into Area I and Area II, implementation of the university center plan gained impetus from an
unexpected source. In the first week of July 1967, HUD issued an
ultimatium to the Nashville Housing Authority. If Nashville did not
submit a final application to HUD for a loan and grant for the
university center by August 18th, HUD would refuse to fund the
project altogether." 5 HUD's deadline was an understandable reac261. On February 2,1967, John Edmunds, Assistant Regional Administrator for HUD's
Atlanta office called Scott Fillebrown, Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of the NHA,
and informed Fillebrown that the capital grant which HUD had reserved for the university
area project had been reduced to $7.9 million. On February 6 a delegation from the NHA
visited Edmunds and his staff in Atlanta whereupon the HUD staff members recommended
that the project be divided into two parts. "It was the view of the conferees that the first stage
Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA,
. . . should embrace the Vanderbilt area .
number 12710.
262. Section 112 was amended in 1961 to allow hospitals as well as educational institutions to participate in the urban renewal program. 42 U.S.C. § 1463 (1970). St. Thomas
became interested in joining Nashville's Section 112 project several years after planning had
first begun. St. Thomas along with Vanderbilt became one of the two institutional sponsors
of the project that was approved by the Metropolitan Council in August 1967. St. Thomas
withdrew from the project in late 1969. Whether because its acquisition area was limited to
fifteen acres or because it was not as large an institution, St. Thomas did not attract the same
bitterness from the area residents that Vanderbilt did. Since St. Thomas was not a participant in the events after 1969, its role in the present study has been foreshortened.
263. Letter from Charles Hawkins of NHA to John Edmunds of HUD, March 10, 1967.
264. See note 260 supra.
265. On May 19, 1967, HUD's Local Public Agency Letter 419 announced that where
project planning had been in progress for more than 36 months and the final section of the
local application for federal project funds had not been received by HUD, HUD would no
longer continue to reserve funds for the project. In June or July of 1967 John Edmunds of
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tion to the five years of delay which had characterized the planning
of the university area plan. If after five years Nashville could not
decide whether to initiate a formal urban renewal plan for the area,
the money which HUD had earmarked for the project should be
given to another, better organized, community. The NHA's response to HUD's ultimatum was swift in coming. On July 5th, the
Board of Commissioners and the executive staff of the NHA met
with Mayor Briley, Chancellor Heard, and Councilman James
Hamilton, the recently elected successor to Councilman Ferguson. " '
The purpose of the meeting was to construct a schedule which would
enable the project participants to gain Council approval of the plan
for the area and of an application to HUD for federal funds before
the August 18th deadline. The schedule which was ultimately
agreed upon called for a public meeting for the entire neighborhood
to be held at Eakin School on July 19th. The single meeting was to
take the place of the series of meetings which Charles Hawkins had
attempted to arrange during the past two years and included both
a formal presentation of the plan by the NHA staff and an opportunity for the residents to ask questions or make statements. On
August 3rd the plan would then be introduced to the Council. On
August 7th the Council would combine the second reading of the bill
with a public hearing on its merits and on August 15th the Council
would presumably give the plan final approval upon its third reading."' Mayor Briley would then approve the plan on the 16th, the
NHA would dispatch it on the 17th and on August 18th, 1967 HUD
would at long last receive the final application for federal funding
for Nashville's university center urban renewal project. Thus in
response to a federal administrative deadline, Nashville was to compress into a period of four weeks a process of local debate and political approval which in the past had been thought to require two to
five full months." Moreover, the Metropolitan Council was called
HUD's Atlanta office advised Gerald Gimre of the NHA that he would recommend that funds
be retained for Area I of the university center project if the final application from the city of4
Nashville were received by August 18, 1967. Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA, number
13135. On July 5, 1967, Edmunds cabled Gimre that the final application would have to arrive
in Atlanta by August 18th or it would not be funded. Cable from John Edmunds of HUD to
Gerald Gimre of NHA, July 5, 1967.
266. Other members of the meeting included two members of the Board of Commissioners, four NHA staff members, the Director of the Metropolitan Planning Commission and the
Senior Vice Chancellor of Vanderbilt University. Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA,
number 13135,
267. Id.
268. For the alternative schedules proposed by Charles Hawkins in the years before 1967
see notes 254 and 258 supra.
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upon to act in the full knowledge that any further delay for any
reason would irretrievably prejudice the possibility of federal
funding for the project.
V.

LOCAL AND FEDERAL APPROVAL OF THE PLAN

A.

1967-1968

The Plan and Its Advocates

The extrinsic nature of the urban renewal plan that was to be
presented to the Metropolitan Council in August 1967 made its
passage seem relatively certain. As the original drafters of Section
112 had intended, the financial advantages that would accrue to
Nashville if the Council approved the plan were so extremely attractive as to discourage critical evaluation of the underlying merits of
the proposal. As explained to the Council members and to the general public, the net cost of the entire project was to be some 21.8
million dollars. Ordinarily the city of Nashville would have to contribute one-third that sum or some 7 million dollars. In the case of
a Section 112 project, however, the city could take credit for the
expenditures made by the sponsoring institutions. Thus the City of
Nashville could use as its share of the project costs the 11.8 million
dollars that would be spent for land acquisition and clearance by
Vanderbilt, and St. Thomas Hospital. Since the 11.8 million was
more than the city's one-third portion of the cost, the city did not
have to spend its own money toward the cost of the project. Moreover, by simply approving the project, the city could actually make
money for itself. The federal government was obligated to pay Nashville the difference between the local expenditures on the project
and the total cost of the project, up to two-thirds of the net cost of
the project. Since the sponsoring institutions were to- spend 11.8
million dollars on a project whose total cost was 21.8 million dollars,
the federal government would pay Nashville the difference of 10
million dollars. Since the total cost of the project was to be borne
by the sponsoring institutions, the city was free to spend the 10
million dollars of federal money for the installation of new separated
storm and sanitary sewers, new roadways and the acquisition of
land to expand the grade schools in the urban renewal area. In
return for this virtual windfall of 10 million dollars, the city had only
to spend 500,000 dollars on necessary improvements immediately
outside the project area" 9 and to assent to the NHA's use of eminent
269. Background Statement: University Center Urban Renewal Area-One: Tenn. R51 issued by the NHA in July 1967. Placed on public file with the Metropolitan Clerk's office
on August 4. Nashville Tennessean, July 12, 1967, at 1, col. 1; Nashville Banner, Aug. 7, 1967,
at 1, col. 5.
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domain in the event a property owner refused to sell his land to a
sponsoring institution. To a Council that was going to have to improve the sewers, roadways and schools in the area in any event, the
opportunity to do so without cost to the voting taxpayer aided the
plan's approval. Moreover, Mayor Briley had endorsed the project
and his backing alone was said to be worth twenty-five to thirty
votes in a forty-member Council. 20 Taking its cue from Mayor Briley, the Chamber of Commerce, representing Nashville's downtown
commercial interests also threw its weight behind the plan. 27 ' In

addition the two Nashville newspapers contributed their editorial
support to the project as well. The morning Nashville Tennessean,
which had once expressed its doubts about the wisdom of the project, reversed directions and acclaimed the plan as an economic
bargain for the city. 272 The front page political columnist for the

evening Nashville Banner also endorsed the plan in the same terms,
dwelling at length upon what he called an "extra value bargain"
that an economy-minded Council could "buy" for $500,000. 2 13 In

sum by the time the much-reduced university area plan was finally
presented to the Metropolitan Council, the economic benefits that
its passage would produce had been extolled by the Mayor of Metropolitan Nashville, the Chamber of Commerce and Nashville's two
daily newspapers.
B. The Response By the Neighborhood
The only opposition to the project that existed in the city of
Nashville in August 1967 came from the residents of the project area
that was to be cleared for university and hospital expansion. Six
years of delay and changing plans had resulted in a 600 acre reduction in the size of the project area, from some 959 acres in 1961 to a
modest 317 acres in Area I in 1967. Of the 317 acres included in the
final university area plan, approximately 110 were to be acquired
and cleared for redevelopment by Vanderbilt University, another 15
were to be used for the site of a new private hospital and the buildings in the remaining acrease were to receive rehabilitation
270. Interview with Councilman Richard Taylor, in Nashville, Tennessee, Feb. 12,
1974. Councilman Taylor sponsored the plan before the Council.
271. Id.
272. "Hopefully the plans will be given final approval ....
with or without urban

renewal, these developments are going to occur." Nashville Tennessean, Aug. 6, 1967, at 4B,
col. 1.
273. Battle, University Center Urban Renewal Is a Bargain,Nashville Banner, Aug. 11,
1967, at 1, col. 3.
274. HUD Region III Report on Tenn. R-51, dated Oct. 23, 1967.
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treatment. 74 The opposition to the university center plan was to
stem primarily from the homeowners in the 125 acre area destined
to be cleared and redeveloped by Vanderbilt University and St.
Thomas Hospital.
1. The Characterof the Project Area
Although the neighborhood had been certified by Clarke and
Rapuano as eligible for clearance under the urban renewal regulations, the area did not bear all of the usual characteristics of an
urban slum appropriate for razing and redevelopment. According to
the 1960 federal housing census, the nearly five hundred buildings
in the clearance zone ranged in value from approximately 8,000 to
over 20,000 dollars. 75 The housing census had found that only 20
percent of the buildings in the area as a whole were "substandard."27 ' Similarly a diagnostic study conducted in Area I for the
NHA in 1964 and July of 1967 to determine the family and housing
needs of the entire area found that "this project is somewhat unique
in that the area is not typified by badly deteriorated structures,
chronic low income nor minority group occupance. ' ' 7 Instead another NHA sponsored study found an area characterized by an aging
but non-indigent population almost entirely free of welfare cases
and participants in related categorical assistance programs. " ' And
as the NHA staff determined in a study released in 1967, the median
income of the approximately 360 non-student residents in the clearance area ranged between $350 and $400 per month,25 an adequate
sum at the time and more than enough to make the majority ineligi275. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Census of Housing in Nashville, Tennessee, 12, Table 2,
census block 22 (1960).
276. See note 169 supra.
277. Project Area Report, R-216, 1.
278. Memorandum from Darlene Nolle to Dick Hume, Dec. 5, 1966. "A general survey
of a number of health and welfare services used by residents of the University Center Area
reveals that the area is not one of primary concern from the standpoint of social pathology.
Our findings indicate a non-indigent aging population for whom services are available if
needed. The non-indigency is evidenced by the small Department of Public Welfare family
services caseload-categorical assistance programs-old age assistance, aid to the blind, aid
to the disabled, and aid to families with dependent children-and defined services caseloads;
the Metro Welfare Commission's small financial and service caseload; only one OJT (On the
Job Training) and no Headstart enrollers in the area; and the small number of people receiving free health services.
The inference that the population was an aging one was drawn from the small numbers
of children receiving day care, group work and recreation, pupil personnel, child health, and
medical services and from the low rates of delinquency and dependent neglected children."
279. Project Area Report, Estimated Housing Requirements and Resources for Displaced Families, D HUD-6122, 5 and accompanying narrative statement.
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ble for public housing programs anywhere in the city.20 Although no
fuller statistical profiles of the clearance area existed, the neighborhood gave the appearance of being a white, essentially middle-class,
area populated by teachers, a sprinkling of professional men, university and hospital employees, a number of blue collar workers and
a substantial number of retired persons living on pensions which
they supplemented by renting rooms to college students. In addition, for an urban renewal area, there were a number of persons with
either single or multiple college degrees.2 8 1 On the whole the residents of the clearance area were as likely to understand the urban
renewal process and as likely to foresee its implications as any group
that was apt to encounter urban renewal in Nashville.
2.

Understanding the Project

During the course of the seven years from 1961 to 1967, however,
the residents of the neighborhood actually learned very little about
the proposed university center plan. Their lack of understanding
was no doubt caused in part by their preoccupation with their own
affairs and their inclination to ignore a project whose future seemed
less and less certain with the passage of time. As the project was
reduced in size from 900 to 700 to 500 and at last to 317 acres,2 2 it
seemed quite possible the entire plan would be abandoned completely, leaving the residents to live as they had before. Moreover,
the daunting complexity of the urban renewal process-with its
overlapping relationships between the sponsoring institutions, the
local housing authority, the Metropolitan government and the
Urban Renewal Administration-was not designed to encourage the
residents to study the project itself with any care. Yet while their
lack of knowledge about the university area project was no doubt
caused by the residents' own inattention it was furthered in no small
part by misleading or incomplete information distributed by both
the local and federal urban renewal authorities.
Although there is no reason to doubt the integrity or good faith
of the staff of the NHA, part of the information which they publicly
280. Id.
281. It is impossible to quantify the educational background of the clearance area
residents but it is apparent that the members of the citizen action groups that later grew up
in the neighborhood included persons with a substantial formal education. The membership
of the University Neighborhood Association consisted in part of Marie H. Means (B.A., M.A.,
Ph.D.), Celeste Albright (B.A., M.A., M.A.), Annie Stroud (B.A.), Mrs. David White (B.A.,
M.A.) and Mr. White (B.A., L.L.B.). Mr. Joseph Johnston, the Chairman of the Project Area
Committee formed in 1970 was also a college graduate.
282. See note 247 supra.
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distributed between 1961 and 1967 could not help but mislead the
residents of the area that was to be affected by the university project. For much of that time the NHA staff labored under the very
real difficulty of having to explain a project whose boundaries constantly shifted and whose future seemed clouded with doubt. Nevertheless, the public statements made by senior staff officers and the
leaflets mailed to the residents' homes combined to create an impression of the project that was inaccurate and misleading to any
residents who read their mail or newspapers. One recurring impression created by official NHA statements was that the university
area project was essentially a rehabilitation project rather than a
clearance program that would be enforced by the NHA's power of
eminent domain and that would result in the razing of over 100 acres
of homes. In the spring of 1962 Charles Hawkins, the Director of
Urban Renewal for the NHA, was called upon to rebut a newspaper
article which reported the university project was to involve the
widespread clearance of residences. Hawkins did so but in terms
that could only have been misleading to residents of the eventual
clearance area. "This is truly an urban RENEWAL program" (emphasis in original), Hawkins observed, "and not a slum clearance
project as such. We are trying to bring about renewal and rehabilitation as the neighborhood changes instead of waiting until it becomes depressed and then make the needed changes. . . . We
anticipate there will be comparatively few structural demolitions." 3 As a Section 112 project, however, the original and primary
purpose of the plan was to provide clearance space for campus expansion. Although the ratio of rehabilitation to clearance may have
favored rehabilitation, 28 4 the clearance of residential housing was
necessarily a substantial part of the Section 112 program. To dwell
upon the rehabilitation aspects of the project and to de-emphasize
the extent of the clearance area could only create a misleading impression about the nature of the program and its potential effect
upon those who lived in the project area. Yet from 1962 to 1968 the
NHA leaflets that were mailed to the area residents emphasized the
importance of rehabilitation and made only veiled or indirect references to the "orderly expansion" of the educational institutions in
the neighborhood.2 Moreover, in 1965 when the NHA staff first
283. Nashville Tennessean, April 11, 1962, at 9, col. 4.
284. The final plan projected approximately 125 acres for clearance out of a total project
area of 317 acres.
285. "The Urban Renewal Administration announced its approval on April 9, 1962, of
a Survey and Planning Grant Application for a University Center Urban Renewal Project.
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began to seek Council approval of their plans for the area, a wellknown columnist for the Nashville Banner ran a series of front page
articles on the project in an attempt to help the NHA explain the
plan to the public. The first article in the series bluntly proclaimed
that "This project is NOT a slum clearance program. . .. It is an
effort. . . to help this section of the community to readjust to new
trends and new land uses around the universities . . . ." (emphasis
in original).'6 Although the words of the article were those of the
columnist, the pattern of emphasis on the restorative nature of the
project mirrored the NHA's own public portrayal of the plan's objectives.
At the same time the NHA issued statements emphasizing the
importance of rehabilitation as a project goal, it also repeatedly
assured the area residents that they would have a full opportunity
to discuss the proposed plan in a series of public meetings before the
plan was cast into its final form. Charles Hawkins firmly announced
that:
The people in this area have a right to know exactly what is contemplated.
We intend to listen to the public and hear any suggestions they might have. If
any problems are brought to our attention in these neighborhood meetings we
will do our best to help the people solve them. This project is for their benefit
and we want them to be involved in it from start to finish. At this point,
however, we want to emphasize that nothing is final. We are ready to listen to
the people who will be affected by this project and to accept their suggestions.2'
Naturally, this news is of great interest to residents of this area. In order to avoid misunderstandings about the proposed Urban Renewal Project and the changes it may bring about,
residents of the area are provided the following facts.
-The purpose of a University Center Urban Renewal Project is to provide various improvements in a basicallysound neighborhood (new street and traffic facilities, sewers, sidewalks,
parks, etc.); and to make possible the orderly expansion of the colleges, hospitals and universities that mean so much to the future of this area." (emphasis added). NHA Circular to Area
Residents dated April 1962. When planning resumed again in 1964, a NHA brochure dated
March 4,1964, announced once again that the purpose of the project was to "provide various
improvements in a basically sound neighborhood." When the site office was opened in 1965
the circular announcing its opening made no reference to a clearance area but instead observed that "You may wish to learn how a particular property might be affected." The only
direct reference to clearance activities that appeared in the NHA materials distributed to
residents occurred in an August 1965 leaflet that assured residents that the "decision as to
areas to be acquired and cleared" would not be made until the end of the final planning
studies. The NHA Background Statement placed on public record at the Metropolitan
Clerk's office on August 4, 1967-three days before the formal public hearing on the project-made the first and apparently only official public acknowledgement before the project
received approval that the NHA would be specifically authorized to use eminent domain on
behalf of the sponsoring university and hospital. Background Statement, 4 (1967).
286. Nashville Banner, Dec. 6, 1965, at 1, col. 1.
287. Nashville Tennessean, April 11, 1962, at 9, col. 4.
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NHA circulars made the same point and encouraged the residents
of the area to attend such meetings in order to receive direct answers
to their questions and concerns.2 m Moreover, the NHA conducted
several such public meetings for the merchants in the commercial
areas outside the clearance zone. 5 But with the exception of the
PTA meeting presentation in the fall of 1965,21" in the course of the
planning period, no such meetings were held for the homeowners in
the neighborhood that was ultimately selected for clearance. The
meeting that was held in 1965 focused on the plan for an area that
was 200 acres larger than the project ultimately presented to the
Metropolitan Council two years later. Although the interruptions
which occurred in 1965 and 1966 when the NHA staff did attempt
to hold its promised series of meetings could not be attributed to the
NHA, the impression that the residents were to play some part in
the planning of the project was rendered illusory nevertheless.
The illusions that the project was primarily intended to "restore a basically sound neighborhood" or that the neighborhood's
residents would have an opportunity to influence the plan before it
was to receive final local consideration by the Council were not
created intentionally by the NHA staff. Indeed the staff had gone
to some trouble to attempt to provide accurate information to the
residents by establishing a site office in the project area with current
288. "During the planning period, a great many meetings will be held with neighborhood groups and citizen organizations to discuss every detail of the proposed Urban Renewal
Project. All residents of the area will be encouraged to participate in these discussions. Only
after these meetings have been held and after the final Project Plan has been prepared, and
approved by the Nashville City Council and the Urban Renewal Administration, can the
actual project work begin." (emphasis added) NHA Circular dated April 1962. Again in May
1964 a leaflet stated "The Nashville Housing Authority is planning a series of meetings for
the University Center residents. The purposes of the meetings will be to acquaint you with
the status of the plans as they develop and to give you an opportunity to participate in
discussions about them. At those times you can have your questions answered directly instead
of depending on rumors." In September 1966 the NHA scheduled four meetings in the project
area and announced "Preliminary plans for the University Center Urban Renewal Project
have been completed. Although the plans are primarily the same as those which have been
on display in the Project Site Office for a number of months, the Nashville Housing Authority
wishes to conduct a series of neighborhood meetings during which the plan will be discussed.
At these meetings, residents and property owners may express their ideas and feelings concerning the planning proposals, and mayask questions." Of the four meetings, however, only
one was ever held and it was for residents outside the neighborhood eventually designated
for renewal. See text accompanying notes 258-9 supra.
289. In July of 1964, the NHA conducted meetings with two different groups of businessmen from the Music City Area and Hillsboro Village to discuss three different alternative
routes for a major boulevard that would affect their businesses. Minutes, Board of Commissioners, NHA, number 10790. Another meeting was held with the Hillsboro Village Merchants
Association in November of 1965.
290. See text accompanying note 253 supra.
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plans on hand and NHA staff members available to discuss individual questions. The site office was opened in the summer of 1965
when plans for the rehabilitation and clearance areas were still necessarily tentative."' The only apparent firm information on which
the visitors to the office could rely was a large Clarke and Rapuano
map with a legend indicating the status of each individual house in
the neighborhood. The large dark circles which indicated obsolete
homes and the legend indicating houses that were substandard and
warranted clearance produced predictable responses from site office
visitors. Residents whose homes had been rated obsolete or substandard were concerned by the evaluation report and began to
inquire into the basis for the survey. According to some of the homeowners who made inquiries at the site office, however, the NHA staff
on hand did not refer to the Urban Renewal Manual standards nor
attempt to refer the residents to the Manual in responding to their
questions. Instead the staff members replied more generally that the
houses had been judged in accordance with federal regulations and
that the neighborhood as a whole contained sufficient substandard
292
houses to warrant a clearance area.
At least one property owner whose house was rated substandard
became actively dissatisfied with the information supplied her by
the site office. In the fall of 1965 Mrs. Harvey Gee wrote directly to
E. Bruce Wedge, the Regional Director of Urban Renewal in Atlanta, Georgia, requesting an explanation of the criteria employed
to judge a house substandard. Wedge replied that current regulations required "a minimum of 51% of the buildings in a project area
proposed for clearance and redevelopment must be structurally substandard to a degree requiring clearance as determined by specific
criteria." Although he did not elaborate on what those specific criteria should be, Wedge added that a "standard" building had to be
"structurally sound, and meet all of the city's code standards and
any additional criteria adopted by the metropolitan government in
291. The site office was opened on July 6, 1965. In the leaflet announcing the opening
of the office, the NHA explained that while there was no final plan for the area, the plan could
be discussed in general terms. "During the time of these studies and the evaluation of the
various alternate proposals, it is not possible to provide reliable information on the details of
the plan. While the project plan is still in the formative stage at this time, its development
has progressed to the point that it can be explained and discussed with interested persons
for their consideration and comments." NHA Circular dated June 30, 1965.
292. Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Charles Adair, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 30, 1974;
interview with Mr. Elbridge Wright, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 23, 1974; interview with
Mr. Robert Gardner, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 22, 1974; interview with Dr. Marie Means,
in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 11, 1974; letter from Celeste Albright to R.M. Carmody, May
15, 1974.
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establishing project rehabilitation standards." He ended by suggesting that the resident contact NHA officials and ask them to
93
review the plan with her.
To the homeowners who were concerned about the standards
employed to evaluate their houses, Wedge's response to Mrs. Gee's
inquiry was perhaps the single more influential piece of information
they received about the eligibility criteria in the years before the
plan was presented to the Metropolitan Council. Mrs. Gee shared
the contents of the letter with friends who were also concerned about
the project and together they ascertained by an inspection of the
map at the site office that the project area lacked a sufifcient number of substandard houses to qualify for a clearance area. With that
false assurance they believed themselves secure from a forced removal by urban renewal officials. Wedge had failed to mention,
however, that the area could still qualify for clearance under the
alternative clearance formula which required only twenty percent
substandard houses and the removal of another thirty-one percent
in order to remove blighting influences. Nor did he mention then or
in his correspondence with other residents in the area that the standards by which the neighborhood had been evaluated were available
in the UrbanRenewal Manual.294 Moreover, even when one resident,
Miss Celeste Albright, wrote the Secretary of HUD requesting an
explanation of the standards to be applied to an urban renewal area,
she still received no indication of the existence of the Manual or its
importance. 2 15 In fact only after the Metropolitan Council had considered the plan for the university area did the residents of the
neighborhood obtain access to a copy of the Manual and have an
opportunity to study its requirements. 296 Thus throughout the period when the future of the plan was being decided, those who were
most inclined to critically evaluate the project were not told of the
alternative standards against which it could have been measured.
293. Letter from Bruce Wedge to Mrs. Harvey Gee, Nov. 19, 1965.
294. See note 292 supra; letter from Bruce Wedge to Harvey Gee, Nov. 2, 1965; letter
from Bruce Wedge to Mrs. Harvey Gee, Nov. 19, 1965; see letter from Dan Hummel, Assistant
Secretary of HUD, to Elbridge Wright, Nov. 6, 1966; letter from Celeste Albright to Robert
Wood, Secretary of HUD, April 25, 1967 (requesting explanation of standards).
295. Letter and information from Harrison Knapp, Director of Consumer Relations,
HUD to Celeste Albright, May 18, 1967 (sending general urban renewal information but
making no reference to the Urban Renewal Manual); Letter from Celeste Albright to R.M.
Carmody, May 15, 1974.
296. Lee Galvani, a resident of the area, apparently purchased a copy of the Urban
Renewal Manual in the fall of 1967, after the Metropolitan Council had approved the project.
The other residents of the area did not become aware of the Manual until the spring of 1968.
Letter from Celeste Albright to R.M. Carmody, May 15, 1974.

19741

SPECIAL PROJECT

3.

Origin of the University Neighborhood Association (UNA)

Whether well-founded or otherwise, by the fall of 1966, a handful of residents of the university neighborhood had become convinced that the NHA was not giving them full or accurate
information." The NHA had not fully explained to the residents the
standards which had been used to evaluate their houses and it had
failed to supply evaluation sheets for individual houses to the few
homeowners who had asked for them."' Despite the statements of
Charles Hawkins that the project was primarily one for the rehabilitation, rather than the clearance of houses, the site office had made
clear to those who actually visited it during its slightly awkward
hours from 7:30 in the morning to 4:00 in the afternoon that a
number of houses were to be removed for Vanderbilt University
expansion and that those who refused to sell their land voluntarily
would have it taken by condemnation instead. Moreover, it hadbecome increasingly clear that despite the assurances by Hawkins
and others that the homeowners would participate in the planning
process, no such participation was in sight in the foreseeable future.
As a result of their growing frustration with the NHA and their fear
that their homes might be taken in a clearance project, approximately twenty of the eighty resident homeowners formed the University Neighborhood Association (UNA) in December, 1966.19 The
stated purpose of the University Neighborhood Association was to
help inform the other residents of the area of impending urban
renewal activities and to offer a means of publicizing the residents'
point of view.:""' The President of the UNA was Dr. Marie Means, a
76 year old psycho-therapist and authoress. The other members of
the group included several school teachers, a retired lawyer, a pharmacist and a local camera store owner. They were brought together
by their common opposition to the nature and purpose of the university area clearance project. In addition to their shared fear that they
would lose comfortable or in some cases profitable houses in what
was' to them an attractive neighborhood, they were united by their
common opposition to using eminent domain to compel them to sell
297. The belief that the NHA was being less than open with the residents began to
emerge in 1965. Letter from Harvey Gee and Charles Adair to Bruce Wedge, Oct. 26, 1965.
298. See note 347 infra and accompanying text.

299.

Interview with Dr. Marie Means, Jan. 11, 1974; interview with Celestre Albright,

Jan. 7,1974. Although the group was formed in late 1966 it did not have a meeting for business
purposes until the spring of 1967. Letter from Celeste Albright to Undersecretary of HUD
Robert C. Wood, April 25, 1967.
300. Letter from Celeste Albright to Robert C. Wood, April 25, 1967.
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their houses to private groups of developers like Vanderbilt University or St. Thomas Hospital."' Rightly or wrongly they believed that
the federal constitution forbade the threatened or actual use of eminent domain on behalf of private interest groups. 2 Acting as a
united group, the UNA continued to acquire additional information
from the Regional Urban Renewal office in Atlanta. Working
through the Regional Office, the Association discovered that the
NHA had failed to use proper interviews with residents in preparing
relocation information. 3 3 Later it managed to secure a packet 3 of
41
general brochures about the national urban renewal program.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, their correspondence with the
Regional Office never elicited any reference to the Urban Renewal
Manual and they continued their efforts in ignorance of it.
United as they were in a common goal and a shared view of the
constitutional restrictions which existed on the power of eminent
domain, the members of the UNA began to disagree on tactical
issues. In the spring of 1967 when Area I was separated from Area
II for individual consideration by the Council, unified action became increasingly difficult as two factions surfaced within the organization. One stressed totally truthful and lawful opposition,
while the other was more militant and felt that the project must be
stopped at all costs. The militant faction advocated attacking the
plan, the NHA, Vanderbilt, and political officials whenever possible, apparently without regard for the absolute truth of their statements. The conservative faction became preoccupied with drafting
a constitution and debated the propriety of incorporating the group.
Just as the difference in approach of the two groups was becoming
apparent, the NHA announced that the final plan for the university
center urban renewal project0 5would be presented to the Metropolitan Council for final action.1
C.

Passageof the Plan

The compressed schedule which the NHA had proposed to secure passage of the university center plan by theMetropolitan Coun301. The residents' expressions of disapproval sometimes took unusual forms. In the
spring of 1965 one resident, Fannie Mae Dees, placed a coffin in her front yard as a symbol
of the death of the neighborhood and of the institution of private property.
302. See note 292 supra. Others were more concerned that they would not receive full
value for their property. Nashville Tennessean, July 20, 1967 at 29, col. 7.
303. Letter from Celeste Albright to Regional Director of Urban Renewal, Jan. 18,1967.
304. Letter and information from Harrison Knapp, Director of Consumer Relations,
HUD to Celeste Albright, May 18, 1967.
305. Interview with Dr. Marie Means, Jan. 11, 1974.

19741

SPECIAL PROJECT

cil consisted of a public presentation of the plan to the area residents at Eakin School on July 19th, a public hearing conducted by
the Council on August 7th and a final vote on the plan by the
Council a week later on August 15th. The July 19th meeting at
Eakin School was apparently intended to take the place of the series
of meetings that Charles Hawkins had originally promised the area
residents. At the July 19th Eakin School meeting, the evening was
dominated by the NHA staff presentation of the details of the plan.
For the first time the full details of the final plan were announced
publicly to a full group meeting of the area residents. Vanderbilt
and St. Thomas Hospital were to attempt to acquire all the houses
in their clearance area by private purchase, but if their negotiations
failed the Nashville Housing Authority would intervene and take
the remaining property through eminent domain proceedings for
subsequent reconveyance to the two sponsoring institutions. A
largely hostile audience of 500 people had jammed the school hall
for the NHA's explanation of the plan and received its description
of the plan with apparent concern." 6 At the conclusion of the presentation, one UNA member criticized the lack of citizen participation
which had characterized the planning of the project. Another observed the unlikelihood of obtaining a fair price for their land. Others denounced what appeared to them an unconstitutional use of
eminent domain to assure the success of the project. 37 No member
of the audience however was able to question the technical aspects
of the project because none had been introduced to the Urban Renewal Manual or its underlying requirements. Once again, moreover, one of the Commissioners of the NHA reiterated that the area
had to contain at least 51% substandard housing to qualify for clearance. ""' With the false belief that there was only one clearance formula for the area, the members of the audience went home after
three hectic hours of questioning and critical statements.
The August 7th public hearing-a hearing required by the
Urban Renewal Manual-represented the area residents' final opportunity to influence the decision making process. The meeting
had been shifted from the Metropolitan Council Chamber, which
would have been filled to overflowing by the crowd of three hundred
and fifty that attended the hearing, to the Municipal Auditorium
:306.
at 1, col.
307.
308.

Nashville Tennessean, July 20, 1967, at 29, col. 7; Nashville Banner, July 20, 1967
1.
Id.
Testimony of Councilman James Hamilton, Trial Transcript, 143 (1961).
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with a seating capacity of over five thousand.:"9 Rather than create
a sense of the urgency of the situation by its size, the crowd of three
hundred and fifty was dwarfed by the large auditorium. The members of the audience who wished to state their views were given a
fairly limited opportunity to do so. Each speaker who wished to
address the meeting was limited to five minutes of speaking time.
Five minutes represented a brief opportunity to develop a concerted
or detailed series of criticisms of a plan that had taken seven years
to draft. Nor did the members of the University Neighborhood Association have the organizational skills to orchestrate speakers with a
similar point of view. Instead the evening was characterized by a
series of disparate and disjointed observations from residents and
commercial land owners. The speakers against the plan continued
to emphasize that the area was not a slum and that eminent domain
should not be used in such a coercive fashion to favor private interest groups at the expense of other private landowners."' By the end
of the meeting approximately equal numbers of speakers had urged
the Council to accept or reject the plan.
At the conclusion of the hearing the members of the Metropolitan Council considered amendments to the plan. Councilman
James Hamilton, spearheaded an attack on the plan with two
amendments that would have made it impossible for the NHA to
exercise effectively its eminent domaih powers and that would have
made it prohibitively expensive for Vanderbilt and St. Thomas to
acquire land by negotiated sales. Hamilton first proposed an
amendment which would restrict the NHA's power of condemnation
to parcels of property needed for streets and other expressly public
uses. When that motion was tabled, Councilman Hamilton then
moved to amend the plan to the effect that all residential property
in the project area be rezoned "commercial," thus raising property
values in the project area and thereby forcing higher land acquisition prices. The motion failed, for lack of a second. After Hamilton's
motions failed, Councilman Tandy Wilson then proposed two
amendments, both of which were unanimously adopted. The first
required that project area properties acquired by condemnation
must be used for "educational, hospital, or research uses only." The
second amendment required that any further changes to the UCUR
309. The meeting was shifted to the auditoium at the request of Councilman James
Hamilton, the leader of the opposition to the plan.
310. Nashville Banner, Aug. 8,1967, at 1, col. 8. Memorandum from John Acuff, Assistant Director of Urban Renewal to Gerald Gimre, Executive Director of the NHA titled "Notes
on University Center Public Hearing" Aug. 9, 1967.

19741

SPECIAL PROJECT

plan must be submitted to the Council for approval. As it happened,
the requirement of Council approval for the plan was to form part
of the basis for an attack on the project six years later. The evening
closed undramatically, however, with a 26 to 6 vote of approval by
31
the Council on the plan's second reading. '
With only a week before the Council was to consider the university center plan for the last time, the UNA members working with
Councilman Hamilton made final plans for what they still confidently believed would be their successful opposition to the plan. As
a preliminary matter the UNA circulated a petition which expressed
opposition to the plan in simple terms:
WE, the residents in the proposed University Urban Renewal Area respectfully
demand that our homes be protected from condemnation by the Urban Renewal Agency for the purpose of making said properties available to Vanderbilt, St. Thomas or any other private group or developers by compelling the
sale of said properties against the will of the owners.
We unanimously hold that it is a great and dangerous wrong for property to
be taken by eminent domain from one private owner and arbitrarily sold to
another private owner.
We therefore petition the Metropolitan County Council to reject the proposed
University Urban Renewal Plan and restore to us the free enjoyment of our
homes." 2

Working from street to street throughout the entire project area, the
UNA members amassed a total of seven hundred and twenty-seven
signatures from the one thousand or so residents of the rehabilitation and clearance areas. 3 3 In addition Councilman Hamilton began
to collect data which would demonstrate on a preliminary basis the
inaccuracy of the NHA's finding that the area was eligible for urban
renewal. Members of the UNA had noted that the NHA maps for
the project area contained references to buildings thathad been
311. Id.; interview with Councilman James Hamilton, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 28,
1974; interview with Councilman Tandy Wilson, in Nashville, Tennessee, Feb. 1, 1974. Several Councilmen felt that the meeting was designed more to inform the public than to obtain
public input for shaping the plan. Interview with Councilman James Hamilton, Jr., Jan. 16,
1974; interview with Councilman Richard D. Taylor, former Councilman for the 25th District,
who sponsored the project, Jan. 28, 1974. Other Councilmen indicated that they thought the
public hearing was designed to obtain meaningful public participation into the adoption of
the plan, but that the process failed for lack of an adequately organized and aroused opposition to the plan as proposed by the NHA. Interview with Tandy Wilson III, Councilman for
the 33rd District, Feb. 1, 1974; interview with James R. Tuck, Councilman for the 34th
District. Jan. 22, 1974. Perhaps the most arresting observation was that of Mr. Farris Deep,
Director of the Metropolitan Planning Commission, who said, "The people were heard but
not listened to." Interview with Farris A. Deep, Director, Metropolitan Planning Commission,
Feb. 1, 1974.
312. Copies of the petition are on file at the Metropolitan Clerk's office.
313. Id.
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demolished. Hamilton hired a local certified public accountant to
investigate the discrepancy between the NHA maps and the buildings that were still standing in the neighborhood. The accountant's
report demonstrated, correctly, that the NHA maps contained over
fifty buildings that had been torn down and could therefore no
longer be used to satisfy the eligibility requirements for the area.
The accountant further sought to demonstrate that twenty-one percent of the houses in the entire area were substandard 34l and that
therefore, under the criteria for clearance areas described to Mrs.
Gee by Bruce Wedge, the Regional Director of Urban Renewal, and
reiterated at the July 19th meeting, the area could not qualify for a
clearance program.
On August 15, 1967, the Metropolitan Council met to consider
the project proposal on third and final reading. Councilman Hamilton presented the Council with the petition signed by 727 of the area
residents coupled with a plea that their wishes be respected. In a
long and vigorous speech, Hamilton then denounced the potential
use of eminent domain on behalf of Vanderbilt and St. Thomas. The
Councilman argued that the power of eminent domain was to be
limited to the taking of land for an actual public use. He argued
against an extension of the power that would allow its use whenever
the public interest might be served by securing benefits to mere
private corporations, whether they were private universities or private hospitals. Hamilton warned the other councilmen that the liberal use of eminent domain on behalf of such institutions as Vanderbilt and St. Thomas was an infringement of private property rights
that were guarded by the Constitution and whose continued violation might lead to the end of the institution of private property in
its own right.3" '
Hamilton concluded by observing that even if the university
center project could be constitutionally justified, it still would not
qualify as an urban renewal project under the criteria announced on
July 19th by the NHA. The Councilman introduced the testimony
of his accountant, demonstrating that the NHA maps for the area
inaccurately represented over fifty houses that were no longer standing. He argued that with the inaccurately depicted houses deleted
from the total houses in the neighborhood, only twenty-one percent
of the buildings were substandard and the area was therefore far
314. The building count was conducted by Clyde Watson, a certified public accountant,
and his conclusions placed on file at the Metropolitan Clerk's office.
315. Copies of Councilman Hamilton's speech were later printed at the expense of the
University Neighborhood Association.
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short of the fifty-one percent necessary for a clearance area. He
concluded that the Council could not endorse the proposed project
without violating the Constitution and without falsely asserting
that the area was qualified for clearance. 3 1 Hamilton's charge that
the area was not qualified for clearance at last brought forth an
accurate public explanation of the clearance formula which had
been used to establish the eligibility of the area. John Van Ness of
the NHA staff described the alternative clearance formula under
which clearance areas for Vanderbilt and St. Thomas had been
qualified. Van Ness observed that according to the Project Area
Report which the NHA had placed on file with the Metropolitan
Clerk two weeks before,3 7 the institutional clearance area contained
28.4 percent substandard buildings and 26.1 percent buildings
where demolition could be justified to remove blighting influences.
The total of 54.5 percent more than satisfied the second Urban
Renewal Manual clearance standard of 20 percent substandard
buildings and an additional 31 percent of houses whose removal
would rid the area of a blighting effect. The ProjectArea Report was
nearly 500 pages long and filled with a series of statistical compilations based upon Clarke and Rauano's surveys of the area as well
as other studies conducted in the neighborhood. Had Hamilton and
the area residents mastered its complexities in the two weeks the
survey had been on file with the Clerk's office, they might at least
have averted what was for them a painful as well as embarrassing
error.3 ' As it was, however, with the assurance from the NHA staff
that the area was properly qualified for clearance as well as rehabili31 9
tation, the Council resolved by a vote of 30 to 4 to accept the plan.
In adopting the resolution, the Council thereby adopted the NHA
survey findings that the project area was sufficiently blighted to be
appropriate for urban renewal, approved the plan for submission to
HUD, and, empowered the NHA to contractually commit the city
of Nashville to the project. It also concluded seven years of confu316. Nashville Banner, Aug. 16, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
317. The Metropolitan Clerk's date on the Report is not legible and the Report could
in fact have been filed at any time between July 27, 1967 and August 4, 1967, when the NHA
Background Statement was filed.
318. The announcement of the alternative clearance formula was a distinct shock to the
residents who had attempted to master the urban renewal process and who, until that moment, were confident the project area was not qualified for clearance. Interview with Mr. and
Mrs. Charles Adair, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 30, 1974; interview with Celeste Albright,
in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 7, 1974.
319. Metropolitan Council Resolution No. 67-284, Aug. 15, 1967. Councilmen Hamilton, Blankenship, La Penna and Phelps voted against the plan.
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sion about the ultimate future of Nashville's Section 112 Urban

Renewal Plan.
In the years before the Council resolved conclusively to undertake the university center project, the neighborhood residents had
had four opportunities to listen to public descriptions of the plan.
No doubt any of the four might have satisfied the statutory prerequisite that a public hearing be held on the project and almost any
one of them might alone have satisfied the constitutional requirements of due process. Indeed two different federal judges indicated
as much in their later opinions on the legal adequacy of the hearings
that were given the area residents.32 0 As a practical matter, however,

it was not clear that the meetings gave the residents a particularly
useful opportunity to influence the ultimate nature of the plan. The
PTA meeting in November of 1965 presented an early plan which
was 200 acres larger than the plan presented to the Council in 1967.
If the memory of one interested participant may be credited, the
clearance area for the project was not discussed at the time nor was
there a direct opportunity to ask questions about individual parcels
of property. The second meeting held for the residents, the meeting
which occurred in September of 1966, was held for the residents of
an area that was later eliminated from the eventual project. The
third and fourth meetings held on July 19th and August 7th of 1967
took place in the shadow of a federally imposed deadline for which
there could be no extension to accommodate changes in the plan.
And unlike the merchants in the area who had the opportunity to
consider and reject alternatives in the plan before it was presented
to the Council, 32' the residents themselves did not appear to have

the opportunity to discuss alternative possibilities with the NHA
staff before the final plan for the area was drawn up. Thus while the
area residents and homeowners had a number of occasions to listen
to descriptions of the plan and to voice their opinions of them, it is
not quite so apparent that their views were of any practical effect.
VI.

APPROVAL BY

HUD

Nashville's application for federal funds arrived at HUD's regional headquarters in Atlanta on August 18, 1967, in time to meet
HUD's deadline for funding. HUD had provisionally determined as
early as 1966 that the university center area was eligible for federal
320. Adair v. Nashville Housing Authority No. 5686 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 1974). Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority, No. 6201 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 30, 1971).
321. See note 251 supra.
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funds '2 but when Nashville's formal application arrived on August
18th it began the process of determining officially and formally the
university neighborhood's eligibility. The surveys by Clarke and
Rapuano and the supporting material amassed by the NHA in its
ProjectArea Report were reviewed by the planning and engineering
section of the Atlanta office to determine their accuracy and reliability. The HUD staff was aware of the controversy in Nashville
about the project's eligibility and as a result took more time than
usual to verify the validity of the area inspection results2.

The

members of the University Neighborhood Association forwarded a
sheaf of information which the staff duly considered in turn: a copy
of Councilman Hamilton's speech on August 15, photographs of the
houses in the neighborhood, a description of how citizens had been
allegedly excluded from the planning process, and copies of the
house count conducted by the certified public accountant hired by
Hamilton.32

4

Although the UNA members allegedly were still not

aware of the Urban Renewal Manual standards and so could not
directly rebut the findings of Clarke and Rapuano, the HUD staff
called a special meeting with the staff members from Clarke and
Rapuano and the NHA to review the residents' contentions. 25 The
group inspected some thirteen records in detail and found that four
were unsatisfactory since they claimed buildings were blighting influences warranting clearance for "inappropriate, vague reasons.

'32

1

Moreover, HUD requested the NHA to revise its list of four "blighting influences" with a view to condensing them into two different
categories and reducing the number of houses eligible for clearance
on these grounds. 2 7 In addition the HUD staff inspected the NHA's

plans for relocating displaced residents. HUD concluded that the
NHA relocation program had weaknesses that needed to be cured
but that the relocation resources for the project were adequate because of the "above average financial characteristics of the families
:322. Testimony of John Edmunds, Assistant Regional Administrator for HUD, Trial
Transcript, 288 (1971). HUD determined on a preliminary basis in January 1966 that the area
was eligible for rehabilitation and clearance and informed NHA officials that Vanderbilt
might demolish the houses it owned in the area without affecting its eligibility if the university documented the condition of the houses before they were razed. Charles Hawkins notified
Ihe Treasurer of Vanderbilt that the university might proceed with its demolitions. Letter
from Charles Hawkins of NHA to Ed Gardner of Vanderbilt, Jan. 28, 1966.
:323. Testimony of John Edmunds, Assistant Regional Administrator for HUD, Trial
Transcript, 284-86, 306-08 (1971).
:324. Id. at 306-08.
:325. Interoffice memorandum of Regional HUD office, dated Sept. 20, 1967.
:326. Id.
:327. Undated HUD Planning Review Memorandum.
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to be displaced . . . and the extensive availability of private resources."3 28 After dispatching one of its attorneys to inspect the
Nashville university area in person, the head of the HUD regional
office, John Edmunds, recommended on October 26, 1967 that the
project be financed. 329 On February 2, 1968 HUD's Washington office provisionally approved the project30 and on March 19th, it formally announced its full approval of the project. Nashville was to
receive a federal loan of some eleven million dollars and a federal
33
grant of a similar amount with which to execute the project. '
Mayor Beverly Briley of Nashville hailed the good news by observing with satisfacton that "we're getting several million dollars of
street, highway, water and sewer improvements almost without cost
'332
to local government.
HUD's official approval of the university center project for federal funding was the signal for the NHA to seal the final terms of
its relationship with HUD and the sponsoring institutions. On April
16, 1968, the NHA contracted with HUD to employ the federal loan
and grant in a manner acceptable to the federal authorities. On May
6th and 7th the NHA then signed separate contracts with Vanderbilt and St. Thomas establishing the formal relationship that would
exist between the housing authority and the institutional sponsors
of the project. In return for Vanderbilt's agreement to spend up to
nine million dollars on acquiring and clearing lots in the clearance
area, the NHA obligated itself to exercise its power of eminent domain in the event Vanderbilt could not complete its acquisitions
through private purchases by the end of the year 1975.13 St. Thomas
in turn signed a similar agreement, allowing itself to rely upon the
housing authorities condemnation powers in the event its negotiated
purchases failed. With the signing of its contracts with HUD in
April 1968 and with Vanderbilt and St. Thomas in May, the NHA
formally launched the implementation of the Nashville University
Center Urban Renewal Plan.
328. Memorandum from Roger Veriland to John Edmunds of HUD, Sept. 19, 1967.
329. Interoffice Memorandum of HUD Regional office, Oct. 26, 1967.
330. Nashville Tennessean, Feb. 3, 1968, at 1, col. 3.
331. The grant was for $11,268,685; the loan for $11,939,310.
332. Nashville Banner, Feb. 2, 1968, at 1, col. 8.
333. In the spring of 1974 Vanderbilt's expenditures on land acquisition in the area
actually totaled over twelve million dollars. Interview with Dr. George Kaludis, Vice Chancellor for Operations and Fiscal Planning, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 29, 1974.
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VII.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

A.

1968-1972

Vanderbilt Expansion

Vanderbilt University's formal binding commitment to join the
University Center Urban Renewal Project in the spring of 1968 in
some ways merely represented a new version of an old policy. Since
1956 Vanderbilt had pursued an explicit policy of land acquisition
3 By the time the
in the residential area to its immediate south.1
urban renewal project was first suggested in 1961, 331 the university,
using part of a living trust fund that had been donated by Mr.
Harold S. Vanderbilt had acquired 109 parcels of land adjacent to
the campus at a total cost of over two million dollars. During the
planning years from 1962 to 1967 the university had continued to
negotiate sales of land in the area that later became the urban
renewal clearance area. By 1967 Vanderbilt had already purchased
approximately sixty percent of the clearance area through negotiated sales, 336 a fact which weighed heavily with many of the Metropolitan councilmen who considered the merits of the plan.
Under the terms of its 1968 contract with the Nashville Housing
Authority then, Vanderbilt was to continue the land acquisition
policy it had already pursued for some twelve years. The University
was to continue buying land on the open market for eight more years
at the end of which time it would either have acquired the entire
area or it could rely upon the NHA to acquire the remaining tracts
through condemnation. In fact, the relative simplicity of the plan
and the guarantee of a finite area by a fixed date were initial inducements in persuading university officials to endorse the project.3 37 In
addition, however, the senior members of the university's administration were firmly convinced that the project would be a benefit to
Nashville as a whole, both in terms of the millions of dollars of
virtually free civic improvements the project would generate and in
terms of the increased service to the community that a larger uni3
versity could provide. 3
Thus in 1968 Vanderbilt simply continued to buy land on what
it continued to believe was the open market around it. Not surprisingly the university was able to rely upon a skilled and veteran team
334. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
335. See text accompanying note 248 supra.
336. Nashville Tennessean, Aug. 6, 1967, at 4B, col. 1.
337. Interview with Dr. William Force, former Vice Chancellor for Business Affairs,
Vanderbilt University, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 21, 1974.
338. Interview with Chancellor Alexander Heard, Vanderbilt University, in Nashville,
Tennessee, Feb. 22, 1974; interview with Dr. George Kaludis, note 333 supra.
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of land purchasers. Gerald Henderson, the Business Manager of the
University, had been charged with directing the practical details of
buying houses for the university as early as 1956 and he continued
to do so until his retirement in 1969. Henderson continued to direct
the university acquisition program under the urban renewal project
much as he had done before. He operated independently, within a
somewhat flexible budget, purchasing homes at his discretion whenthey became available on the market. Throughout the years he had
compiled a rather detailed file on each home in the area-including
the floor plan, the type of heating system, and any particular defects-which he used to calculate the offers he made to the owners
of the clearance property. 339 By the time of his retirement at the end
of 1969, Henderson had supervised the purchase of nearly seventy
percent of the land in the area. Upon Henderson's retirement, authority for directing acquisitions subsequently became vested in
Vice Chancellor George Kaludis who directed the acquisition program through Henderson's former assistant John Robinson. By the
summer of 1973 the university had succeeded in purchasing
approximately 322 of the 490 parcels it was obligated to purchase
by 1975. 34"
B.

ClearanceArea Reaction

To Vanderbilt, the passage of the university area urban renewal
plan merely meant a continuation of its old pattern of acquisitions,
but to the residents and homeowners of the neighborhood who had
opposed the project, it meant the beginning of five years of determined opposition to Vanderbilt's expansion plans. The means by
which the clearance area had been qualified by the NHA had
stunned the members of the University Neighborhood Association
who had been told of only one clearance area criterion by federal and
local urban renewal officials. As one former member of the UNA
bitterly observed of the experience later, "It would have seemed
incredible that we would have been misled, even lied to, by our
government. Had anyone told me of the true state of affairs, I
'13 1 Not only did the UNA members feel
wouldn't have believed it.
that they had been lied to by their government, but a number of
them also felt that implementation of the urban renewal plan was
deeply repugnant to their own personal philosophies of private prop339. Interview with Gerald G. Henderson, Business Manager for Vanderbilt University
until 1969, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 31, 1974.
340. Interview with Vice Chancellor George Kaludis, note 333 supra.
341. Letter from Celeste Albright to R.M. Carmody, May 15, 1974.
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erty.3 41 The passage of the urban renewal plan meant that no longer
would Vanderbilt buy on an open market from willing sellers as it
had done in the past but on a closed market from sellers who had
no other choice but to deal with the university. Worse yet, any
landowner who resisted would suffer what to him would be the
indignity of having his house condemned for use by another private
party. Thus, while Vanderbilt was implementing its portion of the
urban renewal plan, the members of the clearance area who had
originally sought to block the project sought new ways to defeat the
program.
For a period of two years the residents' opposition was centered
in two small pressure groups. The University Neighborhood Association continued to survive as the vehicle for the more militant
members of the neighborhood. In the meantime the more moderate
residents incorporated the Committee for the Protection of Private
Property (CPPP), which concentrated on the use of existing administrative and legal avenues to forward their goals of forcing Vanderbilt to negotiate the purchase of their property in an arms-length
transaction and denying the university the ultimate use of the
NHA's power of eminent domain. Shortly after Council approval of
the project, CPPP members expressed interest in a lawsuit and were
advised by one member's lawyer that the cost might be prohibitive.
He also indicated that they would not have standing to sue until
they had exhausted their administrative remedies and the NHA
actually had instituted condemnation proceedings against their
property. Relying on this advice, the CPPP concentrated on compiling information on clearance project eligibility criteria and pursuing
their administrative remedies .3
1. Eligibility Criteria
Having been sharply reminded of their ignorance of the urban
renewal process by the means in which the clearance area had been
qualified for federal funding, the area residents mounted an effort
to learn the exact criteria that had been used by Clarke and Rapuano in conducting its survey. In addition, the residents sought access to the evaluation sheets Clarke and Rapuano had prepared for
their houses and a list of all houses that had been found to be
"substandard warranting clearance." Without exception, however,
342. See note 292 supra.
343. Interview with Dr. Marie Means, note 292 supra; interview with Mr. Elbridge
Wright, note 292 supra; interview with Mr. Robert Gardner, note 292 supra; interview with
Mr. and Mrs. Adair, note 292 supra.
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the residents' requests for information were made after October 26,
1967, when John Edmunds had recommended to the Washington
office of HUD that the project be funded. Nor was the response of
HUD and the NHA sufficiently rapid to allow the residents to take
advantage of the findings they were able to make. The cumulative
effect was that of a group of citizens trying to master the workings
of an administrative agency well after the process which had affected them was beyond effective appeal.
The residents began on November 22, 1967, with a request to
HUD for a list of the 235 houses that had been found to be structurally substandard.3 Although such a list might have been of value
to both the housing authority as well as any group that sought to
determine the accuracy of Clarke and Rapuano's survey, the NHA
had not requested Clarke and Rapunao to draw up such a compilation, nor did it have one of its own. In consequence, letters to HUD
and the NHA throughout 1968 produced no positive response from
either. 45 In the end the CPPP was forced to prepare its own list of
houses and submit it to the NHA for confirmation. The CPPP prepared its list in July of 1969, submitted it to the NHA in August
and four months later in November received a verified list. 346 The
entire process had taken two years to complete.
The CPPP met with little more luck with its request for copies
of the evaluation sheets which Clarke and Rapuano had compiled
for each house. The residents had first unsuccessfully requested the
NHA to release the individual forms prior to the Metropolitan
Council meeting in August 1967.311 These requests were renewed
344. Letter from Dr. Marie Means to John Edmunds, HUD Atlanta, Nov. 22, 1967.
345. Letter from Dr. Marie Means to Charles Hawkins, NHA, Jan. 16, 1968; letter from
Charles Hawkins to Dr. Marie Means, Jan. 25, 1968; letter from Elbridge Wright to Gerald
Gimre, NHA, July 12, 1969; letter from Gerald Gimre to Elbridge Wright, July 17, 1969.
346. On July 17, 1969, two years after the Metropolitan Council had approved the
project, the NHA offered to allow the members of the CPPP to copy a map of the project
area and derive from it their own list of the substandard houses in the area. The CPPP
members received the map on July 22, 1969, and by August 18th had completed their list of
substandard houses which they submitted to the NHA for confirmation. The NHA kept the
list from August 19th to November 21st at which time they returned a verified copy. Letter
from Elbridge Wright of CPPP to Gerald Gimre of NHA, July 12, 1969; letter from Gerald
Gimre of NHA to Elbridge Wright of CPPP, July 17, 1969; letter from Elbridge Wright of
CPPP to Gerald Gimre of NHA, Aug. 18, 1969; letter from Gerald Gimre of NHA to Elbridge
Wright of CPPP, Aug. 20, 1969; letter from Elbridge Wright of CPPP to Gerald Gimre of
NHA, Sept. 29, 1969; letter from Charles Hawkins of NHA to Elbridge Wright of CPPP, Nov.
21, 1969.
347. Interviews with Mr. and Mrs. Adair, Jan. 30, 1974, Mr. Wright, Jan. 23, 1974, Mr.
Gardner, Jan. 22, 1974, and Miss Albright, Jan. 7, 1974.
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again in late 1967 31 and early 1968, 3 1 but it was not until after HUD
had approved the plan that the NHA began to comply with the
residents' demands. On April 9, 1968, the NHA sent summaries of
the ratings for three properties to three owners in the area but it
refused to send copies of the actual forms prepared by Clarke and
3 5 0 In June 1968 the
Rapuano.
President of the CPPP expressed dissatisfaction with the NHA's unwillingness to make the actual
survey results available to all homeowners on a systematic basis. 3 '
At length on July 10, 1968, the NHA agreed to make summaries of
the survey forms available to all individual property owners who
applied for them in person at the housing authority's office.3 5 2 During the following two weeks, approximately fifty owners requested
and received summaries of the building conditions survey form as
completed by the NHA's consultant.3 0 One resident demonstrated,
at least to his own satisfaction, how the summaries might have been
used earlier when the plan was still under political and administrative consideration by hiring inspectors to investigate his "inadequate" wiring and plumbing3 5' The inspectors subsequently swore
that the wiring and plumbing were in their opinions at least entirely
adequate and in compliance with the building codes. 55 Yet while the
summaries of Clarke and Rapunao's findings were made available
on a systematic basis in July of 1968, the original survey sheets were
not made available. According to one property owner, the original
surveys were first given to her in 1971 and only then as a result of
discovery proceedings in a lawsuit.3 6
The CPPP met with similar difficulties when it tried to deter348. Letter from Fannie Mae Dees to Charles W. Hawkins, Dec. 30, 1967 (repeating a
phone request made several months before). Reply letter from Charles W. Hawkins to Fannie
Mae Dees, Jan. 16, 1968 (general description of deficiencies listed, but no survey sheet).
349. Interview with Celeste Albright, Jan. 7, 1974.
350. Letter from Charles Hawkins of NHA to Celeste Albright, April 9, 1968 (the summaries related to the Albright, Adair and Dees properties).
351. Letter from Dr. Marie H. Means to Dr. H.B. Crouch, Vice-Chairman, NHA, June
24, 1968.
352. Letter from Gerald Gimre of NHA to Dr. Marie Means, July 10, 1968.
353. Inspection of requests submitted to NHA and offered in evidence in the Adair &
Gardner lawsuits.
354. Interview with Mrs. Charles Adair, in Nashville, Tennessee, May 26, 1974. The
actual survey sheets were made available through discovery proceedings.
355. Interview with Mr. Gardner, Jan. 22, 1974. NHA staff members have observed that
the reason why the original Clarke and Rapuano survey sheets were not released sooner was
to prevent the confusion and misunderstanding that would result if the area residents
believed that the survey sheets were formal code inspection reports with which the homeowners would have to comply. Interview with John Acuff, former Assistant Director of Urban
Renewal, NHA, May 1, 1974.
356. Interview with Mrs. Charles Adair, note 354 supra.
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mine the definition of the term, "substandard." Although one member of the militant UNA obtained access to an Urban Renewal
Manual during the Fall of 1967, the members of the CPPP did not
learn of its existence until sometime in 1968.117 When the CPPP
wrote the NHA in April 1968 and requested their criteria for the
substandard ratings, the NHA's reply stated only that the information was contained in the copy of the ProjectArea Report which they
had loaned to the CPPP15s The Project Report, however, offered
only a generalized definition of "substandard" and did not refer to
the Manual at all. 359 Later, in 1969, the CPPP requested from HUD

central offices in Washington, the working definition of a substandard building and the instruction sheets containing the criteria for a
substandard rating.36 HUD replied that the legal definition varied
and was contained in locally adopted codes and ordinances. Its reply
did list some general HUD characteristics for a substandard rating
which were quoted directly from the Manual, but again the letter
made no reference to the source.3 6 Finally a letter in June, 1969 to

I-UD's Regional Office asking for information on how to count substandard buildings to determine project eligibility was answered
fully in August with a complete reference to the Manual and its
standards.3 2 Although it was no doubt understandable for urban
renewal personnel to assume familiarity with the Manual and its
standards, again two years filled with correspondence had passed
before the residents of the neighborhood received their first official
reference to the source of standards by which their homes had been
judged.
2. Administrative and Legal Remedies
The members of the CPPP experienced similar difficulty in
determining whether they had exhausted their administrative remedies and so could proceed to file suit against the project. The President of the CPPP first inquired directly of the Secretary of HUD in
November 1968 whether there were any further avenues of adminis357. Interviews with Mr. and Mrs. Charles Adair, Jan. 30, 1974 and Celeste Albright,
Jan. 7, 1974; see note 296 supra.
358. Letter from Charles W. Hawkins of NHA to Elbridge Wright, Apr. 9, 1968.
359. "Substandard" was defined as "deteriorated beyond the costs of reclamation."
Project Area Report, Code R212, 6 (1967).
360. Letter from ElbridgeWright to Secretary of HUD George Romney, May 24, 1969.
361. Letter from Ralph ,. Herod, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Renewal Assistance to Elbridge M. Wright, July 1, 1969.
362. Letter from Elbridge M. Wright to John T. Edmunds, June 18, 1969; interview
with Elbridge Wright, Jan. 23, 1974.
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trative appeal.113 A similar inquiry was made of the regional office
in Atlanta in December.3 14 Somewhat surprisingly neither inquiry
received a direct answer but instead referred the members of the
CPPP to the NHA.3 65 Yet another request was made to HUD in
Washington in August 1969 for information on administrative remedies.36 6 At length in September 1969 HUD notified the CPPP that
it had exhausted its administrative remedies and had no further
3 7
administrative recourse.
With the knowledge that they had exhausted their administrative remedies the CPPP members began to contemplate legal action
as the next step in their efforts to prevent the use of eminent domain
to support Vanderbilt's expansion. They were uncertain about their
legal standing because the NHA had not moved to condemn any of
their property. Moreover, rightly or otherwise, they were concerned
about the possibility of retaining a Nashville lawyer because of what
they regarded to be high legal fees and the influence of Vanderbilt
within the Nashville bar. 36 As a result, some CPPP members contacted the American Landowners Society to exchange information
about urban renewal projects in Nashville and throughout the
United States. ' During these exchanges, the members learned of
Mr. J. Granville Clark, an attorney in nearby Russellville, Kentucky, and they invited Mr. Clark to address the CPPP in November, 1969.1" At the meeting, Clark voiced his concern about the area
residents' lack of legal standing since the NHA had not thratened
363. Letter from Marie Means of CPPP to Secretary of HUD Robert Weaver, Nov. 3,
1968.
364. Letter from Marie Means of CPPP to John Edmunds, HUD Atlanta, Dec. 28, 1968.
365. Secretary Weaver's office informed the residents the project had been approved for
funding in March 1968 and that they should address any further inquiries to John Edmunds
of the Atlanta office. John Edmunds in turn added that the project had entered the execution
phase on March 20, 1968. To the direct inquiry whether there were any other administrative
remedies the residents should pursue, Edmunds replied that the residents should address
their comments to Gerald Gimre of the NHA if they "object to any specific project activity."
Letter from Mr. McCabe of HUD Washington to Marie Means, Nov. 22, 1968; letter from
John Edmunds of HUD Atlanta to Marie Means, Jan. 7, 1969.
366. Letter from Elbridge Wright of CPPP to Secretary of HUD George Romney, Aug.
3, 1969.
367. Letter from Robert C. Scalia, HUD Washington, to Elbridge Wright, Sept. 26,
1969. This may have been the response to Mr. Wright's letter of Aug. 3, 1969. Note 367 supra.
HUD's letter stated that HUD considered the approval of the plan fair and proper.
368. One lawyer allegedly told the Adairs that it would take a legal fee of $50,000 to
fight the plan. Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Charles Adair, Jan. 30, 1974. Approximately 50%
of the estimated 1000 lawyers in Nashville are Vanderbilt graduates. Interview with Anne
Brandt, Placement Director, Vanderbilt Law School, May 15, 1974.
369. Interviews with Mr. and Mrs. Charles Adair, Jan. 30, 1974 and Dr. Marie Means,
Jan. 11, 1974.
370. Interview with Dr. Marie Means, Jan. 11, 1974.
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the use of eminent domain, but he later agreed to represent Mr. and
Mrs. Charles Adair in an action to preserve their rental property in
the urban renewal area."' An action for an injunction and damages
was filed on March 26, 1970 after the Adairs had received an NHA
letter threatening condemnation of their property for a right of way
January 20, 1971, Mr. and
as of April 1.372 Nearly a year later,3 7on
3
Mrs. Robert Gardner also filed suit.
C. Formation of the PAC-The Political Strategy
In the fall of 1970 the residents' resistance to the university area
took a sharply political tack with the formation of the Project Area
Committee (PAC). The Project Area Committee was a HUD institution created in 1968 for all new urban renewal rehabilitation projects. PAC members were elected by residents of the urban renewal
area and their official function was to serve as a communications
link between the residents of the area and the staff of the local
public agency charged with urban renewal responsibilities, in Nashville's own case the NHA. HUD did not require Project Area Committees for projects initiated before 1968 but the members of the
CPPP learned of the new institution, endorsed it and requested that
the NHA authorized a PAC for the University Center Project.3 4
After some initial hesitation the NHA agreed 375 and in September
1970 the area residents met at Eakin School to elect a Project Area
Committee. The following month the new members of the committee selected a chairman, Mr. Joseph H. Johnston. Johnston was a
resident of the Vanderbilt clearance area and a part owner of a
house that his family had built in the area some thirty-four years
before.37 6 Johnston provided the PAC leadership at a time when the
371. Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Charles Adair, Jan. 30, 1974.
372. Id. The letter provided the Adairs with sufficient legal standing to file suit.
373. Interview with Mr. Gardner, Jan. 22, 1974. Mr. Gardner stated that he joined the
suit because he was told that any dissatisfaction with the eventual NHA appraisals for
eminent domain would have to be settled in court anyway. In addition, Mr. Elbridge Wright
brought yet a third action against the university and the housing authority.
374. HUD LPA LEIrER No. 458, Increased Citizen Participationin Urban Renewal
Projects, at 1 (June 24, 1968).
375. The hesitation was ended by the arrival of Mr. Jack Herrington as the new Executive Director of the NHA. Formerly Assistant Regional Administrator for HUD in St. Louis,
Herrington welcomed citizen participation in urban renewal projects and considered a Project
Area Committee for the University Project a useful development. The approval of the University area PAC was one of his first acts upon assuming office in September 1970.
376. Johnston occupied an unusual role with the university, serving as an employee of
its medical facilities, then as an employee of one of its research institutes and finally becoming a student in its law school.
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CPPP and the UNA had begun to lose whatever immediate effectiveness they might once have had before.
Unlike the CPPP and the UNA, which had concentrated on
gathering information about the administrative and political process that had affected their lives, the PAC under Johnston emphasized overt political action. From the outset the PAC worked closely
with Councilman James Hamilton, the continuing opponent of Vanderbilt's clearance program, in an effort to induce the Metropolitan
Council to unilaterally amend the urban renewal plan it had originally approved for the area in August 1967. In pursuing its political
tasks, the PAC members had at least two advantages that the earlier citizens' interest groups did not have. In the first place the PAC
had been organized by the NHA in accordance with HUD regulations and so had an aura of official legitimacy that the CPPP or the
UNA never possessed.3 7 In the second place, the PAC came into
existence just as it became clear to the area residents that the project plan could be amended in a fundamental fashion.
This last bit of knowledge was important. The area members
had often been told that the urban renewal plan for the university
area was fixed, final and beyond change. They had been led to
believe that once Metropolitan Nashville and HUD had approved
the plan and the NHA had entered into bilateral contracts with
HUD and the sponsoring institutions, the plan could no longer be
changed. 378 As a consequence there had been little apparent reason
for the members of the CPPP or UNA to contemplate political action since their activities apparently would not result in alternations
within the university center plan. The legal and practical truth of
the matter was somewhat different. Legally, the plan could be subject to amendment by an agreement among HUD, the NHA and the
sponsoring institutions to amend the contracts that existed between
them. In addition, the approval of the Metropolitan Council was
considered necessary because the Council, although not a party to
the-contracts, had authorized their creation and was bound by
them. 37' The negotiating process whereby the plan might be
amended was cumbersome and time consuming but as a matter of
377. In addition the NHA gave the PAC office space, a budget and a coordinator, Mr.
David Morton, to serve as liaison between the NHA and the PAC.
378. They were not alone in their belief in the essentially immutable nature of the
project. Chancellor Heard of Vanderbilt later recalled that he received a similar response
when he inquired whether the university might initiate changes in the project to more adequately reflect the interests of the residents. Interview with Chancellor Alexander Heard, Feb.
22, 1974.
379. Interview with Mr. Joseph Lackey, Jr.' counsel for NHA, Jan. 24, 1974.
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legal fact, it did exist. Moreover, in the spring of 1970, immediately
before the PAC was formed, the area residents observed a practical
example of how the plan might be amended in a very basic manner.
St. Thomas Hospital announced its intention to abandon altogether
its role as a sponsoring institution of the urban renewal plan. 8 St.
Thomas would no longer participate in the project but instead
would acquire a site for its new hospital by private negotiation in
an area some miles away from the urban renewal neighborhood. The
decision by St. Thomas to terminate its contract with the NHA,
its obligations to the Metropolitan government and its commitment
to HUD constituted an amendment of the urban renewal plan of
the first order. Yet to the enlightenment of the area residents who
believed that amending the plan was virtually impossible, the Metropolitan Council, the NHA and HUD all consented to the withdrawal.3 8'
The decision by St. Thomas to abandon its role in the urban
renewal plan left Vanderbilt University as the sole institutional
sponsor of Nashville's Section 112 project. More importantly, perhaps it provided the PAC with a means to attack the official plan
for Vanderbilt's clearance area. For the next three years, using all
the local and national publicity that it could generate, the PAC
sought to induce the Metropolitan Council to amend the urban
renewal plan for the area in such a fashion as to protect what it
conceived to be the private property rights of the area residents.
During the first year of its existence in 1971, the PAC worked closely
with Councilman Hamilton and actively supported his efforts to
undercut the plan for the urban renewal area. By the end of the year
the alliance between the Councilman and the PAC had scored what
they regarded as three distinct gains. The gains came in the form
of three amendments to the plan which deleted particular tracts of
land from the project area and forestalled the implementation of a
street-closing which was required by the terms of the original plan.
The first deletion was that of a local garage outside the Vanderbilt
clearance area which was to be acquired by the NHA and demolished to make room for a parking lot for the benefit of local merchants. In January of 1971 Councilman Hamilton proposed that the
Metropolitan Council should amend the plan in order to leave the
380. St. Thomas actually announced its decision on December 31, 1969. The Metropolitan Council did not formally amend the project plan until March and April of 1970 at which
point the area residents began to realize that the plan could be altered in a significant fashion.
381. Interview with Joseph Johnston, Chairman, Project Area Committee, Feb. 22,
1974.
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garage in place. With the active lobbying of the members of the PAC
to support him, Hamilton arranged for the other Council members
to hear a moving plea by the owner of the garage in support of its
deletion from the plans for the area. The garage owner, Mike Lookofski, a Russian emigr& who had owned the building since 1926,
went directly before the Council and in broken but effective English
pleaded for the right to continue his ownership uninterrupted by
urban renewal plans. Lookofski argued that the garage served the
surrounding community just as a hospital did and that it had as
much right to remain in place.3 2 It was an effective, emotional
appeal, which the new Executive Director of the NHA, Jack Herrington, determined not to resist in an effort to maintain amicable
relations with the members of the PAC.313 With the acquiescence of
the NHA, the Council voted to delete the building from the project
acquisition area and the NHA forwarded the amendment to HUD
for its approval.
Emboldened by the successful Lookofski deletion, Councilman
Hamilton later proposed that a house and lot owned by J. Paul
Gregory should also be deleted from the plans for the area. The
Gregory property was not a part of the Vanderbilt clearance zone
but instead was part of a parcel that the NHA had contracted to
sell to Senior Citizens Incorporated for a private apartment house
for the elderly. Like the Lookofski property, however, the Gregory
house was to be levelled for an asphalt parking area. In the face of
vigorous opposition from the NHA, whose attorney had advised
them that they were legally obligated to convey the property, the
Council once again responded to Hamilton and the PAC's skillful
presentation of the case and voted to delete the parcel from the
plan. 14 This time, however, the NHA refused to acquiesce in the
Council's action and refrained from sending it to HUD. Instead the
NHA later successfully brought a lawsuit for a declaratory judgment
382.

"Having a garage for the community is just like having a second hospital for the

community. If you get sick, you go to the hospital in the community but if your car gets sick,
you need to take it to the community garage." Mike Lookofski, as quoted in the Nashville
Tennessean, Jan. 10, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
383. "While in my view I think the project would be better without it [the garage], I
feel there are bigger issues than this facing us." Id.
384. The PAC wrote letters to members of the Council, actively seeking their support
for the Gregory amendment. At the 3rd and final reading on the bill, one representative from
the PAC and one from the Senior Citizens addressed the Council for five minutes. Councilman Hamilton then followed with an hour long peroration on the project as a whole, urging
acceptance of the amendment as a means of making a bad plan marginally better. Interview
with Councilman James Hamilton, Jan. 16, 1974; interview with Joseph Johnston, Chairman,
PAC, Feb. 22, 1974; resolution No. 71-1402 of the Metropolitan Council, May 18, 1971.
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on the issue of whether
the Council could lawfully act in such a
5

unilateral fashion.3

In addition to their successful support of Councilman Hamilton's amendments to the plan, the PAC members raised their own
successful challenge to the plan in a way that directly affected the
interests of Vanderbilt University for the first time. The Vanderbilt
clearance area was divided into two sections by a remaining portion
of the old Natchez Trace Road which survived as a frequently traveled route from Vanderbilt to the suburbs adjoining and beyond the
campus area. According to the original map of the project area,
Natchez Trace was to be permanently closed to traffic to allow
Vanderbilt to unite its two clearance areas. Although there had been
no active move as yet to close the street, the vice chairman of the
PAC, Mr. Harold Steele, was determined to make an issue of the
closing. A printer and layout artist, Steele prepared a flyer which
the PAC distributed to businesses, motorists, and residents that
might be affected if the road were closed. Approximately 400 individuals attended a subsequent public meeting which the PAC organized. The plan was attacked by speakers representing local businesses, churches, and the PAC, and Councilmen Hamilton and
Sharp informed the audience that they would propose an amendment to delete the planned closing of Natchez Trace at the next
meeting of the Metropolitan Council. Having created a newsworthy
event, PAC then persuaded Nashville's educational television station to cover the ensuing Council meeting in January, 1972. For the
first time in its history, a Metropolitan Council meeting was subjected to continuous live television coverage and the Council members responded publicly as the PAC had hoped they would do. Not
only did the Council vote to delete the planned Natchez Trace closing from the plan and thereby perhaps inconvenience Vanderbilt in
the development of its clearance area,386 it also refused to reconsider
its deletion of the Gregory property as well, despite pressure from
the NHA to do so."'
The PAC's use of television to publicize the Council's actions
represented a new technique in the residents' efforts to block the
385. Nashville Housing Authority v. Romney, F. Supp. (1973).
386. Senior officials at Vanderbilt were uncertain about the merits of the plan which
called for the road to be closed and declined to attend the meeting. Interview with Vice
Chancellor George Kaludis, note 333 supra.
387. Interview with Joseph Johnston, Chairman of the PAC, Feb. 22, 1974; interview
with David Morton, PAC Coordinator, Jan. 10, 1974; Nashville Tennessean, Dec. 15, 1971,
at 1, col. 1. The decisive Council action was taken on March 7, 1972. Resolution No. 72-95 of
the Metropolitan Council, March 7, 1972.
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urban renewal plan. Throughout the course of 1971 the PAC members were sensitive to the importance of publicity to their efforts and
consciously sought to exploit it. In the spring of 1971 while on a trip
to the East Coast, the Chairman of the PAC, Joseph Johnston,
contacted the Washington Bureau of the New York Times to tell it
about what he called the Vanderbilt clearance program and to mention the lawsuit that had been recently filed by Mr. and Mrs. Adair
and by Mr. and Mrs. Gardner. The Times responded by sending a
reporter to cover the Nashville urban renewal court case in August
1971. Just before the suit began, Johnston called the Newsweek
regional office in Atlanta to tell them of the impending trial. Although Newsweek was initially reluctant to cover the story because
of its apparent lack of national interest, the fact that the New York
Times would also report the case swayed Newsweek to report it as
well.35 1 The ensuing article published by Newsweek in October of
1971 was highly critical of Vanderbilt's role in the project, accusing
the university of turning a middle class neighborhood into a slum
through its land acquisition techniques. 3 9 Despite a firm denial of
the article's allegations by Chancellor Heard of Vanderbilt and support of his position by a federal district judge,39 0 Newsweek defended
its story and its conclusions. Locally the Newsweek article was regarded by the PAC members as a public relations setback to the
university and Johnston used reproductions of the story to secure
local news coverage of what he had helped make an item of national
interest.
In the course of 1971 the working alliance between Councilman
Hamilton and the members of the PAC suffered only one setback.
In the summer of 1971 Hamilton had proposed an unusual amendment to the Charter of Metropolitan Nashville. Hamilton's charter
amendment would require a referendum on any proposed urban
renewal project in the city. The referendum would be held in each
councilmanic district affected by the plan and the plan could not
be instituted in any district that failed to accord it approval by a
majority of those voting. In effect Hamilton's proposal would ensure
388. Interview with Joseph Johnston, Chairman of the PAC, May 24, 1974.
389. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1971, at 105. Mr. Robert Gardner was pictured in front of his
home with the caition, "Not Exactly a Slum." The article criticized what it called "windshield surveys" to qualify the neighborhood for clearance and a purchasing program that it
said provided for little after-purchase maintenance and added to the deterioration of the area.

Id.
390. Chancellor Heard observed that a federal district judge had recently found the
criticisms of the university's role in the project to be without merit. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 1, 1971,

at 4.
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that the future of each urban renewal plan in Nashville would depend upon the people most directly affected by the plan. In addition, the proposed amendment sought to inhibit urban renewal projects by requiring that any urban renewal proposal that failed such
a referendum could not be reconsidered for two additional years and
that no more than two such referenda could be held every five years
in each district."' Not surprisingly the PAC vigorously supported
the Hamilton proposal and actively lobbied for it among Council
members. 31 What was surprising, however, was the Council's re-

sponse to the measure. Increasingly sensitive to the opposition to
urban renewal which had grown up in both the Edgehill and University Center projects and no doubt weary of constant debates on
urban renewal plans, the Council endorsed the proposal on June 15,
1971 by a one-sided vote of 32 to 4.393
The issue was by no means finally decided by the Counil vote,
however. Charter amendments were subject to public ratification
and the NHA launched a vigorous campaign to ensure that the bill
would be defeated at the election to be held August 26 . 31 The NHA
staff was understandably concerned that the measure would jeopardize their ability to secure future urban renewal funds since the
fate of any plan could never be entirely certain if it were ultimately
subject to residential approval.3 95 Working closely with members of

the Chamber of Commerce and other professional groups of builders
and realtors, the NHA organized and directed an intensive media
campaign of newspaper and radio advertisements against the proposal. 36 The PAC could not begin to match resources with profes-

sional commercial groups and the plan was defeated by a comfortable margin of 6,000 votes. 397 Nevertheless, although the members of
391. Nashville Banner, July 15, 1971, at 6, col. 2.
392. Interview with Joseph Johnston, Chairman of PAC, Jan. 9, 1974.
393. See note 391 supra. As one Councilman who voted against the proposal observed,
"The image of urban renewal is bad in this community. Apparently the Housing Authority
has not done its homework quite as well as a lot of us would like to see it done. Urban renewal
has become a sore subject in Nashville in the past few months." Nashville Banner, July 15,
1971, at 1, col. 1.
394. Joseph Lackey, Jr., counsel for the NHA, argued that the amendment should be
submitted to the Charter Revision Commission, a move that would have effectively killed the
proposal since there would be insufficient time between July 15 and August 26 for the Commission to give the amendment the amount of consideration technically required by law.
Nashville Tennessean, July 16, 1971, at 12, col. 1.
395. John Edmunds of HUD, however, was not prepared to say the proposal would
affect federal funding of future projects. Nashville Banner, July 15, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
396. Interview with John Acuff, then Assistant Director of Urban Renewal NHA, May
1, 1974. "We did everything we could to defeat it."
397. Nashville Tennessean, Aug. 27, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
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the PAC had been defeated in a city-wide contest, the Council's
willingness to endorse the amendment was to them a comforting
sign for the future.
VIII.

1972-1973
The PAC reached the peak of its political influence in the summer of 1973 when for a brief moment it directly and successfully
challenged Vanderbilt University's plans for the clearance area into
which it was to expand. The PAC did so by employing the same
tactics it had exercised throughout 1971 and part of 1972. Once
again Councilman Hamilton introduced a measure before the Metropolitan Council to delete parcels of land from the urban renewal
area and once again the PAC supported him with active lobbying
and an organized group of speakers to address the Council. As it had
done in the past, the Council initially voted to support the area
residents' position. On this occasion, however, Vanderbilt University and the Nashville Housing Authority joined together to mobilize their own political resources and in a considerable display of
strength not only induced the Council to reverse its position but
broke the PAC as an effective force in Council affairs.
The contest between the PAC members and the university was
precipitated by the presentation to the Council of the university's
own plan for developing the 110 acre clearance area. In order to
secure credits for the NHA from HUD for the property it had purchased immediately outside the urban renewal area, Vanderbilt had
to secure Council and HUD approval of its plan for redeveloping the
entire area." ' Although the university had to get Council approval
for any amendments it might wish to make to its plan for developing
the clearance area, in this case university officials proposed its plan
in order to secure additional benefits for the community at large as
well. In fact the university had not been altogether certain as to how
it would incorporate the urban renewal clearance area into its plans
for the future. In the fall of 1971 the Chancellor had requested that
the Council delay implementation of utility improvements in the
area until the university's newly created Office of Campus Planning
could revise the then outdated plan that had been approved by the
Council in 1967.111 Throughout 1972 therefore the Vanderbilt planTHE LAST HURRAH

398. 42 U.S.C. § 1463 (1970).
399. Although the university had begun to systematically acquire land for expansion
purposes in 1956, it did not develop its own internal system for determining how to use the
land until much later. During the late 1950's and through the mid-1960's the university had
relied upon outside planners like Clarke and Rapuano to draft plans for the use of the
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ning staff had worked closely with the NHA and the Metropolitan
Planning Commission in developing a plan that would be sufficiently definite to allow a projection of its utility needs for the future
as well as sufficiently flexible to allow the University to change its
construction plans in the face of changing circumstances."' The
resulting Vanderbilt plan for the expansion area was completed by
the end of 1972, to be introduced before the Council in the summer
of 1973.
The university's administration went to some lengths to ensure
a favorable public reaction to the new plan. In March of 1973, university officials requested the PAC to arrange a meeting at which
the plan could be explained to the area residents. The resulting
meeting drew three to four hundred participants and was so successful it provoked the comment that similarly informative presentations in the past might have avoided much of the bitterness that had
been directed towards the university."' In addition to meeting with
the area residents, the Office of Campus Planning invited all the
Councilmen to the campus to view the plan and to hear its details
explained by the planning staff. During the course of March and
April approximately one quarter of the Councilmen accepted the
invitation.12 While the Councilmen were introduced to the plan
university officials explored satisfactory means of formally introducing the plan before the Council in the most favorable manner
possible. Vanderbilt was at an initial practical disadvantage because the entire university area had been redistricted to fall within
Councilman Hamilton's councilmanic district. Under the local cusexpansion area and had presented a Clarke and Rapuano plan to the Council in 1967 for its
proposed use of the area. After the Clarke and Rapuano plan had been criticized by both
university officials and other planners during the late 1960's, the university administration
moved to establish its own Office of Campus Planning in 1971 under John Waterman, a
professional planner and architect. Waterman's first task was to use the year's grace period
provided by the Council to develop a basic plan for the expansion area that would allow the
city to implant major utilities in the area and at the same time give the university an
opportunity to develop the area in accordance with later needs. The resulting plan was
presented to the Council in 1973.
400. Interview with John Waterman, Director of the Office of Campus Planning for
Vanderbilt University, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 15, 1974. From the outset the staff
members of the planning office sought to work with local government agencies in an explicit
attempt to anticipate and prevent any problems that might be caused to the community by
the university and its expansion.
401. Most of the residents were impressed with the plan and felt that Vanderbilt might
have avoided much of the dissension and animosity directed towards the school if it had used
the same approach several years earlier to explain its plans to the community. Interview with
Joseph Johnston, Chairman of PAC, note 387 supra.
402. Id.; interview with Dr. George Kaludis, Vice Chancellor for Operations and Fiscal
Planning, Vanderbilt University, Jan. 29, 1974.
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tom of "councilmanic courtesy," Hamilton alone normally sponsored the bills that directly affected the residents in his district and
other councilmen refrained from introducing any such bills that he
opposed. Since Hamilton had fought Vanderbilt's urban renewal
expansion since 1967, it was unlikely that the university could induce him to introduce its plan for the area. Moreover, other councilmen were reluctant to invade Hamilton's district by proposing bills
for his district that he opposed because Hamilton might well return
the favor in the future. In consequence William Rutherford, Councilman at large, introduced the Vanderbilt development plan on
June 5, 1973 as an amendment to the original urban renewal plan
approved by the Council in August 1967.113 The bill passed on first
reading and a public hearing on the revised plan was scheduled for
July 3rd.4'"
While Vanderbilt was preparing for its oral presentation of the
development plan for July 3rd, Councilman Hamilton and the PAC
began to organize its last major political attack on the university
center program. Once again the PAC persuaded the local educational television station to borrow the visual equipment necessary
for a live broadcast of the Council's hearings." 5 Once again the PAC
members organized a series of speeches to be delivered by the area
residents in defense of their homes. And once again Hamilton was
prepared to introduce a bill which would further restrict the urban
renewal plan for the area. As the second reading on the Vanderbilt
development plan began, Councilman Hamilton proposed to amend
the Vanderbilt plan by deleting from its acquisition program all the
tracts of land which Vanderbilt had not yet purchased. At the time
some sixty-eight lots in the Vanderbilt clearance area were still
owned by private individuals, some of whom were either members
of PAC, the CPPP, the UNA or a combination of the three. The
Hamilton amendment would have removed these sixty-eight parcels
from the plan altogether, making it impossible for the NHA to acquire them for Vanderbilt by condemnation. Immediately after
Hamilton proposed his amendment, PAC's group of speakers began
403. Id. Councilman Rutherford served as Chairman of the Council's Planning Committee and as such normally introduced bills that would have been blocked by the practice
of councilmanic courtesy.
404. Official Minutes of the June 5,1973, Meeting of the Metropolitan County Council
of Nashville-Davidson County, at 15.
405. The PAC Chairman Joseph Johnston helped to arrange for the local educational
television station to borrow portable equipment from one of the commercial stations.
Johnston believed that if each Council hearing were publicly televised, the impact of the PAC
presentation on the Council would be notably heightened. Interview with Joseph Johnston,
Chairman of PAC, Feb. 22, 1974.
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a concerted plea for the right to continue to dwell peacefully in their
own homes. The area residents emphasized their advancing age and
the personal difficulties a forced move would cause to them and
others who were not well enough to attend the hearing. The PAC
speakers again dwelt on the unconstitutionality and the immorality
of using eminent domain to force them to convey their homes to
Vanderbilt. With Bibles and copies of the Constitution in hand, the
residents received a 194 06to 14 vote from the Council in favor of the
Hamilton amendment.
The Council's decision to omit the remaining sixty-eight parcels represented a variety of motives. Only fourteen of the members
of the Council who had approved the original plan in 1967 continued
to serve in 1973 and by that time the public attitude toward urban
renewal had begun to change. While the university center had received the most direct attention from the Council, the urban renewal projects in Edgehill and East Nashville had created local
controversy and dissension as well. Urban renewal was no longer
widely regarded as a uniformly positive program and as one Councilman observed earlier "Urban renewal has become a sore subject
4
Moreover the members of
in Nashville in the last few months.""
the hardships
Councilmen
to
the
emphasize
helped
had
the PAC
to leave their
required
were
who
individuals
imposed upon elderly
0 8 More cynically perhaps, several days before the Council
homes.
vote on the Hamilton amendment a federal district judge had ruled
that the Council's earlier action in eliminating the Gregory property
was without effect." 9 Thus it was possible to vote for the appealing
Hamilton amendment with the knowledge that the Council's action
would eventually be struck down by the courts.
Whatever the motives behind the bill, the Hamilton amendment represented a direct challenge to Vanderbilt's plans for developing the urban renewal clearance area. Immediately after the July
3rd vote, Chancellor Heard directed his planning staff to consider
whether the university's plans for the area could be modified to
accommodate the continued presence of sixty-eight parcels of pri406. Official Minutes of the July 3, 1973, Meeting of the Metropolitan County Council
of Nashville-Davidson County, at 3.
407. Nashville Banner, July 15, 1971, at 1, col. 1, quoting Councilman Tandy Wilson.
408. Councilman James Tuck credited the PAC with having largely caused the Council's change of attitude toward urban renewal in residential areas. Interview with Councilman
James Tuck, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 22, 1974.
409. See note 385 supra.
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vately owned land among the university's buildings.410 The planning
staff reported, as Hamilton and the PAC had known all along, that
the sixty-eight lots were sprinkled unevenly throughout the 110 acre
area in such a way as to make coherent development of the area
around them virtually impossible.42 " On the strength of its planners'
determination that the deletion of the sixty-eight lots would seriously impede the university's plans for expansion, representatives
of the university made a vigorous effort to have the Hamilton
amendment rescinded. Vice Chancellor George Kaludis and Mr.
Wilson Sims, a former member of the Tennessee House of Representatives and a senior partner in the distinguished law firm representing the university, began to canvass individual Council members in an effort to persuade them to vote against the Hamilton
amendment on its second reading on September 4th. Kaludis and
Sims were joined in their efforts by the former Lieutenant Governor
of Tennessee, Frank Gorrell, who was one of Sims' law partners and
who continued to exercise an active influence in Tennessee political
affairs.' 12 The three Vanderbilt representatives worked closely with
two members of the Nashville Housing Authority,1 3 the new Executive Director Jack Herrington and the NHA's counsel Joseph Lackney, Jr."4' Together the representatives from Vanderbilt and the
NHA divided the members of the Council among themselves for
individual solicitation. In the course of their individual canvassing
the five men emphasized that Vanderbilt had already spent over ten
million dollars on the urban renewal project in direct reliance upon
the Council's approval of the plan in 1967. For better or for worse it
was too late for the Council to retreat from its original commitment,
particularly since a federal court had recently ruled that the Council's earlier unilateral attempt to delete the Gregory property from
the project area was without legal effect in the absence of concurring
approval from the NHA and HUD.
The efforts of the university and of the housing authority took
early effect. Two weeks after the Council had voted to adopt the
410. Interview with Chancellor Alexander Heard, Feb. 4, 1973. Nashville Tennessean,
July 4, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
411. Interview with Chancellor Alexander Heard, Feb. 4, 1973. The reason the lots were
scattered throughout the area was because the university had not attempted to follow the
acquisition schedule originally established in 1968 in individual cases where householders

wished to stay longer in the neighborhood. Interview with Vice Chancellor George Kaludis,
note 333 supra.
412. Interview with Joseph Lackey, Jr., counsel for the NHA, Jan. 24, 1974.
413. By this time the NHA had changed its name to Metropolitan Development and
Housing Agency.
414. See note 402 supra.
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Hamilton amendment deleting the sixty-eight remaining parcels
from the clearance area, Councilman Elmer Disspayne, at the request of university and housing authority representatives, moved to
rescind the July 3rd vote.1 5 Disspayne had been one of the nineteen
councilmen who voted in favor of Hamilton's proposal and Hamilton was angered by the reversal of attitude. Hamilton attacked
Disspayne verbally, openly implying that Disspayne had been "gotten to" by Vanderbilt's representatives." 6 Disspayne's motion failed
to get the required two-thirds vote needed to rescind previous Council action, but the vote of 17-13 in favor of his motion indicated that
several councilmen who had voted for the deletion amendment on
July 3rd had begun to have second thoughts by July 17th. The tide
was beginning to turn against the PAC proposal and although the
influence of Vanderbilt's and the NHA's canvassing was apparent,
one observer indicated that Hamilton's outburst against Disspayne
was a turning point which helped cause the changed votes on July
17th and set the stage for later developments in the September and
17
November meetings which followed.1
The public hearing to consider the revised Vanderbilt campus
expansion plan, as amended by the Hamilton deletion proposal, was
held on September 4th. This time it was the university and the
NHA staff who were prepared to make a concerted presentation to
the Council. Vice Chancellor Kaludis demonstrated in some detail
why the retention of the sixty-eight parcels would render it impossible for the university to adequately develop the expansion area. The
university's counsel, Mr. Wilson Sims, urged the Council to consider the ethical and legal propriety of failing to support the university after the university had proceeded in good faith to implement
a project the Council had approved six years before. Representatives
of the NHA presented a detailed description of the liberal federal
relocation allowances that would be available to the owners of the
sixty-eight parcels in the event they were to move. In addition the
university offered its own counter amendment, an amendment that
would make some concession to the interests of the area residents
without substantially interfering with the university's own expansion plans. Under the terms of the Vanderbilt amendment the sixtyeight parcels would be acquired by the NHA for conveyance to
Vanderbilt by the end of 1975 in return for which the resident own415. Telephone interview with Councilman Elmer Disspayne, in Nashville, Tennessee,
Feb. 22, 1974.
416. Id.; see note 412 supra.
417. See note 412 supra.
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ers would be allowed to remain in their houses rent free until the
4 15 In comparison
end of 1976 or 1977, depending upon theirlocation.
to the detailed and polished expositions offered by the Vanderbilt
and NHA representatives, the PAC's familiar pleadings seemed insubstantial and unpersuasive. By a vote' of 23 to 12 the Council
voted to adopt the Vanderbilt amendment in place of that offered
by Hamilton.419
The Council vote to accept Vanderbilt's amendment signalled
the end of the PAC's immediate political influence. The Vanderbilt
amendment was subsequently passed by the Council on second
reading, November 6th, by a vote of 24 to 10, despite an attempt
by the PAC to introduce a new measure that would allow the owner
residents to remain in their houses for the remainder of their lives.2
At last on November 20th, 1973, Vanderbilt's original development
plan as amended by its own subsequent proposal was passed on
third and final reading by a vote of 26 to 10.421
The Metropolitan Council's endorsement of the Vanderbilt
plan concluded a three year period in which the residents of the
project clearance area had sought to use political action to reopen
the debate on the underlying merits of the original university center
urban renewal plan. Taking their lead from the decision by St.
Thomas Hospital to abandon its commitment to the plan, Councilman Hamilton and the members of the Project Area Committee had
exploited individual cases of hardship to induce the Metropolitan
Council to delete more and more parcels of land from the project
area. Yet when the PAC's amendments touched an area of fundamental concern to the Nashville Housing Authority or to Vanderbilt
University, the PAC was defeated on both occasions by superior
organization and resources. Although the PAC succeeded in inducing the Council to pass an amendment to the Metropolitan Charter
requiring local referenda on each new urban renewal project in
Nashville, the NHA defeated the proposal through vigorous and
concerted campaigning among the city's commercial groups. Similarly when the PAC initially won Council approval for the deletion
418. Nashville Banner, Sept. 5, 1973, at 1, col. 1. The university's counter proposal was
offered by Councilman James Tuck, one of the most respected figures on the Metropolitan
Council and one of the few members who had been on the Council in 1967, when he was a
supporter of the original plan.
419. Id.
420. The life estate proposal failed a voice vote. Telephone interview with Councilman
Charles Sieberling, the original proponent on behalf of the PAC measure, in Nashville, Tennessee, Feb. 21, 1974.
421. Official Minutes of the November 20, 1973, Meeting of the Metropolitan Council,
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of the sixty-eight remaining parcels in the Vanderbilt clearance
area, the political organization and technical skills which both Vanderbilt and the Nashville Housing Authority commanded aided in
the decisive defeat of the measure.
In the end the PAC was able to influence the Metropolitan
Council in marginal ways that did not affect the interests of the
major institutional and administrative participants in Nashville's
urban renewal process. Yet even if the area residents were unable
to reverse the Council's 1967 commitment to the university center
plan, their active opposition to Vanderbilt's expansion through an
urban renewal clearance program had a significant effect on the
attitudes of Nashville's Councilmen towards urban renewal. As
Councilman James Tuck observed in a sentiment that was widely
shared by others, Nashville's experience with the university center
project had virtually ensured that the Metropolitan Council would
not support future urban renewal programs in residential neighborhoods, particularly if the project required a clearance area. 22

IX.

THE RESIDENTS' DAY IN COURT

With their final political defeat by Vanderbilt and the NHA
before the Metropolitan Council, the area residents sought access to
the courts to assert what they felt to be their rights.
In March, 1970, Charles and June Adair had instituted suit in
federal court against the Nashville Housing Authority and Vanderbilt University, challenging the qualification of the University Center Urban Renewal Project area under the federal eligibility requirements. As owners of property located in the project area, the Adairs
had chosen not to await condemnation proceedings to litigate the
issues they had raised 23 but rather requested injunctive relief424 and
damages42 5 in the context of a private lawsuit. R. L. Gardner and
422. Interview with Councilman James R. Tuck, Jan. 22, 1974.
423. Since the suit was not brought as a class action', the final disposition of the issues
would not be conclusive on any other area residents who might wish to contest the necessity
of the taking, or the amount of compensation to be paid them, in any condemnation proceedings which might arise later.
424. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the NHA from initiating eminent domain proceedings
to acquire plaintiffs' property and to enjoin any further funding or implementation of the
University Center Urban Renewal Project; they also asked for a declaration of their rights
under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act.
425. In seeking damages for the diminution in value of their property, plaintiffs advanced two theories: first, that the mere designation of the area as an urban renewal area
effectively created a one-buyer market to Vanderbilt's advantage, and that consequently
Vanderbilt was able to obtain property in the area for less than what would have to be paid
on the open market. Secondly, plaintiffs alleged that the university, having purchased partic-
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Ruth Gardner, who owned and lived in a house in the project area,
filed a similar suit in January 1971.
Federal courts ordinarily have been reluctant to interfere in
urban renewal projects challenged by area residents," and only
occasionally has preliminary injunctive relief been granted on the
4
basis of racially discriminatory relocation plans.2
Seldom, if ever
has the federal judiciary invalidated a plan already in progress, with
funds already expended and land acquired and cleared. To halt a
major urban renewal project already well underway thus wasting
the large sums of money invested up to that point would be distasteful to most courts. 41 Furthermore, the law clearly limits the scope
of review a court may exercise over an administrative agency's determination of the eligibility of a proposed urban renewal project.
In reviewing a legislative or an administrative finding that an area
is blighted or deteriorated, a court cannot reweigh the evidence but
must confine itself to determining whether the finding was supported by substantial evidence.2 9 Thus, while a court may examine
the factual evidence which was before the legislative or administrative body when it determined the eligibility of the area in question,43 it will not invalidate that determination in the absence of a
showing of a clear and palpable abuse of authority,43 ' or arbitrary
32
and capricious action on the part of the decision-making body.1
Given these traditional judicial predispositions towards urban
renewal actions, the disposition of the university center area
ular pieces of property in the area, allowed the property to deteriorate in order to further
devalue the surrounding neighborhood. Defendants, on the other hand, contended that prop-

erty values in the area had, if anything, increased rather than decreased since the institution
of the urban renewal program, and denied any actions on Vanderbilt's part to cause the
neighborhood to deteriorate.
426. See generally McGee, Urban Renewal in the Crucible of JudicialReview, 56 VA.
L. REv. 826 (1970).
427. E.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968); see VA. L. REv. 826, 858-71 (1970).
428. 56 VA. L. REv. 826, 854-57 (1970).
429. See, e.g., Berggren v. Moore, 61 Cal. 2d 347, 392 P.2d 522 (1964); In Re Bunker
Hill Urban Renewal Project 1B, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 389 P.2d 538 (1964); Sanguinetti v. City
Council, 231 Cal. App. 2d 813, 42 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1965).
430. See, e.g., Bristol Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93
S.E.2d 288 (1956).
431. Harper v. Trenton Housing Authority, 38 Tenn. App. 396, 410, 274 S.W.2d 635,
641 (1954).
432. Starr v. Nashville Housing Authority, 145 F. Supp. 498, 503 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
It has been held that all presumptions are in favor of the determination made by the city or
housing authority and that the burden of proof to be met by the one alleging the invalidity
of the determination is not merely a preponderance of the evidence, but a more stringent
standard of "clear and convincing proof." Runnels v. Staunton Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, 207 Va. 407, 411, 149 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1966).
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residents' lawsuit was not unexpected. The Adair and Gardner cases
were consolidated and tried at the federal district court level in
August 1971. Finally, in March 1974 after the case had been dismissed4' 3 and appealed for the failure to join HUD as an indispensable party,4 34 after remand4 3 and recusation of the original trial judge,
a judgment was rendered for the defendants on all the issues and
43
the suit was dismissed. 6

The Adairs and the Gardners had presented three major contentions,4 37 all of which the district court rejected. Their primary
contention was that Section 112 of the Housing Act had been unconstitutionally applied to the project in question; secondly, they
argued that the property owners in the university area were denied
a fair and meaningful hearing as guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment; and finally, that the actions
of the NHA, the Metro Council, and HUD in declaring the area to
be a slum and blighted area suitable for urban renewal were arbi433. Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority, No. 6021 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 30, 1971).
434. Despite the fact that Judge Morton's dismissal of the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction could readily be said to render the remainder of his opinion the dicta of
its distinguished author, the defendants in their briefs on remand argued that the Sixth
Circuit's failure to disturb the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions was conclusive with respect to defendants Vanderbilt and the Nashville Housing Authority. Therefore
the opinion limited the issues to be tried on remand to the sole question of the arbitrary or
capricious nature of the project area eligibility determination made by HUD.
435. Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority, 468 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1972). The court
ruled that the case was clearly one of federal question jurisdiction: "Whatever proceedings
were undertaken by the Nashville Housing Authority depended for their vitality and financing on federal statutes 42 U.S.C.A. § 1441, et seq. [Housing Act of 1949]." Id. at 481.
436. Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority, No. 6021 (M.D. Tenn., Mar. 4, 1974).
437. In addition to these three major issues, the Adairs and Gardners argued that their
neighborhood had been qualified as a clearance area as the result of a conspiracy between
Vanderbilt and the NHA. Moreover, they maintained that the project was approved by the
NHA as the result of a conflict of interest between the NHA commissioners and the Vanderbilt Board of Trust. Many residents of the area strongly believed that a conspiracy existed
between Vanderbilt and the Housing Authority whereby the university allowed its property
in the area to deteriorate in order to cause the neighborhood to qualify as a slum. Councilman
James Hamilton testified that he attended a meeting in July 1967 with various NHA and
Vanderbilt officials at which Chancellor Heard stated that in order to assure compliance with
the required federal percentages of substandard structures in the area, Vanderbilt was deliberately permitting property it had acquired in the area to stand in deteriorating condition.
The NHA, however, offered testimony from another participant in the same meeting which
indicated Heard had not made such a statement.
The district court found no evidence supporting the conspiracy charge and noted that
Vanderbilt had consistently followed a pattern of demolishing substandard housing it had
acquired. The court further stated that Vanderbilt's plan of expansion had begun in 1956 and
would have continued regardless of the availability of Section 112; hence there was no need
for a conspiracy with NHA officials to qualify the area for urban renewal status.
Closely related to the conspiracy issue was an allegation by the property owners of the
existence of several decisive conflicts of interest. The plaintiffs claimed that the dual employ-
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trary, capricious, and in bad faith. This section will analyze the
issues from the standpoint of the parties' relative contentions as well
as the ultimate resolution by the court. Such an analysis may prove
useful in indicating the potential results, in other cities, in future
actions concerning urban renewal projects.
A.

The Constitutionalityof Section 112
Behind the Adairs' and the Gardners' decision to institute their
lawsuit lay a philosophical opposition to the use of eminent domain
by a government agency on behalf of a private institution. The
constitutional validity of the use of urban renewal condemnation by
private interest groups was, however, already well established. In
attempting to convert their philosophy into a legal theory, therefore,
the property owners sought to attack the constitutionality of Section
112 as it had been used in the University Center Urban Renewal
Project. In making such an attack the plaintiffs had to circumvent
two major cases, Berman v. Parker4 3 and Ellis v. City of Grand
Rapids.'2 In the landmark case of Berman v. Parker the Supreme
Court had held that land taken in a slum clearance project to be
redeveloped for private as opposed to public use was not in itself an
unconstitutional taking. The court found that the clearance of slum
conditions from the land was a legitimate public purpose justifying
the use of eminent domain to obtain the land for clearance. Under
its view, the subsequent redevelopment of the land was constitutionally irrelevant since the public use requirement of the fifth
amendment had already been satisfied and because it was for the
ment of Clarke and Rapuano by the NHA and Vanderbilt created the possibility for the
engineering firm to assure itself of additional work by finding that the area qualified for urban
renewal. Furthermore, they sought to prove that two NHA commissioners, Gayle Gupton and
Scott Fillebrown, had violated a state statute prohibiting housing commissioners from having
or acquiring a direct or indirect interest in a proposed project. The plaintiffs argued that
Gupton and Fillebrown, whose employers were bank officials and members of the Vanderbilt
Board of Trust, were susceptible to influence in their capacities as NHA commissioners
because of their positions in their respective banks. At trial, however, all of the individuals
involved denied that there had ever been any discussion of the project between the employers
and employees, much less any attempts to influence Gupton and Fillebrown in their NHA
duties.
The district court held that there was no evidence to support the charge either as to
Clarke and Rapuano or as to the NHA commissioners. It found no evidence that the engineering firm exhibited a bias in favor of the plans of Vanderbilt nor that the firm deliberately
carried out its inspection surveys with the purpose of achieving the requisite qualifying
percentages. As for Gupton and Fillebrown, the court stated: "There is not the slightest bit
of evidence that. . . these individuals were, in their public capacities, at any time motivated
by any purpose other than serving the interests of the community."
438. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
439. 257 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Mich. 1966).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

legislature, and not the courts, to determine when to exercise the
police and condemnation powers on behalf of the public. The specific issue of the constitutionality of Section 112 had been litigated
in Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids. In Ellis a Michigan district court
upheld the right of a private hospital to participate as a principal
redeveloper in a Section 112 urban renewal program. The court
relied heavily on Berman's characterization of the legislature's des44 and
ignation of the public interest as "well-nigh conclusive""
stated that once an urban renewal project's primary public purpose
of beautification and redevelopment had justified the use of eminent domain, the question of whether the condemned land was to
be redeveloped by public or private bodies was largely irrelevant.",
Faced with such strong precedents, the Adairs and the Gardners attempted to distinguish Berman and Ellis from their own case
on factual grounds. While noting that in Berman the percentage of
substandard buildings in the project area exceeded 80 percent, the
property owners observed that only 24 percent of the buildings in
the university clearance area were substandard under the Clarke
and Rapuano survey. They further argued that in both Berman and
Ellis the private institution or developer was merely an incidental
beneficiary of the redevelopment project at issue.4 2 Vanderbilt,
however, had participated in the origination of Section 112 and had
originated an urban renewal clearance program the primary purpose
of which was to benefit the university. The area residents contended
that Section 112 did not authorize the selection of an urban renewal
project for the principal benefit of a hospital or university to the
damage of private property owners, and thus the statute had been
unconstitutionally applied in the Nashville project. In response,
Vanderbilt and the Nashville Housing Authority argued that Vanderbilt had embarked on a land acquisition program in 1956 that it
would have pursued regardless of the enactment of Section 112.
Vanderbilt had not initiated the University Center Urban Renewal
Project but rather had been invited by the Mayor of Nashville to
participate in the project along with Peabody College and Scarritt
College. The defendants further argued, that the project from its
inception was designed to benefit not only Vanderbilt but the entire
440. Id. at 571, citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
441. Id.
442. In Ellis, for example, the redevelopment plan consisted primarily of the establishment of a major medical center south of the city's central business district, and in addition
to the land to be taken by St. Mary's Hospital, space was also to be provided for a public
plaza, professional buildings, off-street parking, and commercial use. Id. at 572.
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Nashville community by reducing traffic problems in the area and
providing improvements to roadways, utilities, and sewers in the
area at minimal cost to the city of Nashville.
Given Berman, its progeny in other courts,44 3 and Ellis, the
decision of the district court was rendered in favor of the defendants. The court observed that Vanderbilt's participation in the
project's implementation and benefits did not render the project
invalid. "4 In reaching its decision the court relied upon Berman and
Ellis,"' and held that "Section 112 . . . meets the constitutional
challenge." 4 6 In response to the Adairs' contention that Vanderbilt
had misused Section 112 for its own advantage, the court concluded
by holding that "[iut appears . . . that [this project] is of the
447
particular sort for which this statute was enacted.
B. Whether Property Owners in the Area Were Denied the Right
to a Fairand Meaningful Hearingas Guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the FourteenthAmendment
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state may deprive any person of property, "without
due process of law.""4 Due process has consistently been interpreted
by the federal courts as requiring both notice and the opportunity
for a fair and meaningful hearing before such a deprivation occurs.4 49
One of the most significant issues raised by the plaintiffs related to
the kind of hearing required by state'1 and federal" 1 statutes as a
prerequisite to the approval of an urban renewal plan.
At trial the Adairs testified that they were repeatedly denied
access to the exterior survey summary sheets on all of the buildings
rated as structurally substandard or blighting influences in the pro443. See, e.g., Rabinoffv. District Court, 145 Colo. 225, 233-34, 360 P.2d 114, 118 (1961);
Alahel Corp. v. Indianapolis Redevelopment Comm'n, 239 Ind. 35, 47-48, 154 N.E.2d 515, 522
(1958); Cannata v. City of New York, 14 App. Div. 2d 813, 221 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458 (1961).
444. Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority, No. 6021 (M.D. Tenn., Mar. 4, 1974), at
13.
445. Id. at 14.
446. Id. at 13.
447. Id.
448. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
449. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 235 (1897).
450. "[The local] governing body shall not approve a [redevelopment] plan until after
a public hearing has been held by said governing body . . . to determine the necessity for
the adoption of said plan . . " TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-815 (1973).
451. "No land for any project to be assisted under this subchapter shall be acquired by
the local public agency except after public hearing following notice of the date, time, place,
and purpose of such hearing." 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1970).
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ject area ' 2 until after final HUD approval of the project in April
1968. Moreover, the Project Area Report,"3 with its compilation of
qualification statistics, was not placed on public file until about a
week before the August 7th public hearing. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the area residents were not informed of the existence of the Urban Renewal Manual guidelines before the public
hearing. 54 Without knowledge either of the federal standards used
to judge the area or the specific deficiencies alleged to exist in their
properties, and further limited to a five-minute speaking period per
individual at the public meeting, the property owners argued that
the hearing which they were accorded on August 7th was a hearing
in form alone. Since the residents allegedly were denied a meaningful opportunity to rebut the contentions of the NHA that the area
qualified for urban renewal, they contended that they were deprived
of their property without due process of law.455
In response, the defendants emphasized that in addition to the
statutorily required public hearing on August 7th, at which the
Adairs, the Gardners, and other area residents spoke against the
project, two other public meetings were held at Eakin School. The
first took place in November 1965 at a meeting of the Eakin School
PTA and served as a general informational meeting on the proposed
project. The second occurred in July 1967, at which NHA officials
were present to explain the project and answer questions, and at
which both Mrs. Adair and Mr. Gardner were present. The defendants observed that once the five hundred page ProjectArea Report
had been placed on file at the Metropolitan Clerk's office on July
27th, the area residents had access to all its information to use in
452. June Adair testified that although she and her husband were furnished in 1968
with forms specifying the particular deficiencies which had been the basis of the individual
ratings placed on each of their own three pieces of property, it was not until 1971 that they
were able to obtain similar forms on the rest of the properties in the area. Record, vol. 1, at
7-8, Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority, No. 6021 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 30, 1971)
[hereinafter cited simply as "Record"].
453. The Project Area Report was compiled from the Clarke and Rapuano survey results; the maps of the area in the Report indicated by different shadings the ratings (e.g.,
minor repair, major repair, standard, substandard and obsolete) assigned to the structures
represented, but did not anywhere list the specific building deficiencies that formed the basis
for each rating.
454. The Adairs were given a copy of the Urban Renewal Manual when they visited
HUD's Atlanta regional office in 1969.
455. "In determining what is due process of'law, regard must be had to substance, not
form." Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897) (in a condemnation proceeding, the fact that statutory requirements of notice and a court proceeding were complied with
did not in itself rebut the railroad's contention that it was deprived of its property without
due process of law).
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preparation for the public meeting on August 7th. The defendants
treated the issue of plaintiffs' access to the individual evaluation
sheets as irrelevant," 6 arguing that the conditions of individual
pieces of property within the area had no bearing on the issue of
whether the area as a whole qualified for urban renewal. Moreover,
the defendants established that Councilman Hamilton knew of various alleged discrepancies in the eligibility documentation furnished
to the Council,457 and that Hamilton had raised the issue of the
discrepancies before the Council prior to their passage of the ordinance on the final reading.
The property owners challenge to the adequacy of their opportunity to be heard raised a perplexing problem in constitutional
law. 5 In effect the plaintiffs maintained that without adequate
prior access to the working standards used to evaluate the urban
renewal area as a whole and without prior access to the actual survey results for each building in the area, they would be unable to
obtain a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the Metropolitan Council because they could not rebut the administrative findings that formed the technical basis for the project. In their own case
the Adairs and the Gardners, among other members of the University Neighborhood Association, had made early attempts in late
1966 and early 1967 to understand the standards used to determine
the condition of their houses. Yet it was not until some months after
the August 7, 1967 hearing that the residents gained access to the
Urban Renewal Manual and its standards.459 Similarly their earlier
efforts to gain access to the actual evaluation sheets that Clarke and
Rapuano had filled out for every house in the neighborhood were not
successful until almost four years after the August 7th meeting. Nor
456. Defendant Nashville Housing Authority cited Apostle v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash.
2d 59, 442 P.2d 289 (1966) as on point, but on close examination the case appears to be
distinguishable from the instant situation. In Apostle, plaintiffs argued that each property
owner should have been informed of the defects assigned to his property, in order to prepare
adequately for the hearing before the city planning commission, but the court, relying on
Berman v. Parker, held that denial of such information did not violate due process requirements since the council was concerned with an area concept and not whether any particular
piece of property was standard or substandard. However, the Adairs were seeking access to
survey sheets not simply on their own individual pieces of property, but on all the other
property in the area as well, in order to investigate independently the issue of the eligibility
of the area as a whole. Since the eligibility of the entire area was the issue voted on by the
Metro Council and ultimately passed on by HUD, the Apostle case seems to furnish support
for plaintiffs rather than defendants in the instant situation.
457. Record, vol. 1, at 69-70.
458. Note, The FederalCourtsand UrbanRenewal, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 472, 486 (1969).
459. DEP'T OF HousING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK 7206.1, ch.
3, at I.
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could the Project Area Report, which was placed on file for public
use on July 27, 1967, take the place of either the Manual or the
individual evaluation sheets. Assuming that laymen were aware of
the FinalReport (and could assimilate its content in ten days) the
Final Report nevertheless contained only a generalized verbal description of the results that Clarke and Rapuano had obtained in the
area coupled with a series of conclusory statistical summaries. The
Report did not, however, contain a clear summary of the actual
standards which Clarke and Rapuano had applied nor any indication of its particularized results for individual structures. Thus, at
the August 7th public hearing the Adairs and the Gardners had a
five-minute opportunity to express their concern that the project
area was not qualified but, alleged the plaintiffs, they had no opportunity to challenge the project area eligibility directly. Similarly,
even if the meetings held on November 5, 1965 and July 19, 1967
had been sufficient in other respects, the plaintiffs alleged that they
still did not have access to the underlying technical information
that would have given them a full opportunity to question the project's eligibility.
The court, however, did not question the substance of either the
August 7th public hearing or the two meetings that had preceded
it. Instead the Court found that "the plaintiffs were not denied
access to the project area plans, surveys, records and ratings on the
structures involved."46 0 The court further observed that the Adairs
and Gardners had attended three different public meetings on the
urban renewal plan but did not examine the substance or timing of
the events. The court concluded that the three hearings in general
and the August 7th meeting in particular, complied with the state
and federal statutory requirements and were, therefore, by implication constitutionally adequate.
C. Whether the DeterminationsMade by the Housing Authority,
Metro Council, and HUD that the Area Constituted a Slum and
Blighted Area Were Arbitrary, Capricious, and in Bad Faithso as
to Require the Court to Overturn the Findings
The crux of the area residents' suit consisted of an attack on
the three decision-making bodies in their findings that the area
constituted a slum or blight. Under Berman v. Parker"' and subsequent urban renewal cases, taking property through eminent do460.

Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority, No. 6021 (M.D. Tenn., Mar. 4, 1974) at

461.

340 U.S. 26 (1954).
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main for urban renewal purposes is valid only if there is a clearly
supportable finding of slum and blighted conditions in the area. The
Adairs and Gardners most concerted efforts were therefore directed
at producing evidence to show that the NHA findings, the ordinance
passed by the Metropolitan Council, and the funding eligibility decision made by HUD, were all without factual basis and were thus
arbitrary and capricious in nature.
1. Actions of the Nashville Housing Authority
The NHA received the brunt of the area residents' attack, in
three specific charges made against Housing Authority officials.
First, the Adairs and Gardners contended that NHA officials had
failed to fulfill three statutory prerequisites in making the decision
concerning area eligibility; secondly, they alleged that the NHA had
failed to use any kind of objective criteria in the classification of
structures in the area as "substandard;" and finally, the property
owners attempted to show that the Project Area Report compiled by
the NHA was riddled with statistical discrepancies affecting the
percentages of "substandard" structures necessary to qualify the
area for federal funding.
(a)

Statutory Prerequisites

The first step in determining whether a particular area qualified for an urban renewal project required a finding that conditions
in the area justified labelling it as a "slum" or "blighted area." The
Adairs and Gardners argued that Section 112 required a finding of
both slum and blighted conditions in the proposed urban renewal
area, 112 and that, according to the deposition testimony of two NHA
commissioners and the Director of the NHA's Urban Renewal Division, the area was not in their opinion a "slum." The plaintiffs
argued therefore that the wording of both the Metropolitan ordinance and the NHA resolution approving the area for renewal evidenced a deliberate attempt to circumvent this statutory prerequisite through a falsification of the facts.
Secondly, the plaintiffs alleged that the NHA failed to meet the
standards under Tennessee state urban renewal law that the area
contained conditions detrimental to the safety, health, morals or
462. "In any case where an educational institution or a hospital is located in or near
an urban renewal project area and the governing body of the locality determines that, in
addition to the elimination of slums and blight from such area ....
" 42 U.S.C. § 1463(a)
(1970) (emphasis added).
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welfare of the community.4 0 The property owners introduced testimony by sociologists" 4 to support their view that the urban renewal
area was a richly heterogeneous neighborhood with a distinctively
positive influence on the Nashville community as a whole.
Returning to federal law for their third and final statutory challenge to the NHA's findings, the Adairs and Gardners argued that
the Housing Act did not authorize clearance of a proposed urban
renewal area unless it had been determined that rehabilitation of
the area was unfeasible. 65 At trial the plaintiffs introduced evidence
showing that in many instances the cost of bringing allegedly "substandard" houses into full compliance with Metropolitan building
codes was entirely reasonable."' They also sought to demonstrate
that Clarke and Rapuano did not determine the values or repair
costs of any structures in the area.467 Had the NHA investigated
rehabilitation costs, the plaintiffs argued, they would have discovered that the area was capable of being rehabilitated, and therefore
the designation of the area as a clearance area was contrary to
federal law.
The NHA countered by denying it had violated any statutory
duties. It pointed out that the Housing Act prerequisites cited by
the Adairs were obligations imposed only on the Secretary of HUD
and not on the local public agency involved in an urban renewal
project. Stressing Tennessee law as the source of power for the determinations made by the Housing Authority and Metro Council, the
NHA noted that the pertinent statute's6 6 requirements were considerably less clearly defined than requirements for federal assistance
under the Housing Act. Since the Adairs and Gardners had not
based their attack on the eligibility of the project under state law,4 '
463. TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-813 defines "blighted areas" as "areas . . . which, by
reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, . . . or any
combination of these or other factors, are detrimentalto the safety, health, morals, or welfare
of the community" (emphasis added).
464. Record, vol. 2, at 233-45 (testimony of Dr. Carroll Bourg); id. at 200-01 (testimony
of Dr. Marie H. Means).
465. "Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (A) no contract shall be
entered into for any loan or capital grant . . . for any project which provides for demolition
and removal of buildings and improvements unless the Secretary determines that the objectives of the urban renewal plan could not be achieved through rehabilitation of the project
area.
...
42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1970).
466. Record, vol. 2, at 155-57.
467. Id., vol. 5, at 526.
468. TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-813 (1973).
469. The Housing Authority thus appears to consider the challenge to the "health,
welfare and morals" finding as not constituting a sufficiently direct attack on the eligibility
of the area under state law.
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the Housing Authority argued, the project presumably encompassed
a legally constituted urban renewal area and any further attack
would have to be directed at HUD's determination that it met federal financial assistance standards.
(b)

The Use of Objective Criteria in Classifying Structures as
"Substandard"

Under HUD regulations, no area could be subjected to clearance unless a percentage of its buildings were found to be "structurally substandard warranting clearance.""4 7 The Urban Renewal
Manual defined "structurally substandard" in a general manner
and at trial the property owners sought to prove that the Clarke and
Rapuano engineers and officials involved in inspecting the proposed
project area had failed to use any objective criteria in classifying
structures in the area as "substandard." As prima facie evidence of
their point, residents noted that houses in the area that complied
with Metropolitan building codes were nevertheless classified as
substandard. In the plaintiff's opinion it was not at all clear that a
house that failed to conform to the building codes was therefore by
definition "substandard" for HUD funding purposes. Depositions
taken from an NHA commissioner and a HUD official produced
conflicting opinions on whether a house which failed to meet Metropolitan Code standards was therefore "substandard" for HUD
urban renewal purposes.17' In further support of their view that there
were no objective qualification standards, the Adairs also introduced a deposition statement by Charles Hawkins, NHA Director
of Urban Renewal, admitting that there were no absolute standards
to follow but that individual judgment played a key role in the
evaluation process.172 Further testimony elicited throughout the
course of the trial from various NHA commissioners sought to
demonstrate their own lack of personal knowledge to any of the
factors used to classify structures as "substandard," and their
unquestioning reliance on the results of the Clarke and Rapuano
survey when voting on the NHA resolution to approve the plan. The
cumulative effect of this alleged lack of objective standards and the
NHA commissioner's own ignorance of the standards used by Clarke
and Rapuano indicated to the plaintiffs that the entire qualification
process was unlawfully arbitrary.
The Housing Authority relied both upon the conclusions of its
470.
471.
472.

See note 227 supra.
Deposition of John Edmunds at 65.
Brief for Plaintiffs on Remand at 9.
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own engineers and on the propriety their reliance upon a distinguished engineering firm that was experienced in making urban
renewal surveys to satisfy HUD guidelines. The NHA's refusal to
deal directly with the "objective criteria" issue possibly indicated
their belief that no firm objective criteria in fact existed and that a
careful exercise of discretionary judgment was their primary obligation.
(c)

Discrepancies in the Project Area Report

The ProjectArea Report was prepared by the Housing Authority on the basis of the Clarke and Rapuano survey and was filed on
public record on July 27, 1967. At trial the Adairs and Gardners
alleged the existence of misleading and incorrect information in the
Report. The four major discrepancies they alluded to included:
(1) Maps in the Report showed that over fifty houses in
the project area rated as substandard were represented as standing in August 1967 when in fact they had been previously demolished.
(2) The margin of error in the random sample interior survey was twenty-eight percent rather than one to four percent as
473
indicated in the Report.
(3) Certain structures rated substandard because of building deficiencies had been cured by repair since the 1962 original
survey.
473. Celeste Albright, an area resident and a witness for the Adairs and the Gardners,
testified to the following facts, based purely on an independent compilation of statistics from
the interior and exterior summary sheets: on the basis of the exterior survey, houses in the
entire project area (not just the clearance area) were rated, in increasing order of deficiency,
standard, minor repair, major repair, or substandard. Then a random sample inspection was
made by Metro Code inspectors and Clarke and Rapuano engineers of the interiors of 10% of
the structures, excluding those which had been rated substandard.
Of the 133 houses entered in the whole project area, in approximately 39% the interior
and exterior survey ratings were the same, while in 53% the interior rating was better than
the exterior rating and in 7.5% the exterior rating was better than the interior (giving a total
of 60.5% of the structures whose interiors did not bear out their exterior ratings). In the
clearance area, of the 78 buildings entered, in approximately 36% the interior and exterior
ratings agreed, while in slightly over 56% the interior rating was better and in about 8% the
exterior rating was better (thus in about 64% of the buildings in the clearance area the interior
survey did not bear out the results of the exterior survey).
Miss Albright stated that the ratings shown on the maps were almost always the worse
of the two ratings. For example, a house with an exterior rating of minor repair and an interior
rating of major repair would be shown on the area map as major repair, whereas a structure
with an exterior rating of major repair and an interior rating of standard or minor repair would
also be shown on the map as major repair. Thus an interior rating worse than the exterior
rating would serve to downgrade the final rating the structure would receive, but a better
interior rating could never serve to upgrade the structure's final rating for purposes of final
percentage tabulations of structure ratings in the area. Record, vol. 6, at 664-79.
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(4) The Report was misleading in indicating that it summarized area eligibility conditions as of August 1967.
Numerous property owners in the area testified that the building defects listed on their individual summary sheets were incorrect;
in addition, the plaintiffs introduced evidence attempting to show
that in a few instances ratings of substandard had been assigned to
474
lots where no structure at all existed.
In response to the testimony and statistical evidence put on by
the plaintiffs, the Housing Authority asserted that the area did
qualify under the federal urban renewal criteria outlined in the
HUD regulations. Although the NHA admitted that the maps of the
area that were presented to the Council did indeed include over fifty
houses that had already been demolished, it observed that removal
of those houses from the eligibility tables did not affect the qualification of the area under federal regulations. Moreover, the NHA
pointed out that the Metropolitan Council had been made aware of
the demolitions by Councilman Hamilton immediately before the
plan was approved by the Council on third reading in 1967.175 The
NHA, however, did not challenge the mathematical discrepancies
alleged to exist in the interior survey, but did deny any attempt to
mislead the Council as to the dates of the surveys, which were
clearly indicated on the maps in the Report. In response to the
plaintiffs' evidence that many defects listed on individual evaluation sheets had either been cured before 1967 or never existed in the
first place, the NHA contended that while the buildings themselvesmight have been adequate, many of them had to be cleared to
remove "blighting influences" such as inadequate street layout, incompatible uses or land relationships, overcrowding of buildings on
land, or excessive dwelling unit density. Such blighting influences
could not be eliminated by rehabilitation, and.the property in question could not be removed from the category of houses to be cleared
simply by proving that certain defects had been cured or were inaccurately determined. The Housing Authority further stressed the
irrelevance of considering the conditions of individual pieces of
property, under the "area concept" traditionally applied in urban
renewal cases . 71 The NHA argued that the evidence as a whole
showed that the area fully qualified under the HUD standards, and
the plaintiffs' attempt to disqualify the area through their own definitions of slum and blight should not be allowed to succeed.
474.
475.
476.

Record, vol. 2, at 231, 233.
Record, vol. 5, at 489.
See Apostle v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. 2d 59, 61, 422 P.2d 289, 291 (1966).
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In the face of the different yet interrelated theories advanced
by the Adairs and Gardners to challenge the nature of the determinations made by the NHA, several things appeared clear by the end
of the trial. The property owners had sought to demonstrate that the
standards used to survey their neighborhood lacked specificity and
were not readily explicable to nonengineers who had not participated in the actual survey itself. Moreover, the plaintiffs had demonstrated, in part, the NHA Commissioners' own lack of knowledge
of the standards on which they had relied to approve the project.
The court, however, dismissed all the plaintiffs' contentions with
the observation that while the testimony of the area residents was
"competely sincere," it was "for the most part by persons without
' The court further stated that it found
engineering qualifications."4 77
the area to be a slum and blighted area within the scope of the
Tennessee statutory definition. It also found that the NHAs determination that the area was eligible for urban renewal under state
law was "in accordance with the applicable legal requirements and
47 and was therefore not
the clear preponderance of the evidence""
arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith.
2.

Passage of the August 15, 1967 Ordinance by the Metropolitan
Council

Although the Metropolitan Council was not made a defendant
to the lawsuit, the Adairs and Gardners challenged the validity of
its ordinance that declared the area a slum and blighted area and
approved the University Center Urban Renewal Project. The plaintiffs argued that the evidence produced at trial clearly showed that
the federal urban renewal criteria were so arbitrarily applied as to
invalidate any finding that the area was qualified, and that, in the
absence of any rational basis for the legislative action taken by the
Council in passing the ordinance, the court should declare the ordinance null and void. Vanderbilt, the Housing Authority, and HUD
in turn contended that the weight of evidence at trial supported the
determination of eligibility, even under the more stringent federal
guidelines. Moreover, the defendants alleged that the Council was
informed of many of the alleged discrepancies in the Final Project
Report prior to voting on the ordinance, and thus made an informed
legislative judgment about the project which should not, in the
absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, be overturned
by the court.
477.

Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority, No. 6021 (M.D. Tenn., Mar. 4, 1974)

478.

Id. at 8.

at 7.
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Although in the course of the trial some doubt was raised as to
precisely how well informed the Metropolitan Council was when its
members voted 32 to 4 to pass the ordinance authorizing the urban
renewal project, in the opinion of the court, this question was not
serious enough to affect the validity of the ordinance. Since the
court had already determined that the area constituted a slum and
blighted area within the definition of state law, the action of the
Metro Council in approving the area for an urban renewal project
was entirely lawful and would not be overturned.
3.

Determinationof Funding Eligibility by HUD
The Adairs and Gardners sought to prove that HUD officials
had approved the university center project for federal funding in an
arbitrary and capricious fashion constituting an abuse of their discretion. The plaintiffs alleged that HUD officials had either misled
or ignored the residents of the area. The 1965 letter to Mrs. Harvey
Gee from the Regional Director for Urban Renewal was introduced
as evidence that HUD had informed the area residents of only one
of two possible clearance area formulas and that the misunderstanding that resulted in consequence was prejudicial to the plaintiffs. 7 9
The limited report on the August 7, 1967 public hearing that HUD
received from the NHA was introduced as evidence of HUD's indifference to the opinions of the area residents. 8 The plaintiffs further
alleged that HUD officials had ignored evidence of a conflict of
interest in Clarke and Rapuano's dual role as a planner for Vanderbilt and as a project area surveyor for the NHA in Vanderbilt's
expansion area. Moreover, the area residents charged HUD with
failing to adequately consider the exhibits and documentation they
had submitted which directly conflicted with that submitted by the
NHA.
In response to these charges, HUD produced extensive testi479. In a letter to Mrs. Harvey Gee dated November 19, 1965, E. Bruce Wedge (Regional Director of Urban Renewal in HUD's Atlanta office at that time) stated: "Current URA
Regulations require that a minimum of 51% of the buildings in a project area proposed for
clearance and redevelopment must be structurally substandard to a degree requiring clearance as determined by specific criteria." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27) Plaintiffs also introduced
into evidence a letter dated July 7, 1969 from HUD Secretary George Romney to one of the
area residents stating the area qualified because 50.3% of the buildings were substandard (see
Deposition of John Edmunds, pp. 47-48). Both letters made no mention of the alternative
way of qualifying an area for clearance-by having over 20% of the buildings found substandard warranting clearance coupled with enough blighting influences warranting clearance to
bring the total number of buildings warranting clearance in the area to over 50%.
480. "[Clitizens were heard in favor and in opposition to. . . the bill." Deposition of
John Edmunds, at 42.
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mony to demonstrate the particular care it had exercised in evaluating the university center project precisely because of its controversial nature and because of HUD's communications with some of the
area residents.
HUD officials testified that they were aware that Clarke and
Rapuano had been employed by Vanderbilt as well as by the NHA,
but they believed the relationship did not constitute a conflict of
interest that would invalidate the accuracy of the engineering firm's
findings. The Assistant Regional Director of HUD's Atlanta Office
testified that he personally visited Nashville twice and walked
through the project area, to determine conditions for himself. 8' In
addition, he testified that both NHA and HUD officials had continued to make personal inspections of the area from time to time in
order to be certain of continued project eligibility. During the period
of time between the Metro Council's approval of the plan in August
1967 and HUD's final determination of eligibility in April 1968,
HUD once again reviewed all the materials NHA had submitted on
the project, sent a HUD attorney to Nashville to survey the area
personally once more, and studied letters, tapes, and photographs
sent them by area residents challenging the NHA findings, including a transcript of the speech made by James Hamilton before the
Metro Council challenging the eligibility of the project, alleging a
conspiracy between Vanderbilt and the Housing Authority and a
conflict of interest on the part of certain NHA commissioners. After
restudying all the documentation submitted, after considering the
results of HUD officials' own visits to Nashville, and after giving
careful consideration to the area residents' charges, HUD had made
an independent determination that the area qualified for assistance. " 2 HUD officials thus contended that the degree of care taken
in reaching their determination, combined with the reliability of the
data submitted by the NHA, negated any possible inference of arbitrary or capricious action by the federal agency.
The apparent care that the Atlanta HUD officials had taken in
making their decision was a decisive factor in the court's decision.
In ruling that HUD's determination that the area was eligible for
urban renewal was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the trial judge
was impressed by HUD's independent determination that the area
qualified, on the basis of personal investigations of the area. Moreover, the court complimented HUD on the "courteous and
competent" manner in which its officials replied to inquiries from
481.
482.

Record, vol. 3, at 284.
Id. at 308-09.
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property owners in the area. As for the presence of the requisite
guideline percentages of "substandard" structures in the area, the
court stated that the clear proponderance of the evidence indicated
these percentages did exist and that the area therefore qualified
under federal as well as state law. In so holding, the court disposed
of the area residents' final attempt to prove that the three decisionmaking bodies involved in the university area project had failed to
48 3
act in a careful and objective manner.
X.

CONCLUSION

By the spring of 1974 the few remaining residents of the Vanderbilt university clearance area had absorbed two successive major
reverses in their efforts to halt implementation of Nashville's Section 112 project. In the fall of 1973 the members of the Project Area
Committee had lost their political struggle to have their homes
deleted from Vanderbilt's acquisition program in the clearance area.
In the early spring of 1974 the Adairs and the Gardners had lost their
lawsuit against the university, and although its outcome was not
binding upon other residents who might seek judicial relief in the
future, the implications of the result were clear enough. Yet despite
their reverses and despite the fact there were now no more than
twenty property owners still within the clearance area, the members
of the PAC continued to carry on their struggle. Some individuals
began to lay plans for their own suits against the university. The
PAC as a whole on the other hand requested the NHA to prepare a
federal environmental impact statement for the entire urban renewal project area, a request that may have originated in the PAC's
concern for the university neighborhood's environment but which
also could not help but add perceptibly to the NHA staff's immediate workload. In short, despite the reverses that stretched back over
the previous eight years, a significant portion of the original opponents of the Vanderbilt clearance program continued their plans to
make acquisition of their homes as expensive as possible in time,
trouble and perhaps even money.
The intractability of the handful of remaining residents had its
origins in many sources. As a matter of personal convenience it was
no doubt easier for the older members of the group to wait until 1975
before having to make a move to new quarters. More importantly,
perhaps, many of the remaining residents continued to feel a genu483.

Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority, No. 6021 (M.D. Tenn., Mar. 4, 1974) at
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ine sense of concern that their homes could be forcibly taken from
them to serve the expansion plans of a private institution. Despite
judicial proceedings which sanctioned the use of eminent domain on
behalf of private institutions a number of the residents continued
to feel that condemnation of their land for such a purpose was
immoral if not in fact unconstitutional. Most importantly of all,
however, many of the remaining residents continued to feel a personal sense of bitterness that they had had such little opportunity
to influence a project that directly affected their homes and their
lives.
If nothing else, the experience of the residents of the university
center urban renewal clearance area had suggested that in at least
one city, those who were affected most seemed to have counted least
in the community's decision to use eminent domain. Despite the
PTA meeting in November 1965, the public meeting of July 19th
and the public hearing on August 7th, 1967, the residents of the
clearance area had been unintentionally but nevertheless effectively
excluded from Nashville's political decision making process by their
own ignorance of the federal urban renewal program, the unresponsiveness of urban renewal officials to their inquiries and their own
initial lack of political skills. In contrast to the staff of the NHA with
its monopoly of technical skills and the administration of Vanderbilt University with its capacity to determine the future of the plan,
the area residents had neither the knowledge nor the power to command events. Although as a whole they seemed to be persons with
more than average education, the residents who attempted to learn
about the standards and procedures which governed the urban renewal process were unable to acquire the information they needed
until after the final political and administrative decisions to implement the plan had been made. While the sponsoring institutions
could affect the final decision to implement the plan, during the
seven years from August 1961 to August 1967 the area residents
could only wait for the decisions of others to affect their future.
When at last in August 1967 the residents were given their legal
opportunity to speak to the merits of the clearance plan for their
neighborhood, they were allotted five minutes each to attempt to
reverse a plan that had gained virtually irreversible momentum
from seven years of planning, an imminent federal deadline and an
almost irresistable financial incentive to Nashville's government
that Vanderbilt itself originally helped provide. As the events of
succeeding years were to demonstrate, the area residents could be-
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come an influential political force in their own right given the proper
organization and the time necessary to acquire political skills. Yet
by the time the residents had become politically adept the public
decision about their property had long since been made and they
could only embark on a series of bitter, time consuming skirmishes
that resulted in few important victories and a number of ultimately
pointless meetings of the Metropolitan Council.
Despite the fact that the area residents had no meaningful
practical opportunity to affect the public decision about their neighborhood, the process by which they were to be deprived of their
property was entirely constitutional. The very legality of the process
by which they were to lose their land provided its own reflection on
the judicial protection afforded to private property. The original
federal guidelines which had first established the characteristics of
an urban renewal clearance area were never the subject of public
debate or dispute, although they were the ultimate determinate of
whether a deprivation of property would occur under the federal
urban renewal program. Likewise, the local application of the federal standards was never open to public discussion, although they
exercised a similar practical function and in part, at least seemed
open to some legitimate questioning. In addition, while some of the
persons most directly affected by the clearance program had attempted to learn in advance the nature of the criteria that had been
used to judge their homes, they were effectively but not deliberately
prevented from learning the relevant technical standards until after
the decision had been taken to clear their houses. When, at last, the
residents sought judicial review of the political and administrative
decisions that had ensured the deprivation of their property, precisely because those decisions were political and administrative in
nature, the reviewing court was bound by precedent to apply the
narrowest scope of judicial review. In effect the deprivation of the
area residents' property was based on a series of ex parte regulations, applied in an ex parte manner and effectively insulated from
judicial review by the political and administrative decisions to
which they gave rise.
Although the administration of Vanderbilt University was subjected to local criticism for the means by which it fulfilled its part
in the University Center Urban Renewal Project, in the end, the
university's policies had little to do with the enmity it encountered
from the residents of its clearance area. At various times university
officials were advised that the project would have gained greater
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acceptance had the university developed its own direct communications with the area residents rather than relying on that of the
housing authority.4 Alternatively some residents observed that the
university would have encountered less resistance had it been capable of demonstrating a coherent plan for redeveloping the clearance
area.485 Yet it seems apparent that neither of these nor any other
palliatives would have worked a change in the attitude of the residents who opposed the university's urban renewal expansion plans.
Once the university resolved to proceed with the University Center
Urban Renewal Plan it almost inevitably imposed upon itself and
its community the social cost of the struggle of a group of people
whose attachment to the institution of private property mirrored the
rhetoric but not the reality of American property law. The cost of
that struggle was almost certainly raised by the bitterness those
people continued to feel from their initial exclusion from the political decisions that affected their lives and homes. And despite the
years of past and present American legal tradition that justify the
practices, it is a cost which every community might practically
consider in resolving to use its own power of eminent domain on
behalf of private interest groups. In Nashville, Tennessee, at Vanderbilt University, with over a year to run before the remaining
thirty homes must be acquired or condemned, that cost has not yet
been fully paid.
Charles Fels, Special Projects Editor
N.T. Adams
Richard Carmody
Margaret Elizabeth Clark
Randolph H. Lanier
James Carlos Smith
Robert M. White
484. The University Next Door, published by the Vanderbilt Inter-Faith Association
circa 1969.
485. See note 188 supra.
Note on Sources
The present case study was based in part upon interviews with representatives of the
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency (formerly the Nashville Housing Authority),
Vanderbilt University, residents of the clearance area and several of the Nashville Councilmen who participated in the political decisions of 1961, 1967 and 1973. The authors were given
access to the files of the old Nashville Housing Authority, the Project Area Committee, the
trial transcripts of the Adair-Gardner suit and the trial exhibits. Acting upon the advice of
its attorney, the administration of Vanderbilt University did not allow the authors access to
university files but the individual members of the administration were generous in sharing
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their own personal recollections of the events.
From the outset the authors offered to circulate the manuscript of the present study for
critical comments and suggestions before publication. In every case there has been a conscious effort to incorporate the numerous useful comments which were received during the
period from May 23rd to May 28.
The authors wish to express their appreciation to the numerous persons who were generous with their time and knowledge. The resulting study and its conclusions are the exclusive
work of the authors. Any errors that may appear in the text are also exclusively theirs.

